long established rule in Pennsylvania

1957In Engemann v. Colonial Trust Co., 378 Pa. 92 , 105 A. 2d 347 , this Court thus summarized the pertinent legal principles (pages 95-97): “In Corn v. Wilson, 365 Pa. 355 , 75 A. 2d 530 , this Court said (pp. 358, 359) : ‘There is a long established presumption that a mortgage, a's well as all evidentes of debt excepted out of the Statute of Limitations, unclaimed and unrecognized for 20 years, has been paid: [citing cases].

1957In Engemann v. Colonial Trust Co., 378 Pa. 92 , 105 A. 2d 347 , this Court thus summarized the pertinent legal principles (pages 95-97): “In Corn v. Wilson, 365 Pa. 355 , 75 A. 2d 530 , this Court said (pp. 358, 359) : ‘There is a long established presumption that a mortgage, a's well as all evidentes of debt excepted out of the Statute of Limitations, unclaimed and unrecognized for 20 years, has been paid: [citing cases].

1974“It has been held that a designated relative, under section 3 of the Act of June 1, 1915, supra, is liable to the Commonwealth for past support of an insane inmate in a state hospital (Harnish’s Estate, 268 Pa. 128 (1920)), and some courts have held that this liability could be enforced by an order obtained under section 4 of the act.

1950It has been held that a designated relative, under section 3 of the Act of June 1, 1915, supra, is liable to the Commonwealth for past support of an insane inmate in a State hospital (Harnish’s Estate, 268 Pa. 128 (1920)), and some courts have held that this liability could be enforced by an order obtained under section 4 of the act.

1966Prior to the passage of the Act of 1953, it was a long established rule that no commissions on principal were payable until the termination of the trust: Snyder Estate, 346 Pa. 615 (1943); Bosler’s Estate, 161 Pa. 457 (1894).

1950I. 292, affirmed 9 Atl. 65 (1887) ; Bosler’s Estate, 161 Pa. 457 (1894); Snyder Estate, 346 Pa. 615 (1943) : See also Kennedy Trust, 364 Pa. 310 .

1966Prior to the passage of the Act of 1953, it was a long established rule that no commissions on principal were payable until the termination of the trust: Snyder Estate, 346 Pa. 615 (1943); Bosler’s Estate, 161 Pa. 457 (1894).

1950I. 292, affirmed 9 Atl. 65 (1887) ; Bosler’s Estate, 161 Pa. 457 (1894); Snyder Estate, 346 Pa. 615 (1943) : See also Kennedy Trust, 364 Pa. 310 .

1958Thus, the Board’s contention comes face to face at the outset with the familiar and long established rule of statutory construction that when, in a later legislative enactment, the same language is used as in a prior cognate statute, which has been construed by us, the presumption is that the language thus repeated is to be interpreted in the same way it previously had been when we passed upon the earlier enactment: Buhl’s Estate, 300 Pa. 29, 32 , 150 A. 86 .

1958Thus, the Board’s contention comes face to face at the outset with the familiar and long established rule of statutory construction that when, in a later legislative enactment, the same language is used as in a prior cognate statute, which has been construed by us, the presumption is that the language thus repeated is to be interpreted in the same way it previously had been when we passed upon the earlier enactment: Buhl’s Estate, 300 Pa. 29, 32 , 150 A. 86 .

1943Statutes should be so interpreted that they will accord as nearly as possible with the common law theretofore existing: Bridgeford v. Groh et ux., 306 Pa. 566 .

1943Statutes should be so interpreted that they will accord as nearly as possible with theretofore existing common law: Bridgeford v. Groh et ux., 306 Pa. 566 ; Vale Pa. D., 317, sec. 222.

1943In Lit Brothers v. Dixon et ux., 20 D. & C. 98, Hause, P. J., held: “The Act of June 20, 1883, P. L. 136, regulating the computation of time under statutes, applies only where the statute specifies a period of time within which some action must be taken ...” In Gordon, etc., v. Home Indemnity Co., 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 241 , the court said (p. 245) : “Our act of June 20,1883, P. L. 136, regulating the computation of time under statutes, rules, orders and decrees of court, and under the charters and by-laws of corporations, does not apply here; but, as stated in Gregg’s Estate, supra, the act is

1943In Lit Brothers v. Dixon et ux., 20 D. & C. 98, Hause, P. J., held (syllabus) : “The Act of June 20,1883, P. L. 136, regulating the computation of time under statutes, applies only where the statute specifies a period of time within which some action must be taken. . . .” In Gordon, Secretary of Banking, v. Home Indemnity Co., 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 241 , the court said (p. 245) : “Our Act of June 20, 1883, P. L. 136, regulating the computation of time under statutes, rules, orders and decrees of court, and under the charters and bylaws of corporations, does not apply here; but, as stated in Gre

2017Id. at 289 (citing Board of Supervisors of Northampton Township v. Gentsch, 414 A.2d 1102, 1105 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980)) (emphasis added).

2015In Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312 (Pa. Super. 1993), this Court summarized the principles relevant to an “Alford plea.” It is a long established principle of constitutional due process that the decision to plead guilty must be personally and voluntarily made by the accused. * * * In order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty plea colloquy must affirmatively show that the defendant understood what the plea connoted and its 12 As noted above, we withdrew this decision after granting reconsideration. - 10 - J-S67018-14 consequences.

2001Our supreme court, relying on the long established rule set out in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), held that the appellant was entitled to know about the deal and the Commonwealth’s failure to reveal its communications with the witness constituted a due process violation. ¶ 28 Like Johnson, Strong does not represent a change in controlling law, only a reaffirmation of existing law.

2001Our supreme court, relying on the long established rule set out in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), held that the appellant was entitled to know about the deal and the Commonwealth’s failure to reveal its communications with the witness constituted a due process violation. ¶ 28 Like Johnson, Strong does not represent a change in controlling law, only a reaffirmation of existing law.

1994See e.g., Commonwealth v. Perlman, 392 Pa.Super. 1 , 572 A.2d 2 (1990); Commonwealth v. Petras, 368 Pa.Super. 372 , 534 A.2d 483 (1987).

1994See e.g., Commonwealth v. Perlman, 392 Pa.Super. 1 , 572 A.2d 2 (1990); Commonwealth v. Petras, 368 Pa.Super. 372 , 534 A.2d 483 (1987).

1991Carney v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 428 Pa. 489 , 240 A.2d 71 (1968).

1991Carney v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 428 Pa. 489 , 240 A.2d 71 (1968).

1991Viewing the evidence from this long established standard of review, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carroll, 510 Pa. 299 , 507 A.2d 819 (1986), we conclude that there is no merit to appellant’s insufficiency of the evidence arguments as to these bribery convictions.

1991Viewing the evidence from this long established standard of review, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carroll, 510 Pa. 299 , 507 A.2d 819 (1986), we conclude that there is no merit to appellant’s insufficiency of the evidence arguments as to these bribery convictions.

1986By its Opinion, the trial court mistakenly relied upon Toth v. Philadelphia, 213 Pa.Super. 282 , 247 A.2d 629 (1968), as being dispositive of Pennsylvania law concerning the potential liability of a landlord out of possession to third parties injured on the leased premises: “A long established exception ... has been that if the defect existed at the time the lease was executed, the landlord remains responsible to the injured third party.” Toth at 213 Pa.Superior Ct. 287, 247 A.2d 631 .

1986By its Opinion, the trial court mistakenly relied upon Toth v. Philadelphia, 213 Pa.Super. 282 , 247 A.2d 629 (1968), as being dispositive of Pennsylvania law concerning the potential liability of a landlord out of possession to third parties injured on the leased premises: “A long established exception ... has been that if the defect existed at the time the lease was executed, the landlord remains responsible to the injured third party.” Toth at 213 Pa.Superior Ct. 287, 247 A.2d 631 .