Reed factors in Kansas

1994Then, “[b]ecause Wilcox, Williams, and Sims dealt with sufficiency of the evidence for the crime charged and not with ' whether the district court had jurisdiction to accept Reed’s plea to theft by deception,” 254 Kan. at 59, the: court shifted its attention to State v. Gibbens, 253 Kan. 384 , 855 P.2d 937 (1993).

1994Then, “[b]ecause Wilcox, Williams, and Sims dealt with sufficiency of the evidence for the crime charged and not with ' whether the district court had jurisdiction to accept Reed’s plea to theft by deception,” 254 Kan. at 59, the: court shifted its attention to State v. Gibbens, 253 Kan. 384 , 855 P.2d 937 (1993).

2021Mid-Continent Specialists, Inc. v. Capital Homes, 279 Kan. 178, 185 , 106 P.3d 483 (2005).

2021Mid-Continent Specialists, Inc. v. Capital Homes, 279 Kan. 178, 185 , 106 P.3d 483 (2005).

2020It found: "Reed essentially asks this court to make the necessary factual findings or to remand the case to the district court for the same." Reed, 300 Kan. at 513 .

2020Deficient performance Before Spies moved to find Jessica's Law unconstitutional and before Reed was sentenced, our Supreme Court decided State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715 , 217 P.3d 443 (2009), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015).

2020Deficient performance Before Spies moved to find Jessica's Law unconstitutional and before Reed was sentenced, our Supreme Court decided State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715 , 217 P.3d 443 (2009), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015).

2020Deficient performance Before Spies moved to find Jessica's Law unconstitutional and before Reed was sentenced, our Supreme Court decided State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715 , 217 P.3d 443 (2009), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015).

2020Deficient performance Before Spies moved to find Jessica's Law unconstitutional and before Reed was sentenced, our Supreme Court decided State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715 , 217 P.3d 443 (2009), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 , 342 P.3d 935 (2015).

2015Reed also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for waiving Reed’s right of confrontation by allowing the State to read Beck-nell’s preliminary hearing testimony to the jury is premised on his assertion that “the motive and interest in trial counsel’s cross-examination of Becknell at preliminary hearing was not similar to that at the trial where Becknell’s preliminary hearing testimony was offered.” “The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is satisfied if the accused confronted the witnesses against him at any stage of the proceedings in the same case and has had an opportunity of c

2015Reed also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for waiving Reed’s right of confrontation by allowing the State to read Beck-nell’s preliminary hearing testimony to the jury is premised on his assertion that “the motive and interest in trial counsel’s cross-examination of Becknell at preliminary hearing was not similar to that at the trial where Becknell’s preliminary hearing testimony was offered.” “The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is satisfied if the accused confronted the witnesses against him at any stage of the proceedings in the same case and has had an opportunity of c

2014In Reed’s brief before this court, he states the issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting the notes because the notes “were impermissible hearsay and unnecessarily cumulative evidence causing great prejudice to Defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Yet, in the body of his argument the only authorities he cites are K.S.A. 60-407(f) (“all relevant evidence is admissible”) and State v. Gardner, 264 Kan. 95, 104 , 955 P.2d 1199 (1998), for its statement that “ ‘ “[t]he determination of relevancy is a matter of logic and experience, not a matter of law. [Citations omitted.]’ Thu

2014In Reed’s brief before this court, he states the issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting the notes because the notes “were impermissible hearsay and unnecessarily cumulative evidence causing great prejudice to Defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Yet, in the body of his argument the only authorities he cites are K.S.A. 60-407(f) (“all relevant evidence is admissible”) and State v. Gardner, 264 Kan. 95, 104 , 955 P.2d 1199 (1998), for its statement that “ ‘ “[t]he determination of relevancy is a matter of logic and experience, not a matter of law. [Citations omitted.]’ Thu

2005See also State v. Huff, 278 Kan. 214, 220 , 92 P.3d 604 (2004) (employing the Reed factors); State v. Weas, 26 Kan.

2005See also State v. Huff, 278 Kan. 214, 220 , 92 P.3d 604 (2004) (employing the Reed factors); State v. Weas, 26 Kan.

1999In State v. Reed, 248 Kan. 506 , 809 P.2d 553 (1991), we considered Reed’s motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea before sentencing.

1999In State v. Reed, 248 Kan. 506 , 809 P.2d 553 (1991), we considered Reed’s motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea before sentencing.

1993We conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to consider Reed's motion to modify sentence following receipt of the mandate even though the court had denied his pre-appeal motion to modify filed within 120 days of sentencing." 253 Kan. at 162 .

1993We conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to consider Reed’s motion to modify sentence following receipt of the mandate even though the court had denied his pre-appeal motion to modify filed within 120 days of sentencing.” 253 Kan. at 162 .

1993It noted that under a similar set of facts in State v. Wilcox, 245 Kan. 76 , Syl. ¶ 2, this court had determined that “K.S.A. 39-720 is the proper statute under which persons accused of welfare fraud should be prosecuted.” In Wilcox , the defendant had received payment from SRS to assist her in the care of her children.

1993Reed alleges the district com't automatically revoked her probation once the probation violation was established, without con *60 sidering the reasons for the violation, citing State v. Duke, 10 Kan.

1893The Reed rule was a subject of investigation before the supreme court of the United States upon the “tariff bill.” It is reported in United States v. Ballin, 144 U. S. 1 ; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507.

1893The Reed rule was a subject of investigation before the supreme court of the United States upon the “tariff bill.” It is reported in United States v. Ballin, 144 U. S. 1 ; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507.