10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sutter v. Hutchingsgreen2 sentences2005Sutter v. Hutchings, supra at 198 (1), 327 S.E.2d 716 . 2005Sutter v. Hutchings, supra at 198 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessnergreen2 sentences1992Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 GA. 199, 201 ( 296 SE2d 693 ) (1982). [2] When applied to private entities that exist to provide private medical treatment or fine dining or vacation accommodations, the rationale behind the rule is apparent. 1992Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 201 ( 296 SE2d 693 ) (1982). 2 When applied to private entities that exist to provide private medical treatment or fine dining or vacation accommodations, the rationale behind the rule is apparent. | 1 | 1 |
City Council v. Mackeygreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., City Council of Augusta v. Mackey, 113 GA. 64, 69 ( 38 SE 339 ) (1901) (city liable for negligent act "in the same manner and to the same extent that a private person would be.") It would seem that the general principle of tort law applicable here is the long established rule that private entities owe no duty to members of the general public to control the behavior of third parties or protect those endangered by the criminal conduct of third parties. 1992See, e.g., City Council of Augusta v. Mackey, 113 Ga. 64, 69 ( 38 SE 339 ) (1901) (city liable for negligent act “in the same manner and to the same extent that a private person would be.”) It would seem that the general principle of tort law applicable here is the long established rule that private entities owe no duty to members of the general public to control the behavior of third parties or protect those endangered by the criminal conduct of third parties. | 1 | 1 |
Crisp v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1985In Crisp v. Wright, 56 Ga. App. 338, 341 ( 192 SE 390 ) (1937), the court held: “Where a person, with knowledge that another person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor and not in a condition safely to operate an automobile, entrusts the automobile to such person to be operated along the public street, he is liable in damages for that person’s negligent operation of the automobile, due to his drunkenness.” Id. at 341 . 1985In Crisp v. Wright, 56 Ga. App. 338, 341 ( 192 SE 390 ) (1937), the court held: “Where a person, with knowledge that another person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor and not in a condition safely to operate an automobile, entrusts the automobile to such person to be operated along the public street, he is liable in damages for that person’s negligent operation of the automobile, due to his drunkenness.” Id. at 341 . | 1 | 1 |
Dunlap v. Citizens & Southern DeKalb Bankgreen2 sentences1981The individual defendants next insist that they were discharged from their liability under the guaranty agreement because the holder of the note (now assigned to the plaintiff) had increased the risk that the principal debtor (the defendant corporation) would default on the underlying obligation, citing Dunlap v. C. & S. DeKalb Bank, 134 Ga. App. 893, 895 (1) (2) (3) ( 216 SE2d 651 ); and Palmes v. Southern Mechanical Co., 117 Ga. App. 672, 673 ( 161 SE2d 413 ), with reference to the defense of increase of risks as a long established defense in both surety and guaranty loans. 1981The individual defendants next insist that they were discharged from their liability under the guaranty agreement because the holder of the note (now assigned to the plaintiff) had increased the risk that the principal debtor (the defendant corporation) would default on the underlying obligation, citing Dunlap v. C. & S. DeKalb Bank, 134 Ga. App. 893, 895 (1) (2) (3) ( 216 SE2d 651 ); and Palmes v. Southern Mechanical Co., 117 Ga. App. 672, 673 ( 161 SE2d 413 ), with reference to the defense of increase of risks as a long established defense in both surety and guaranty loans. | 1 | 1 |
Palmes v. Southern Mechanical Companygreen2 sentences1981The individual defendants next insist that they were discharged from their liability under the guaranty agreement because the holder of the note (now assigned to the plaintiff) had increased the risk that the principal debtor (the defendant corporation) would default on the underlying obligation, citing Dunlap v. C. & S. DeKalb Bank, 134 Ga. App. 893, 895 (1) (2) (3) ( 216 SE2d 651 ); and Palmes v. Southern Mechanical Co., 117 Ga. App. 672, 673 ( 161 SE2d 413 ), with reference to the defense of increase of risks as a long established defense in both surety and guaranty loans. 1981The individual defendants next insist that they were discharged from their liability under the guaranty agreement because the holder of the note (now assigned to the plaintiff) had increased the risk that the principal debtor (the defendant corporation) would default on the underlying obligation, citing Dunlap v. C. & S. DeKalb Bank, 134 Ga. App. 893, 895 (1) (2) (3) ( 216 SE2d 651 ); and Palmes v. Southern Mechanical Co., 117 Ga. App. 672, 673 ( 161 SE2d 413 ), with reference to the defense of increase of risks as a long established defense in both surety and guaranty loans. | 1 | 1 |
Doyal & Associates, Inc. v. Blairgreen2 sentences1980“It is a long established rule of evidence that the judgment or decree is the highest and best evidence of its contents and that the contents cannot be proved by parol. [Cits.] ” Young v. Foster, 148 Ga. App. 737, 738 ( 252 SE2d 680 ) (1979); see also Doyal & Associates v. Blair, 138 Ga. App. 314, 315 ( 226 SE2d 109 ) (1976). 1980“It is a long established rule of evidence that the judgment or decree is the highest and best evidence of its contents and that the contents cannot be proved by parol. [Cits.] ” Young v. Foster, 148 Ga. App. 737, 738 ( 252 SE2d 680 ) (1979); see also Doyal & Associates v. Blair, 138 Ga. App. 314, 315 ( 226 SE2d 109 ) (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Fostergreen2 sentences1980“It is a long established rule of evidence that the judgment or decree is the highest and best evidence of its contents and that the contents cannot be proved by parol. [Cits.] ” Young v. Foster, 148 Ga. App. 737, 738 ( 252 SE2d 680 ) (1979); see also Doyal & Associates v. Blair, 138 Ga. App. 314, 315 ( 226 SE2d 109 ) (1976). 1980“It is a long established rule of evidence that the judgment or decree is the highest and best evidence of its contents and that the contents cannot be proved by parol. [Cits.] ” Young v. Foster, 148 Ga. App. 737, 738 ( 252 SE2d 680 ) (1979); see also Doyal & Associates v. Blair, 138 Ga. App. 314, 315 ( 226 SE2d 109 ) (1976). | 1 | 1 |
James v. Kerbygreen1 sentence1979See James v. Kerby, 29 Ga. 684 (1860); Cody v. First Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Sparks Improvement Co. v. Jonesgreen1 sentence1977See Sparks Improvement Co. v. Jones, 4 Ga. App. 61 ( 60 SE 910 ) (1908); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 198 Ga. 536 ( 32 SE2d 177 ) (1944). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grannemann v. Salley
green
1 sentence1993Even the plaintiff’s own testimony on cross-examination may not be used “to nullify the long established rule of practice shown above that negligence cases arising from automobile collisions are tried only on the negligence or non-negligence of the *323 operators at the time and place involved in the controversy.” Grannemann v. Salley, 95 Ga. App. at 779 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Crane v. Crane
green
2 sentences1986Thomas v. State, 248 Ga. 247 (10) ( 282 SE2d 316 ) (1981); Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634 (6) ( 242 SE2d 55 ) (1978); Fann v. State, 195 Ga. 176 (2) ( 23 SE2d 399 ) (1942). 1986Thomas v. State, 248 Ga. 247 (10) ( 282 SE2d 316 ) (1981); Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634 (6) ( 242 SE2d 55 ) (1978); Fann v. State, 195 Ga. 176 (2) ( 23 SE2d 399 ) (1942). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Thomas v. State
green
2 sentences1986Thomas v. State, 248 Ga. 247 (10) ( 282 SE2d 316 ) (1981); Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634 (6) ( 242 SE2d 55 ) (1978); Fann v. State, 195 Ga. 176 (2) ( 23 SE2d 399 ) (1942). 1986Thomas v. State, 248 Ga. 247 (10) ( 282 SE2d 316 ) (1981); Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634 (6) ( 242 SE2d 55 ) (1978); Fann v. State, 195 Ga. 176 (2) ( 23 SE2d 399 ) (1942). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fann v. State
neutral
2 sentences1986Thomas v. State, 248 Ga. 247 (10) ( 282 SE2d 316 ) (1981); Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634 (6) ( 242 SE2d 55 ) (1978); Fann v. State, 195 Ga. 176 (2) ( 23 SE2d 399 ) (1942). 1986Thomas v. State, 248 Ga. 247 (10) ( 282 SE2d 316 ) (1981); Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634 (6) ( 242 SE2d 55 ) (1978); Fann v. State, 195 Ga. 176 (2) ( 23 SE2d 399 ) (1942). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Dickey v. State
green
2 sentences1986Thomas v. State, 248 Ga. 247 (10) ( 282 SE2d 316 ) (1981); Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634 (6) ( 242 SE2d 55 ) (1978); Fann v. State, 195 Ga. 176 (2) ( 23 SE2d 399 ) (1942). 1986Thomas v. State, 248 Ga. 247 (10) ( 282 SE2d 316 ) (1981); Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634 (6) ( 242 SE2d 55 ) (1978); Fann v. State, 195 Ga. 176 (2) ( 23 SE2d 399 ) (1942). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Crenshaw v. Crenshaw
neutral
2 sentences1977See Sparks Improvement Co. v. Jones, 4 Ga. App. 61 ( 60 SE 910 ) (1908); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 198 Ga. 536 ( 32 SE2d 177 ) (1944). 1977See Sparks Improvement Co. v. Jones, 4 Ga. App. 61 ( 60 SE 910 ) (1908); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 198 Ga. 536 ( 32 SE2d 177 ) (1944). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Cox v. Norris
green
2 sentences1957Cox v. Norris, 70 Ga. App. 580 ( 28 S. E. 2d 888 ); Code § 38-202.” Although the defendant was entitled to present proper evidence to impeach the testimony of the plaintiff, to allow the defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff, over proper objection, about his reputation and then to permit the defendant to introduce evidence, over proper objection, to impeach such irrelevant and immaterial testimony would be to nullify the long established rule of practice shown above that negligence cases arising from automobile collisions are tried only on the negligence or non-negligence of the operators a 1957Cox v. Norris, 70 Ga. App. 580 ( 28 S. E. 2d 888 ); Code § 38-202.” Although the defendant was entitled to present proper evidence to impeach the testimony of the plaintiff, to allow the defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff, over proper objection, about his reputation and then to permit the defendant to introduce evidence, over proper objection, to impeach such irrelevant and immaterial testimony would be to nullify the long established rule of practice shown above that negligence cases arising from automobile collisions are tried only on the negligence or non-negligence of the operators a | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.