Reed claim in Texas

2025“If there is an express conveyance of a specific substance,” as is the case here, “we are not bound to follow the Acker and Reed presumption.” Id.

1992Id. at 189.

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). .

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2024See Martin- de-Nicolas v. Jones, No. 03-13-00318-CV, 2014 WL 4414827 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 28, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Watkins v. Debusk, 286 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2009, no pet.).

2024Reed’s motion for extension of time is not in compliance with Rule 26.3 because it was filed more than fifteen days after the period for filing a notice of appeal had expired, and—moreover—she has not filed a notice of appeal or explained her failure to do so.1 Although appellate courts should read the rules broadly to avoid depriving a party of her right to appeal due to “harmless procedural mistakes” and will look to timely filed instruments to determine whether they are bona fide attempts to invoke appellate jurisdiction, see Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997), Reed’s attem

2023See Vara, 2013 WL 1315035 , at *3; Beck, 284 S.W.3d at 426–28. 7 Brickley also calls some of Reed’s alleged acts and omissions “criminal,” but aside from the causes of action we are dealing with, Brickley nowhere claims that he is bringing any civil cause of action for Reed’s violation of a Penal Code statute. 8 Moreover, this Court and others have said that claims pleaded as fraud still may constitute improperly fractured legal-malpractice claims.

2023See, e.g., Beck, 284 S.W.3d at 426–27; Brantner v. Robinson, No. 10-17-00335-CV, 2019 WL 3822306 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Meullion v. Gladden, No. 14-10-01143-CV, 2011 WL 5926676 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). 9 The cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty remains an improperly fractured legal-malpractice claim for the independent reason, explained above, that Brickley has not alleged an improper benefit. 7 In all, the result of our analysis is that Brickley pleaded only legal malpractice against Reed.

2016Strict scrutiny Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, which has been described as “‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact,’”89 the government has the burden of proving that the restriction furthers a 86 Id. 87 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 . 88 See Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 , 501 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied) (“On questions of federal law . . . all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (Texas courts “are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and th

2016Strict scrutiny Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, which has been described as “‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact,’”89 the government has the burden of proving that the restriction furthers a 86 Id. 87 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 . 88 See Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 , 501 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied) (“On questions of federal law . . . all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (Texas courts “are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and th

2016Strict scrutiny Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, which has been described as “‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact,’”89 the government has the burden of proving that the restriction furthers a 86 Id. 87 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 . 88 See Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 , 501 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied) (“On questions of federal law . . . all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (Texas courts “are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and th

2016Strict scrutiny Under a strict-scrutiny analysis, which has been described as “‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact,’”89 the government has the burden of proving that the restriction furthers a 86 Id. 87 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 . 88 See Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495 , 501 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ denied) (“On questions of federal law . . . all courts in every state owe obedience to the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see also Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (Texas courts “are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and th

2015Dinkins v. State, 84 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Kutzner, 75 S.W.3d at 442 . 8.

2014See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 , 120 S. Ct. at 2106 ; Griffin v. Sea Mar Mgt., Inc., 243 F. App’x 852, 854 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff did not present a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination because refusal to promote appellant did not constitute an adverse employment action). 17 Because Reed did not meet her initial burden of presenting evidence of a prima facie case of racial discrimination, we hold that the trial court did not err by granting CCMC’s motion for summary judgment on Reed’s claim for racial discrimination.

2014See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 , 120 S. Ct. at 2106 ; Griffin v. Sea Mar Mgt., Inc., 243 F. App’x 852, 854 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff did not present a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination because refusal to promote appellant did not constitute an adverse employment action). 17 Because Reed did not meet her initial burden of presenting evidence of a prima facie case of racial discrimination, we hold that the trial court did not err by granting CCMC’s motion for summary judgment on Reed’s claim for racial discrimination.

2014See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 , 120 S. Ct. at 2106 ; Griffin v. Sea Mar Mgt., Inc., 243 F. App’x 852, 854 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff did not present a prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination because refusal to promote appellant did not constitute an adverse employment action). 17 Because Reed did not meet her initial burden of presenting evidence of a prima facie case of racial discrimination, we hold that the trial court did not err by granting CCMC’s motion for summary judgment on Reed’s claim for racial discrimination.

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

2010See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). [4] Because a routine traffic stop typically involves only a short, investigative detention, as opposed to a custodial arrest, we analyze traffic stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 ; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Martinez v. State, 236 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). [1] Majority op. at 418-19. [2] Id. [3] 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).