10 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1848–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Perkins v. Philbrickgreen2 sentences2015It has been "a long established principle in Maine and many other jurisdictions that 'an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client's claim.'" Perkins v. Philbrick, 443 A.2d 73, 74 (Me. 1982), quoting PomerrYJ v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401,407 , 76 A. 898 (1910). 1990In Perkins v. Philbrick, 443 A.2d 73 (Me.1982), we stated, “we find a long established principle in Maine and many other *1085 jurisdictions that ‘an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client’s claim.’ ” Id. at 74 (quoting Pomeroy v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401, 407 , 76 A. 898 (1910)). | 1 | 2 |
Lane v. Maine Central Railroadgreen1 sentence2015See also Lane v. Maine Central Railroad, supra, 572 A.2d at 1084-85 (settlement negotiated by attorney not binding on client who did not actually agree to it). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Langleygreen1 sentence1987The Maine Criminal Code has codified the long established rule that proof of exclusive possession of property recently taken in a theft, robbery or burglary permits the fact-finder to draw an inference that the exclusive possessor of that property committed the theft, robbery or burglary. 17-A M.R. 5.A. § 361(2) (1983). 6 State v. Durgan, 467 A.2d 165, 167 (Me.1983); State v. Langley, 242 A.2d 688, 689 (Me.1968). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Durgangreen1 sentence1987The Maine Criminal Code has codified the long established rule that proof of exclusive possession of property recently taken in a theft, robbery or burglary permits the fact-finder to draw an inference that the exclusive possessor of that property committed the theft, robbery or burglary. 17-A M.R. 5.A. § 361(2) (1983). 6 State v. Durgan, 467 A.2d 165, 167 (Me.1983); State v. Langley, 242 A.2d 688, 689 (Me.1968). | 1 | 1 |
Raymond N. Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corporationgreen1 sentence1982Dealing with the issue as thus framed, we find a long established principle in Maine and many other jurisdictions that “an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client’s claim.” Pomeroy v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401 , 76 A. 898 (1910); see also, e.g., Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1974); Senyshyn v. Karlak, 450 Pa. 535 , 299 A.2d 294 (1973); Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal.2d 272 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 544 , 449 P.2d 760 (1969); Palm Beach Royal Hotel, Inc. v. Bree | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pomeroy v. Prescott
green
2 sentences2015It has been "a long established principle in Maine and many other jurisdictions that 'an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client's claim.'" Perkins v. Philbrick, 443 A.2d 73, 74 (Me. 1982), quoting PomerrYJ v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401,407 , 76 A. 898 (1910). 2015It has been "a long established principle in Maine and many other jurisdictions that 'an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client's claim.'" Perkins v. Philbrick, 443 A.2d 73, 74 (Me. 1982), quoting PomerrYJ v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401,407 , 76 A. 898 (1910). | 3 | 1982–2015 |
Palm Beach Royal Hotel, Inc. v. Breese
green
1 sentence1982Dealing with the issue as thus framed, we find a long established principle in Maine and many other jurisdictions that “an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client’s claim.” Pomeroy v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401 , 76 A. 898 (1910); see also, e.g., Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1974); Senyshyn v. Karlak, 450 Pa. 535 , 299 A.2d 294 (1973); Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal.2d 272 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 544 , 449 P.2d 760 (1969); Palm Beach Royal Hotel, Inc. v. Bree | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Archbishop v. KARLAK
green
2 sentences1982Dealing with the issue as thus framed, we find a long established principle in Maine and many other jurisdictions that “an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client’s claim.” Pomeroy v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401 , 76 A. 898 (1910); see also, e.g., Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1974); Senyshyn v. Karlak, 450 Pa. 535 , 299 A.2d 294 (1973); Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal.2d 272 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 544 , 449 P.2d 760 (1969); Palm Beach Royal Hotel, Inc. v. Bree 1982Dealing with the issue as thus framed, we find a long established principle in Maine and many other jurisdictions that “an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client’s claim.” Pomeroy v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401 , 76 A. 898 (1910); see also, e.g., Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1974); Senyshyn v. Karlak, 450 Pa. 535 , 299 A.2d 294 (1973); Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal.2d 272 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 544 , 449 P.2d 760 (1969); Palm Beach Royal Hotel, Inc. v. Bree | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Linsk v. Linsk
green
2 sentences1982Dealing with the issue as thus framed, we find a long established principle in Maine and many other jurisdictions that “an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client’s claim.” Pomeroy v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401 , 76 A. 898 (1910); see also, e.g., Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1974); Senyshyn v. Karlak, 450 Pa. 535 , 299 A.2d 294 (1973); Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal.2d 272 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 544 , 449 P.2d 760 (1969); Palm Beach Royal Hotel, Inc. v. Bree 1982Dealing with the issue as thus framed, we find a long established principle in Maine and many other jurisdictions that “an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or release and discharge his client’s claim.” Pomeroy v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401 , 76 A. 898 (1910); see also, e.g., Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1974); Senyshyn v. Karlak, 450 Pa. 535 , 299 A.2d 294 (1973); Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal.2d 272 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 544 , 449 P.2d 760 (1969); Palm Beach Royal Hotel, Inc. v. Bree | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Reville v. Reville
green
1 sentence1975Reville v. Reville, Me., 289 A.2d 695 (1972); Younie v. State, Me., 281 A.2d 446 (1971) ; Frost v. Lucey, Me., 231 A.2d 441 (1967). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Frost v. Lucey
green
1 sentence1975Reville v. Reville, Me., 289 A.2d 695 (1972); Younie v. State, Me., 281 A.2d 446 (1971) ; Frost v. Lucey, Me., 231 A.2d 441 (1967). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Adams v. Alley
green
1 sentence1975In this respect, Adams v. Alley, supra, represents another concrete application of the long established principle that appellate cognizance is denied as to issues sought to be raised without compliance with governing rules calculated to promote sound appellate practice. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Younie v. State
green
1 sentence1975Reville v. Reville, Me., 289 A.2d 695 (1972); Younie v. State, Me., 281 A.2d 446 (1971) ; Frost v. Lucey, Me., 231 A.2d 441 (1967). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Inhabitants of Milo v. Milo Water Co.
green
2 sentences1971“To prevent forfeitures, strict constructions are not unreasonable.” Milo v. Water Co., 131 Me. 372 , *600 163 A. 163 . 1971“To prevent forfeitures, strict constructions are not unreasonable.” Milo v. Water Co., 131 Me. 372 , *600 163 A. 163 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
State v. Sanborn
green
2 sentences1970But, as stated in State v. Sanborn, 1921, 120 Me. 170 , 113 A. 54 , “this rule never contemplated that the truth should be shut out and justice perverted. 1970But, as stated in State v. Sanborn, 1921, 120 Me. 170 , 113 A. 54 , “this rule never contemplated that the truth should be shut out and justice perverted. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Hawkins v. Portland Gas Light Co.
green
1 sentence1947This was reaffirmed a little more than two years ago in Hawkins v. Portland Gas Light Co. et al., 141 Me. 288 ; 43 A. (2nd) 718: “The ruling * .is firmly established * * * since the earliest construction of the statute * * * that the burden rests upon the claimant to prove the facts necessary to establish the right to compensation.” In a reply brief counsel for the petitioner stresses the point that his opponent cites no evidence on which the decision could have been based. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Jaffe v. . Harteau
green
1 sentence1898In Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398 , a boiler defective in construction exploded. | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Mapes v. Weeks
neutral
1 sentence1848In the case of Mapes v. Weeks, 4 Wend. 659 , it was decided in accordance with the long established doctrine, that a defendant, who had not named the author at the time, could not be permitted to prove that another person told him the story. | 1 | 1848–1848 |
Inman v. Foster
neutral
1 sentence1848In the case of Inman v. Foster, 8 Wend. 602 , the rule by implication was admitted. | 1 | 1848–1848 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.