Reed analysis in California

2026The Reed defendant made two unsuccessful Marsden motions asking the court to discharge his appointed counsel. ( Reed, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1140-1141.) Later, at the sentencing hearing, the defendant asked his counsel to move for a new trial on the basis of counsel’s incompetence.

2013(Reed I, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 .) We concluded the trial court erred in failing to make any inquiry into Reed’s reasons for believing he was ineffectively assisted at trial, including the requisite Marsden inquiries on such issues, as required by People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 388 and People v. Mejía (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1081 .8 (Reed I, at pp. 1144-1145, 1148.) We were unable to conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “because it remains impossible on this record to determine whether further inquiry would have led the court to grant a new trial motion.

2026(Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320 .) For both of these reasons, we deem Reed’s challenge on this matter forfeited.

2025The court rejected Reed’s claim that his due process right to present evidence in his own defense as outlined by Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284 (Chambers) was violated.

2025The court rejected Reed’s claim that his due process right to present evidence in his own defense as outlined by Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284 (Chambers) was violated.

2018In Trevino , the eyewitness identification was *1008 highly equivocal, in contrast to Fradiue's consistent identification of Reed as the shooter. ( 39 Cal.3d at p. 696 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 652 , 704 P.2d 719 ["Mrs. Nyberg was never able to positively identify Rivas as the second man at the apartment."].) And in Blakeslee , the prosecution offered no direct evidence of the defendant's guilt at all. ( 2 Cal.App.3d at p. 838 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 839 ["No one witnessed the shooting, no one placed defendant in the apartment at the time of the shooting, no one saw defendant with a weapon, and no one identified

2018In Trevino , the eyewitness identification was *1008 highly equivocal, in contrast to Fradiue's consistent identification of Reed as the shooter. ( 39 Cal.3d at p. 696 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 652 , 704 P.2d 719 ["Mrs. Nyberg was never able to positively identify Rivas as the second man at the apartment."].) And in Blakeslee , the prosecution offered no direct evidence of the defendant's guilt at all. ( 2 Cal.App.3d at p. 838 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 839 ["No one witnessed the shooting, no one placed defendant in the apartment at the time of the shooting, no one saw defendant with a weapon, and no one identified

2018In Trevino , the eyewitness identification was *1008 highly equivocal, in contrast to Fradiue's consistent identification of Reed as the shooter. ( 39 Cal.3d at p. 696 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 652 , 704 P.2d 719 ["Mrs. Nyberg was never able to positively identify Rivas as the second man at the apartment."].) And in Blakeslee , the prosecution offered no direct evidence of the defendant's guilt at all. ( 2 Cal.App.3d at p. 838 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 839 ["No one witnessed the shooting, no one placed defendant in the apartment at the time of the shooting, no one saw defendant with a weapon, and no one identified

2018In Trevino , the eyewitness identification was *1008 highly equivocal, in contrast to Fradiue's consistent identification of Reed as the shooter. ( 39 Cal.3d at p. 696 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 652 , 704 P.2d 719 ["Mrs. Nyberg was never able to positively identify Rivas as the second man at the apartment."].) And in Blakeslee , the prosecution offered no direct evidence of the defendant's guilt at all. ( 2 Cal.App.3d at p. 838 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 839 ["No one witnessed the shooting, no one placed defendant in the apartment at the time of the shooting, no one saw defendant with a weapon, and no one identified

2015(Lingenfelter v. County of Fresno (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 198, 207 ; Code Civ.

2014On May 17, 2010, Reed filed a motion for appointment of new evaluators, asserting that, in response to the court’s order for the preparation of new evaluations, SDSH had reassigned the same evaluators who had previously evaluated Reed pursuant to the now invalid SAP and “[n]ot surprisingly, said evaluators reached the same conclusion that they had under the improperly performed evaluations performed earlier.” Reed argued the evaluators had “a prior bias, based on their earlier flawed evaluations, in violation of the due process clauses of the United States Constitution and California Constitut

2014On May 17, 2010, Reed filed a motion for appointment of new evaluators, asserting that, in response to the court’s order for the preparation of new evaluations, SDSH had reassigned the same evaluators who had previously evaluated Reed pursuant to the now invalid SAP and “[n]ot surprisingly, said evaluators reached the same conclusion that they had under the improperly performed evaluations performed earlier.” Reed argued the evaluators had “a prior bias, based on their earlier flawed evaluations, in violation of the due process clauses of the United States Constitution and California Constitut

2014The trial court indicated, based on the grant of summary judgment, that “we’re dealing in an area that has been preempted by federal law.” Following the hearing, the trial court adopted its tentative ruling and denied Reed’s motion for leave to amend on the grounds that the second amended complaint “fails to allege a permissible state law claim.” The trial court held that since Reed “fail[ed] to allege that the programming of the device is not part of a products claim . . . the claim for improper programming may be preempted [and] is barred by Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008) 552 US 312, 315 .

2014None of that evidence, whether viewed separately or together, raises “grave doubts about [S.’s] veracity and credibility.” (People v. Randle, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 293 .) The principal areas Reed wished to question S.’s mother about—the mother’s discipline of S., how S. paid for her cell phone, and whether the mother fed S. every day—were allowed at the second remand and produced no evidence that would significantly aid Reed’s defense that S. had sex with him for money.

2014(Id. at p. 348.) The court based this conclusion on the principle that “the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates is inherently federal in character because the relationship originates from, is governed by, and terminates according to federal law.” (Id. at p. 347.) Medtronic argues that Reed’s claim is premised upon allegations that Medtronic violated the terms of its premarket approval by failing to ensure that Dr. Shannon properly programmed the ICD, and is therefore in preempted by Buckman, supra, 531 U.S. 341 .

2014Oct. 3, 2013) 13-CV-02049-LHK, 2013 WL 5533081, *7 .) Here, Reed’s claim that Medtronic’s employee negligently programmed or assisted in programming the ICD is not premised on a violation of the FDCA.

2013(Reed I, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 .) We concluded the trial court erred in failing to make any inquiry into Reed’s reasons for believing he was ineffectively assisted at trial, including the requisite Marsden inquiries on such issues, as required by People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 388 and People v. Mejía (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1081 .8 (Reed I, at pp. 1144-1145, 1148.) We were unable to conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “because it remains impossible on this record to determine whether further inquiry would have led the court to grant a new trial motion.

2013(Reed I, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 .) We concluded the trial court erred in failing to make any inquiry into Reed’s reasons for believing he was ineffectively assisted at trial, including the requisite Marsden inquiries on such issues, as required by People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 388 and People v. Mejía (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1081 .8 (Reed I, at pp. 1144-1145, 1148.) We were unable to conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “because it remains impossible on this record to determine whether further inquiry would have led the court to grant a new trial motion.

2013Here, the matter was not raised below, and is therefore waived on appeal.' [Citation.]" ( Norman, supra, at pp. 229-230 .) 28 We do not read Reed's brief as contending that there is no substantial evidence to support the burglary-murder special circumstance finding.

1998Moreover, once the Court brought the motion to my attention, all I heard was that the motion was about that ‘she’s not claiming alter ego.’ Given the Court’s ruling rejecting J.A.T’s proposed instruction on alter ego, such a statement seemed logical and that was the end of the matter.” The trial court denied Reed’s motion under section 473, ruling that “Mr. London’s inattention and failure to understand the significance of the motion made October 10, 1996, does not constitute excusable neglect nor the type of mistake or inadvertence for which relief may be granted,” citing Elms v. Elms (1946)

1998Moreover, once the Court brought the motion to my attention, all I heard was that the motion was about that ‘she’s not claiming alter ego.’ Given the Court’s ruling rejecting J.A.T’s proposed instruction on alter ego, such a statement seemed logical and that was the end of the matter.” The trial court denied Reed’s motion under section 473, ruling that “Mr. London’s inattention and failure to understand the significance of the motion made October 10, 1996, does not constitute excusable neglect nor the type of mistake or inadvertence for which relief may be granted,” citing Elms v. Elms (1946)

1996“Under these circumstances it may be said that defendant initiated the gunplay. . . .” (Id. at p. 46.) Consistent with the Reed analysis, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 578 , reviewed the accomplice’s conduct, consisting of a coercive approach to the victim, repeated threats of “execution,” and nervous apprehension as the victim was held at gunpoint.

1996“Under these circumstances it may be said that defendant initiated the gunplay. . . .” (Id. at p. 46.) Consistent with the Reed analysis, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 578 , reviewed the accomplice’s conduct, consisting of a coercive approach to the victim, repeated threats of “execution,” and nervous apprehension as the victim was held at gunpoint.

1987(Id., at p. 11.) The recent case of People v. Piper (1986) 42 Cal.3d 471 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 125 , 722 P.2d 899 ] indicates that the Reed analysis is the one we are obliged to follow.

1987(Id., at p. 11.) The recent case of People v. Piper (1986) 42 Cal.3d 471 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 125 , 722 P.2d 899 ] indicates that the Reed analysis is the one we are obliged to follow.