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23 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1952–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Klubergreen2 sentences2020The long- established standard to determine a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case was articulated in State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967): [T]he question the trial judge must determine is whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 458-59 (citing State v. Fiorello, 36 N.J. 80 2020The long- established standard to determine a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case was articulated in State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967): [T]he question the trial judge must determine is whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 458-59 (citing State v. Fiorello, 36 N.J. 80 | 3 | 3 |
State v. Papasavvasgreen2 sentences2020The long- established standard to determine a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case was articulated in State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967): [T]he question the trial judge must determine is whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 458-59 (citing State v. Fiorello, 36 N.J. 80 2020The long- established standard to determine a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case was articulated in State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967): [T]he question the trial judge must determine is whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 458-59 (citing State v. Fiorello, 36 N.J. 80 | 3 | 3 |
City of Jersey City v. Farmergreen2 sentences2024Super. at 429-30 (quoting City of Jersey City v. Farmer, 329 N.J. 2021The legislative decision to authorize a different kind of tax levy to fund schools may rationally vary depending on district wealth, and it was not irrational for the Legislature to decide that a municipality with a greater median income should be limited in the permissible uses of any payroll tax imposed. [O]ur Supreme Court has emphasized "the long established principle of deference to the will of the lawmakers whenever reasonable men might differ as to whether the means devised to meet the public need conform to the Constitution . . . [and] the equally- settled doctrine that the means are p | 2 | 2 |
The Passaic Daily News v. Blairgreen2 sentences1981Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J. 474, 484 [ 308 A. 2d 649 ] (1973). 1981Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J. 474, 484 [ 308 A. 2d 649 ] (1973). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Fiorellogreen2 sentences2020The long- established standard to determine a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case was articulated in State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967): [T]he question the trial judge must determine is whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 458-59 (citing State v. Fiorello, 36 N.J. 80 2020The long- established standard to determine a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case was articulated in State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967): [T]he question the trial judge must determine is whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 458-59 (citing State v. Fiorello, 36 N.J. 80 | 1 | 3 |
Roe v. Kervickgreen2 sentences2000Although we recognize that reasonable persons might differ on the constitutionality of the grandfather provision that effectively excludes Jersey City and includes only Newark, our Supreme Court has emphasized "the long established principle of deference to the will of the lawmakers whenever reasonable men might differ as to whether the means devised to meet the public need conform to the Constitution .... [and] the equally-settled doctrine that the means are presumptively valid, and that reasonably conflicting doubts should be resolved in favor of validity." Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 229 , 2000Although we recognize that reasonable persons might differ on the constitutionality of the grandfather provision that effectively excludes Jersey City and includes only Newark, our Supreme Court has emphasized "the long established principle of deference to the will of the lawmakers whenever reasonable men might differ as to whether the means devised to meet the public need conform to the Constitution .... [and] the equally-settled doctrine that the means are presumptively valid, and that reasonably conflicting doubts should be resolved in favor of validity." Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 229 , | 1 | 2 |
Grabow v. Gelbergreen1 sentence2024Law Inst. 1981) which provided "[t]he evidentiary element can be satisfied by painstaking examination of the evidence and realistic appraisal of the probabilities on the part of the trier of fact; this is commonly summarized in a standard that calls upon the trier of the facts to be satisfi ed by 'clear and convincing evidence.'" Moreover, we cited to Cauco v. Galante, where the Court recognized, "the long established principle that in order to sustain part performance of a parol contract conveying an interest in real estate sufficiently to take the contract out of the [SOF,] the parol agreeme | 1 | 1 |
Cauco v. Galantegreen1 sentence2024Law Inst. 1981) which provided "[t]he evidentiary element can be satisfied by painstaking examination of the evidence and realistic appraisal of the probabilities on the part of the trier of fact; this is commonly summarized in a standard that calls upon the trier of the facts to be satisfi ed by 'clear and convincing evidence.'" Moreover, we cited to Cauco v. Galante, where the Court recognized, "the long established principle that in order to sustain part performance of a parol contract conveying an interest in real estate sufficiently to take the contract out of the [SOF,] the parol agreeme | 1 | 1 |
Cohen v. Hurleyred2 sentences1962See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117 , 81 S. Ct. 954 , 6 L. 1962See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117 , 81 S. Ct. 954 , 6 L. | 1 | 1 |
Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmarygreen1 sentence1962See Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 46 (1958), overruling the long established doctrine of charitable immunity. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Reyes
green
2 sentences2020The long- established standard to determine a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case was articulated in State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967): [T]he question the trial judge must determine is whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 458-59 (citing State v. Fiorello, 36 N.J. 80 2020The long- established standard to determine a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case was articulated in State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967): [T]he question the trial judge must determine is whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 458-59 (citing State v. Fiorello, 36 N.J. 80 | 3 | 2019–2020 |
Griffin v. California
green
2 sentences1975Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 , 85 S. Ct. 1229 , 14 L. 1975Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 , 85 S. Ct. 1229 , 14 L. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Viviano v. CBS, INC.
green
2 sentences1998Such result runs counter to the long established principle that, “[jjustice impels strongly towards affording the plaintiffs their day in court on the merits of their claim.” Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 549 , 503 A.2d 296 (1986). 1998Such result runs counter to the long established principle that, “[jjustice impels strongly towards affording the plaintiffs their day in court on the merits of their claim.” Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 549 , 503 A.2d 296 (1986). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Calabro v. Campbell Soup Co.
green
1 sentence1993Cf. Calabro v. Campbell Soup Co., 244 N.J. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Skulski v. Nolan
green
2 sentences1990Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 521 , 432 A. 2d 80 (1981); Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179, 202 , 343 A. 2d 721 (1975). 1990Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 521 , 432 A. 2d 80 (1981); Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179, 202 , 343 A. 2d 721 (1975). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Stamato v. Agamie
green
2 sentences1990The long established rule is that the party who "seeks performance of a contract for the conveyance of land must show himself ready, desirous, prompt and eager to perform the contract on his part." Stamato v. Agamie, 24 N.J. 309, 316 , 131 A. 2d 745 (1957). 1990The long established rule is that the party who "seeks performance of a contract for the conveyance of land must show himself ready, desirous, prompt and eager to perform the contract on his part." Stamato v. Agamie, 24 N.J. 309, 316 , 131 A. 2d 745 (1957). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Gibbons v. Gibbons
green
2 sentences1990Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 521 , 432 A. 2d 80 (1981); Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179, 202 , 343 A. 2d 721 (1975). 1990Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 521 , 432 A. 2d 80 (1981); Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179, 202 , 343 A. 2d 721 (1975). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Valentin
green
2 sentences1987This haste may have been due partly to the arrival of the British fleet off Sandy Hook. [Proceedings of the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844, pp. x and xiii (footnote omitted).] The opinion in Valentin notes that the prosecutor's failure to offer evidence as to the circumstances of the search was in reliance "on the long established rule in New Jersey" that evidence was admissible irrespective of the legality of the search. 36 N.J. at 43 . 1987This haste may have been due partly to the arrival of the British fleet off Sandy Hook. [Proceedings of the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844, pp. x and xiii (footnote omitted).] [29] The opinion in Valentin notes that the prosecutor's failure to offer evidence as to the circumstances of the search was in reliance "on the long established rule in New Jersey" that evidence was admissible irrespective of the legality of the search. 36 N.J. at 43 . [30] Justice Garibaldi's dissenting opinion cites a number of post- Mapp cases, post at 184-85, for the proposition that "New Jersey | 1 | 1987–1987 |
First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone
green
1 sentence1986Although First Southern Properties had neither actual nor constructive notice of the receiver's appointment, the Texas Supreme Court "decline[d] to change or depart from the long established rule of property law which has been continuously applied to lands in custodia legis without reliance upon actual or constructive notice." 533 S.W. 2d at 342 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. McElroy
green
1 sentence1975Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); State v. McElroy, 96 N.J. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Malloy v. Hogan
green
2 sentences1975Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); State v. McElroy, 96 N.J. 1975Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); State v. McElroy, 96 N.J. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Barrows v. Jackson
green
2 sentences1971In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 , 73 S.Ct. 1031 , 97 L.Ed. 1586 , this Court developed various reasons for this rule. 1971In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 , 73 S.Ct. 1031 , 97 L.Ed. 1586 , this Court developed various reasons for this rule. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Goodwin
green
1 sentence1962As stated in American Alliance Insurance Company v. Mitchell, 299 S.W. 2 d 536, 539 ( Mo. Ct. App. Missouri 1957), "This seems to be in accord with the long established principle announced by the Supreme Court of the United States. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co.
green
2 sentences1959These considerations make it evident that the present case is different from the Connolly Case. * * *" ( 212 U.S., at page 261 , 29 S.Ct. at page 291 ; italics the court's) The fact that defendant received a windfall was held not material it is the public welfare that is uppermost and following the long established rule the court refused to give its aid in any measure whatsoever to a party seeking to realize the fruits of an agreement tainted with illegality. 1959These considerations make it evident that the present case is different from the Connolly Case. * * *" ( 212 U.S., at page 261 , 29 S.Ct. at page 291 ; italics the court's) The fact that defendant received a windfall was held not material it is the public welfare that is uppermost and following the long established rule the court refused to give its aid in any measure whatsoever to a party seeking to realize the fruits of an agreement tainted with illegality. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Funk v. United States
green
2 sentences1952But when the rule is one of common law established by the courts the remedy lies with either the Legislature or the courts, and inaction by one does not preclude action by the other. *151 Even so conservative a jurist as the late Mr. Justice Sutherland, in the case of Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 , 78 L.Ed. 369 (1933), refused to apply a long established rule rendering a wife incompetent to testify in her husband's behalf in a criminal proceeding, saying: "The public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another. * * * It may be said that th 1952But when the rule is one of common law established by the courts the remedy lies with either the Legislature or the courts, and inaction by one does not preclude action by the other. *151 Even so conservative a jurist as the late Mr. Justice Sutherland, in the case of Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 , 78 L.Ed. 369 (1933), refused to apply a long established rule rendering a wife incompetent to testify in her husband's behalf in a criminal proceeding, saying: "The public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another. * * * It may be said that th | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.