integrity bar in Texas

1994When the client’s right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility clash, “[T]he preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is *789 paramount ...” and “[The client’s recognizably important right to counsel of his choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of the judicial process.” Zardenetta, 661 S.W.2d at 248 , quoting, Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2nd Cir.1975).

1990When the client's right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility clash, "[T]he preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount ..." and "[The client's recognizably important right to counsel of his choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of the judicial process." Zardenetta, 661 S.W.2d at 248 , quoting, Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975).

2004Wilson, 938 S.W.2d at 59-60 ; 12 Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 159 (Tex. Crim.

2004Wilson , 938 S.W.2d at 59-60 ; Hughes v. State , 878 S.W.2d 142, 159 (Tex. Crim.

2005In the present case, appellant relies on such cases as Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (prosecutor stated “We are not paid to satisfy Pat Abeyta, or anyone else that he drags down here from Lubbock to manufacture evidence.”), Bell v. State, 614 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (prosecutor stated that counsel’s duty was to “see that his client gets off even if it means putting on witnesses who are lying.”), and Jones v. State, 151 Tex.Crim. 115 , 205 S.W.2d 590, 592 (1947) (prosecutor stated “My dear fellow, you needn’t have worried one minute because Dusty Miller wil

1992Bell v. State, 614 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (prosecutor argued that defense lawyer’s “duty is to see that his client gets off even if it means putting on witnesses who are lying”; held jury instruction insufficient; error to deny mistrial); See Summers v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 519, 521 , 182 S.W.2d 720, 722 (1944) (“striking at appellant over the shoulders of his counsel” was held to be a denial of fair trial).

2005In the present case, appellant relies on such cases as Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (prosecutor stated “We are not paid to satisfy Pat Abeyta, or anyone else that he drags down here from Lubbock to manufacture evidence.”), Bell v. State, 614 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (prosecutor stated that counsel’s duty was to “see that his client gets off even if it means putting on witnesses who are lying.”), and Jones v. State, 151 Tex.Crim. 115 , 205 S.W.2d 590, 592 (1947) (prosecutor stated “My dear fellow, you needn’t have worried one minute because Dusty Miller wil

2000See Wilson v. State, 938 S.W.2d 57, 58-59 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

2004Wilson, 938 S.W.2d at 59-60 ; 12 Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 159 (Tex. Crim.

2004Wilson , 938 S.W.2d at 59-60 ; Hughes v. State , 878 S.W.2d 142, 159 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Summers v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 519, 521 , 182 S.W.2d 720, 721-22 (1944).

2003See Summers v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 519, 521 , 182 S.W.2d 720, 721-22 (1944).

2002We agree that the appearance of a testifying advocate tends to cast doubt on the ethics and propriety of our judicial system. “[T]he preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount ...” Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515, 523 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).

1996The court of appeals held: “[T]he preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount ...” and “[The client’s recognizably important right to counsel of his choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of the judicial process.” 791 S.W.2d at 523 (quoting United Pac.

2025See Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 468 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Morford v. Esposito Sec., LLC, No. 05-14-01223- CV, 2015 WL 5472640 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 18, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding jurisdiction over portion of order denying motion to compel arbitration but not over that portion granting the motion to compel arbitration); see also –10– Halliburton Co. v. KBR, Inc., 446 S.W.3d 551 , 558–59 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“Based on the trial court’s characterization of Halliburton’s application as one to compel arbitration, its express denial of the application, and the resulting denial of Halliburton’s asserted contra

2005In the present case, appellant relies on such cases as Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (prosecutor stated “We are not paid to satisfy Pat Abeyta, or anyone else that he drags down here from Lubbock to manufacture evidence.”), Bell v. State, 614 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (prosecutor stated that counsel’s duty was to “see that his client gets off even if it means putting on witnesses who are lying.”), and Jones v. State, 151 Tex.Crim. 115 , 205 S.W.2d 590, 592 (1947) (prosecutor stated “My dear fellow, you needn’t have worried one minute because Dusty Miller wil

2005In the present case, appellant relies on such cases as Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (prosecutor stated “We are not paid to satisfy Pat Abeyta, or anyone else that he drags down here from Lubbock to manufacture evidence.”), Bell v. State, 614 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (prosecutor stated that counsel’s duty was to “see that his client gets off even if it means putting on witnesses who are lying.”), and Jones v. State, 151 Tex.Crim. 115 , 205 S.W.2d 590, 592 (1947) (prosecutor stated “My dear fellow, you needn’t have worried one minute because Dusty Miller wil

1998The test for determining whether jury argument constitutes reversible error is set forth in Cantu v. State , 939 S.W.2d 627, 633 (Tex. Crim.

1998The test for determining whether jury argument constitutes reversible error is set forth in Cantu v. State , 939 S.W.2d 627, 633 (Tex. Crim.

1994There exists a broader concern for public confidence in the administration of justice — “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F.Supp. 350 at 357 n. 3 (N.D.Ill.1984). [[Image here]] “The practice of attorneys furnishing from their own lips and on their own oaths the controlling testimony for their client is one not to be condoned by judicial silence * * * nothing short of actual corruption can more surely discredit the profession.” Ferraro v. Taylor, 197 Minn. 5 , 265 N.W. 829, 833 (1936).

1994There exists a broader concern for public confidence in the administration of justice — “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F.Supp. 350 at 357 n. 3 (N.D.Ill.1984). [[Image here]] “The practice of attorneys furnishing from their own lips and on their own oaths the controlling testimony for their client is one not to be condoned by judicial silence * * * nothing short of actual corruption can more surely discredit the profession.” Ferraro v. Taylor, 197 Minn. 5 , 265 N.W. 829, 833 (1936).

1989See McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.Cr.App.1989).

1988See Lopez, 500 S.W.2d at 846 .

1983When the client’s right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility clash “[T]he preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount ...” and “[The client’s recognizably important right to counsel of his choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of the judicial process.” Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir.1975); see also Comden v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal.3d 906 , 576 P.2d 971 , 145 Cal.Rp

1983When the client’s right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility clash “[T]he preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount ...” and “[The client’s recognizably important right to counsel of his choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of the judicial process.” Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir.1975); see also Comden v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal.3d 906 , 576 P.2d 971 , 145 Cal.Rp

1983When the client’s right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility clash “[T]he preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount ...” and “[The client’s recognizably important right to counsel of his choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of the judicial process.” Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir.1975); see also Comden v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal.3d 906 , 576 P.2d 971 , 145 Cal.Rp

1983When the client’s right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility clash “[T]he preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount ...” and “[The client’s recognizably important right to counsel of his choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of the judicial process.” Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir.1975); see also Comden v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal.3d 906 , 576 P.2d 971 , 145 Cal.Rp

1983When the client’s right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility clash “[T]he preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount ...” and “[The client’s recognizably important right to counsel of his choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of the judicial process.” Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir.1975); see also Comden v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal.3d 906 , 576 P.2d 971 , 145 Cal.Rp