integrity bar in New Jersey

2022The Court noted that “the pressures on the attorney that forced him to steal, and the very real possibility of reformation” are deeply troubling in ordering disbarment, but it found those factors to be outweighed by the “most compelling reasons” -- “the continued confidence of the public in the integrity of the bar and the judiciary.” Id. at 460 .

2017Despite the potential for personal reformation and the severity of the discipline in such cases, we concluded that no result other than disbarment would satisfy the need for “continued confidence of the public in the integrity of the bar and the judiciary.” Ibid.

1995In re Kinnear, supra, 105 N.J. at 397 , 522 A.2d 414 ; In re Kaufman, 104 N.J. 509, 513 , 518 A.2d 185 (1986); In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 400 , 502 A.2d 32 (1986).

1995In re Kinnear, supra, 105 N.J. at 397 , 522 A.2d 414 ; In re Kaufman, 104 N.J. 509, 513 , 518 A.2d 185 (1986); In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 400 , 502 A.2d 32 (1986).

1995In re Kinnear, supra, 105 N.J. at 397 , 522 A.2d 414 ; In re Kaufman, 104 N.J. 509, 513 , 518 A.2d 185 (1986); In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 400 , 502 A.2d 32 (1986).

1995In re Kinnear, supra, 105 N.J. at 397 , 522 A.2d 414 ; In re Kaufman, 104 N.J. 509, 513 , 518 A.2d 185 (1986); In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 400 , 502 A.2d 32 (1986).

2026However, the Dewey Court acknowledged that it could not "conceive of any situation in which the side-switching attorney or his new firm would be permitted to continue representation if, . . . the attorney had in fact actually represented the former client." 109 N.J. at 220 ; see also U.S. v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1202-04 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming disqualification of law firm when lawyer violated New Jersey rule by switching sides); IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 , 283 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming disqualification for law firm that represented both sides of litigation "as a vindication of the integri

2026However, the Dewey Court acknowledged that it could not "conceive of any situation in which the side-switching attorney or his new firm would be permitted to continue representation if, . . . the attorney had in fact actually represented the former client." 109 N.J. at 220; see also U.S. v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1202-04 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming disqualification of law firm when lawyer violated New Jersey rule by switching sides); IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming disqualification for law firm that represented both sides of litigation "as a vindication of the integrity

2026However, the Dewey Court acknowledged that it could not "conceive of any situation in which the side-switching attorney or his new firm would be permitted to continue representation if, . . . the attorney had in fact actually represented the former client." 109 N.J. at 220 ; see also U.S. v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1202-04 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming disqualification of law firm when lawyer violated New Jersey rule by switching sides); IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 , 283 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming disqualification for law firm that represented both sides of litigation "as a vindication of the integri

2026However, the Dewey Court acknowledged that it could not "conceive of any situation in which the side-switching attorney or his new firm would be permitted to continue representation if, . . . the attorney had in fact actually represented the former client." 109 N.J. at 220; see also U.S. v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1202-04 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming disqualification of law firm when lawyer violated New Jersey rule by switching sides); IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming disqualification for law firm that represented both sides of litigation "as a vindication of the integrity

1998As far as we are concerned, the only reason that disbarment might be necessary is that any other result risks something even more important, the continued confidence of the public in the integrity of the bar and the judiciary. [ Id. at 460 , 409 A. 2d 1153 (footnotes omitted).] *161 See also In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32, 36-37 , 446 A. 2d 1208 (1982) ("[E]ven if it is unlikely that the attorney will repeat the misconduct, certain acts by attorneys so impugn the integrity of the legal system that disbarment is the only appropriate means to restore public confidence in it.").

1998As far as we are concerned, the only reason that disbarment might be necessary is that any other result risks something even more important, the continued confidence of the public in the integrity of the bar and the judiciary. [ Id. at 460 , 409 A. 2d 1153 (footnotes omitted).] *161 See also In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32, 36-37 , 446 A. 2d 1208 (1982) ("[E]ven if it is unlikely that the attorney will repeat the misconduct, certain acts by attorneys so impugn the integrity of the legal system that disbarment is the only appropriate means to restore public confidence in it.").

2017See Unemployed-Employed Council v. Horn, 85 N.J. 646 (1981).

1986See Unemployed-Employed Council v. Horn, 85 N.J. 646 (1981).

1998Finding that the “Respondent’s conduct demonstrated] his lack of fitness to be a lawyer and his unsuitability to be entrusted with the privileges and duties of the legal profession,” we held that “[d]isbarment, the strongest sanction available, must be imposed in order to preserve the integrity of the bar.” Ibid.

1995As we have stated, such conspiracies pose a “direct threat to society,” mandating disbarment “to preserve the integrity of the bar.” In re Goldberg, supra, 105 N.J. at 283, 520 A.2d 1147 .

1995In re Kinnear, supra, 105 N.J. at 397 , 522 A.2d 414 ; In re Kaufman, 104 N.J. 509, 513 , 518 A.2d 185 (1986); In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 400 , 502 A.2d 32 (1986).

1995In re Kinnear, supra, 105 N.J. at 397 , 522 A.2d 414 ; In re Kaufman, 104 N.J. 509, 513 , 518 A.2d 185 (1986); In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 400 , 502 A.2d 32 (1986).

2026However, the Dewey Court acknowledged that it could not "conceive of any situation in which the side-switching attorney or his new firm would be permitted to continue representation if, . . . the attorney had in fact actually represented the former client." 109 N.J. at 220 ; see also U.S. v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1202-04 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming disqualification of law firm when lawyer violated New Jersey rule by switching sides); IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 , 283 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming disqualification for law firm that represented both sides of litigation "as a vindication of the integri

2026However, the Dewey Court acknowledged that it could not "conceive of any situation in which the side-switching attorney or his new firm would be permitted to continue representation if, . . . the attorney had in fact actually represented the former client." 109 N.J. at 220; see also U.S. v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1202-04 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming disqualification of law firm when lawyer violated New Jersey rule by switching sides); IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978) (affirming disqualification for law firm that represented both sides of litigation "as a vindication of the integrity

2007The Court emphasized that it had "long held that judicial intervention in the course of a court proceeding is permissible where such intervention is necessary to preserve the integrity of that hearing." Ibid.; see also State v. Poinsett, 206 N.J.Super. 307 , 313 n. 1, 502 A. 2d 578 (Law Div.1984).

2007The Court emphasized that it had "long held that judicial intervention in the course of a court proceeding is permissible where such intervention is necessary to preserve the integrity of that hearing." Ibid.; see also State v. Poinsett, 206 N.J.Super. 307 , 313 n. 1, 502 A. 2d 578 (Law Div.1984).

1991Bruno v. Rushen, supra, 721 F. 2d at 1195 (prosecutor's "insidious" attacks on defendant's exercise of his right to counsel and on the integrity of defense counsel were errors of constitutional dimension); State v. McDonald, 620 F. 2d 559, 564 (5th Cir.1980) ("It is impermissible to attempt to prove a defendant's guilt by pointing ominously to the fact that he has sought the assistance of counsel"); United States ex rel.

1991Bruno v. Rushen, supra, 721 F.2d at 1195 (prosecutor’s “insidious” attacks on defendant’s exercise of his right to counsel and on the integrity of defense counsel were errors of constitutional dimension); State v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559, 564 (5th Cir.1980) (“It is impermissible to attempt to prove a defendant’s guilt by pointing ominously to the fact that he has sought the assistance of counsel”); United States ex rel.

1991Bruno v. Rushen, supra, 721 F. 2d at 1195 (prosecutor's "insidious" attacks on defendant's exercise of his right to counsel and on the integrity of defense counsel were errors of constitutional dimension); State v. McDonald, 620 F. 2d 559, 564 (5th Cir.1980) ("It is impermissible to attempt to prove a defendant's guilt by pointing ominously to the fact that he has sought the assistance of counsel"); United States ex rel.

1991Bruno v. Rushen, supra, 721 F.2d at 1195 (prosecutor’s “insidious” attacks on defendant’s exercise of his right to counsel and on the integrity of defense counsel were errors of constitutional dimension); State v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559, 564 (5th Cir.1980) (“It is impermissible to attempt to prove a defendant’s guilt by pointing ominously to the fact that he has sought the assistance of counsel”); United States ex rel.

1991Macon v. Yeager, 476 F. 2d 613 (3d Cir.1973) (prosecutor's comment penalized defendant exercising his right to counsel and was thus constitutional error), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 , 94 S.Ct. 154 , 38 L.Ed. 2d 104 (1974); see United States v. Daoud, 741 F. 2d 478, 481 (1st Cir.1984) (trial court's refusal of defendant's request for curative instruction, where prosecutor twice "needlessly" elicited testimony that defendant had requested counsel after issuance of Miranda warnings, was error).

1991Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613 (3d Cir.1973) (prosecutor’s comment penalized defendant exercising his right to counsel and was thus constitutional error), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 , 94 S.Ct. 154 , 38 L.Ed.2d 104 (1974); see United States v. Daoud, 741 F.2d 478, 481 (1st Cir.1984) (trial court’s refusal of defendant’s request for curative instruction, where prosecutor twice “needlessly” elicited testimony that defendant had requested counsel after issuance of Miranda warnings, was error).

1988E.g., In re Stier, 108 N.J. 455, 460 (1987); Matter of Noonan, supra, 102 N.J. at 165; In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 400 (1986); In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 456 (1979).

1986As far as we are concerned, the only reason that disbarment might be necessary is that any other result risks something even more important, the continued confidence of the public in the integrity of the bar and the judiciary. [Id. at 460 (footnote omitted).] See also In re Marks, 96 N.J. 30, 36 (1984) (severe financial pressure rejected as a mitigating factor).

1986As far as we are concerned, the only reason that disbarment might be necessary is that any other result risks something even more important, the continued confidence of the public in the integrity of the bar and the judiciary. [ 81 N.J. at 460 (footnotes omitted).] We have only recently restated our resolve to stand behind the Wilson principle, pointing out that since Wilson , disbarment for knowing misappropriation has been “invariable.” In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157, 160 (1986); see In re Lennan, 102 N.J. 518, 525 (1986).

1986As far as we are concerned, the only reason that disbarment might be necessary is that any other result risks something even more important, the continued confidence of the public in the integrity of the bar and the judiciary. [ 81 N.J. at 460 (footnotes omitted).] We have only recently restated our resolve to stand behind the Wilson principle, pointing out that since Wilson , disbarment for knowing misappropriation has been "invariable." In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157, 160 (1986); see In re Lennan, 102 N.J. 518, 525 (1986).

1986As far as we are concerned, the only reason that disbarment might be necessary is that any other result risks something even more important, the continued confidence of the public in the integrity of the bar and the judiciary. [ 81 N.J. at 460 (footnotes omitted).] We have only recently restated our resolve to stand behind the Wilson principle, pointing out that since Wilson , disbarment for knowing misappropriation has been “invariable.” In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157, 160 (1986); see In re Lennan, 102 N.J. 518, 525 (1986).

1986As far as we are concerned, the only reason that disbarment might be necessary is that any other result risks something even more important, the continued confidence of the public in the integrity of the bar and the judiciary. [ 81 N.J. at 460 (footnotes omitted).] We have only recently restated our resolve to stand behind the Wilson principle, pointing out that since Wilson , disbarment for knowing misappropriation has been "invariable." In re Noonan, 102 N.J. 157, 160 (1986); see In re Lennan, 102 N.J. 518, 525 (1986).