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5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Osborne v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Reed’s challenge to the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences does not present a colorable claim of voidness because “[t]here is no constitutionally cognizable right to concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences . . . [and] whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple offenses is within the trial court’s discretion, so long as the sentence for each offense is within the statutory limits.” Osborne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 339, 342 (2) ( 734 SE2d 59 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2026Reed’s challenge to the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences does not present a colorable claim of voidness because “[t]here is no constitutionally cognizable right to concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences . . . [and] whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple offenses is within the trial court’s discretion, so long as the sentence for each offense is within the statutory limits.” Osborne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 339, 342 (2) ( 734 SE2d 59 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Morrell v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Georgia law is thus clear—at least at present, and in the criminal context—that we “accept a trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous” and “[t]he clearly erroneous standard is 33 equivalent to the highly deferential ‘any evidence’ standard, which means we will not reverse a trial court’s factual findings if there is any evidence in the record to support them.” Morrell, 313 Ga. at 251 . 2024Georgia law is thus clear—at least at present, and in the criminal context—that we “accept a trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous” and “[t]he clearly erroneous standard is 35 equivalent to the highly deferential ‘any evidence’ standard, which means we will not reverse a trial court’s factual findings if there is any evidence in the record to support them.” Morrell, 313 Ga. at 251. | 1 | 1 |
Hardy v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See Hardy, 306 Ga. at 661 (3). (b) Reed also asserts that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to ensure a complete transcription of his trial, in particular the unrecorded bench conferences, in violation of OCGA § 5-6-41. 2022See Hardy, 306 Ga. at 661 (3). (b) Reed also asserts that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to ensure a complete transcription of his trial, in particular the unrecorded bench conferences, in violation of OCGA § 5-6-41. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Truitt Oil & Gas Co. v. Ranger Insurance
green
2 sentences2007Co., 231 Ga. App. 89, 90 , 498 S.E.2d 572 (1998). *845 The policy in this case excludes coverage for damages resulting from the "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants" defined as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant," including "fumes." Reed's claim is that she has been injured by the discharge of carbon monoxide at the insured property. 2007Co., 231 Ga. App. 89, 90 , 498 S.E.2d 572 (1998). *845 The policy in this case excludes coverage for damages resulting from the "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants" defined as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant," including "fumes." Reed's claim is that she has been injured by the discharge of carbon monoxide at the insured property. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Reese v. Haggard
green
2 sentences1978"The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict for special damages for the loss of the automobile, there being no evidence of its value after the collision, and no evidence sufficient to establish that it had been totally destroyed.” Reese v. Haggard, 75 Ga. App. 654 (1) ( 44 SE2d 290 ) (1947). 1978"The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict for special damages for the loss of the automobile, there being no evidence of its value after the collision, and no evidence sufficient to establish that it had been totally destroyed.” Reese v. Haggard, 75 Ga. App. 654 (1) ( 44 SE2d 290 ) (1947). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.