damage claim in Maryland

2019The Court explained that a liability insurer “is liable for the damages, including attorneys’ fees incurred by an insured as a result of the insurer’s breach of its contractual obligation to defend the insured against a claim potentially within the policy’s coverage, and this is so whether the attorneys’ fees are incurred in defending against the underlying damage claim or in a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage and a duty to defend.” Id. at 648 (collecting cases).

2019The Court explained that a liability insurer “is liable for the damages, including attorneys’ fees incurred by an insured as a result of the insurer’s breach of its contractual obligation to defend the insured against a claim potentially within the policy’s coverage, and this is so whether the attorneys’ fees are incurred in defending against the underlying damage claim or in a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage and a duty to defend.” Id. at 648 (collecting cases).

1997See also Continental Casualty Co. v. Bd. of Education, 302 Md. 516, 537-38 , 489 A.2d 536 (1985); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins.

1997See also Continental Casualty Co. v. Bd. of Education, 302 Md. 516, 537-38 , 489 A.2d 536 (1985); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins.

2000See also Smith, 174 F.R.D. at 100 (rejecting motion for class certification of medical monitoring fund for Missouri smokers because monetary relief was predominant relief being sought); Harding v. Tambrands, 165 F.R.D. 623, 632 (D.Kan.1996) (holding that certification under Federal Rule 23(b)(2) for medical monitoring of alleged victims of toxic shock syndrome was inappropriate because primary relief sought was money damages); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 828 (10th Cir.1995) (affirming trial court’s decision not to certify medical monitoring class because relief sought was primarily

2000See also Smith, 174 F.R.D. at 100 (rejecting motion for class certification of medical monitoring fund for Missouri smokers because monetary relief was predominant relief being sought); Harding v. Tambrands, 165 F.R.D. 623, 632 (D.Kan.1996) (holding that certification under Federal Rule 23(b)(2) for medical monitoring of alleged victims of toxic shock syndrome was inappropriate because primary relief sought was money damages); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 828 (10th Cir.1995) (affirming trial court's decision not to certify medical monitoring class because relief sought was primarily

2000See also Smith, 174 F.R.D. at 100 (rejecting motion for class certification of medical monitoring fund for Missouri smokers because monetary relief was predominant relief being sought); Harding v. Tambrands, 165 F.R.D. 623, 632 (D.Kan.1996) (holding that certification under Federal Rule 23(b)(2) for medical monitoring of alleged victims of toxic shock syndrome was inappropriate because primary relief sought was money damages); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 828 (10th Cir.1995) (affirming trial court’s decision not to certify medical monitoring class because relief sought was primarily

2000See also Smith, 174 F.R.D. at 100 (rejecting motion for class certification of medical monitoring fund for Missouri smokers because monetary relief was predominant relief being sought); Harding v. Tambrands, 165 F.R.D. 623, 632 (D.Kan.1996) (holding that certification under Federal Rule 23(b)(2) for medical monitoring of alleged victims of toxic shock syndrome was inappropriate because primary relief sought was money damages); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 828 (10th Cir.1995) (affirming trial court's decision not to certify medical monitoring class because relief sought was primarily

2000See also Smith, 174 F.R.D. at 100 (rejecting motion for class certification of medical monitoring fund for Missouri smokers because monetary relief was predominant relief being sought); Harding v. Tambrands, 165 F.R.D. 623, 632 (D.Kan.1996) (holding that certification under Federal Rule 23(b)(2) for medical monitoring of alleged victims of toxic shock syndrome was inappropriate because primary relief sought was money damages); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 828 (10th Cir.1995) (affirming trial court’s decision not to certify medical monitoring class because relief sought was primarily

2000See also Smith, 174 F.R.D. at 100 (rejecting motion for class certification of medical monitoring fund for Missouri smokers because monetary relief was predominant relief being sought); Harding v. Tambrands, 165 F.R.D. 623, 632 (D.Kan.1996) (holding that certification under Federal Rule 23(b)(2) for medical monitoring of alleged victims of toxic shock syndrome was inappropriate because primary relief sought was money damages); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 828 (10th Cir.1995) (affirming trial court's decision not to certify medical monitoring class because relief sought was primarily

2000See Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 484 (ruling that Pennsylvania smokers’ medical monitoring claim could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), first, because its inclusion of a request for treatment rendered the claim “identical to a traditional damage claim for personal injury” that illicitly attempted to “transform a legal claim into an equitable one merely by using a fund as a repository for money damages” and, secondly, “because the overwhelming majority of relief sought by plaintiffs in their entire complaint is monetary in nature”).

2000See Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 484 (ruling that Pennsylvania smokers' medical monitoring claim could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), first, because its inclusion of a request for treatment rendered the claim "identical to a traditional damage claim for personal injury" that illicitly attempted to "transform a legal claim into an equitable one merely by using a fund as a repository for money damages" and, secondly, "because the overwhelming majority of relief sought by plaintiffs in their entire complaint is monetary in nature").

1993See Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 28-32 , 557 A.2d 210, 216-18 (1989) (discussing why Maryland has not recognized a damage claim for loss of parental society and affection). *286 Ms. Endal also argues that in light of Maryland’s recognition of a limited claim for loss of the economic value of a child’s services, see Maryland Code (1984, 1991 RepLVol.), Family Law Article, § 5-206; Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 528 , 174 A.2d 339, 342 (1961), we should recognize a reciprocal loss of parental services claim on behalf of minor children.

1993See Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 28-32 , 557 A.2d 210, 216-18 (1989) (discussing why Maryland has not recognized a damage claim for loss of parental society and affection). *286 Ms. Endal also argues that in light of Maryland’s recognition of a limited claim for loss of the economic value of a child’s services, see Maryland Code (1984, 1991 RepLVol.), Family Law Article, § 5-206; Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 528 , 174 A.2d 339, 342 (1961), we should recognize a reciprocal loss of parental services claim on behalf of minor children.

1993See Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 28-32 , 557 A.2d 210, 216-18 (1989) (discussing why Maryland has not recognized a damage claim for loss of parental society and affection). *286 Ms. Endal also argues that in light of Maryland’s recognition of a limited claim for loss of the economic value of a child’s services, see Maryland Code (1984, 1991 RepLVol.), Family Law Article, § 5-206; Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 528 , 174 A.2d 339, 342 (1961), we should recognize a reciprocal loss of parental services claim on behalf of minor children.

1993See Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 28-32 , 557 A.2d 210, 216-18 (1989) (discussing why Maryland has not recognized a damage claim for loss of parental society and affection). *286 Ms. Endal also argues that in light of Maryland’s recognition of a limited claim for loss of the economic value of a child’s services, see Maryland Code (1984, 1991 RepLVol.), Family Law Article, § 5-206; Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 528 , 174 A.2d 339, 342 (1961), we should recognize a reciprocal loss of parental services claim on behalf of minor children.

1988In Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1981), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals offered this alternative explanation: “[T]o allow the district court to stay or hold in abeyance the damage claim against the FDIC until the six month period accrues would tend to increase the congestion in our already heavily burdened district courts.

1988Instead of promoting congressional intent in enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2675 by ‘making it possible for the Government to expedite the fair settlement of tort claims asserted against the United States,’ .... appellants’ theory would spur unnecessary litigation and slow down the process.” (3) In those instances where the court action was prematurely filed but, before the court rules on the motion to dismiss, the jurisdictional prerequisite has become satisfied in that a proper claim has been made and denied (either affirmatively or by operation of law), the plaintiff is generally allowed to amend the

1972Co., 268 U. S. 633, 637 , 69 L.Ed. 1126, 1129 (1925), after the expiration of the period of limitations for filing a damage claim against a railroad under the Interstate *57 Commerce Act, which created the cause of action and specified the period of time within which suit had to be filed, The Transportation Act of 1920 attempted to eliminate from the computation of such time the period during which the railroads were under Federal control.

1972Co., 268 U. S. 633, 637 , 69 L.Ed. 1126, 1129 (1925), after the expiration of the period of limitations for filing a damage claim against a railroad under the Interstate *57 Commerce Act, which created the cause of action and specified the period of time within which suit had to be filed, The Transportation Act of 1920 attempted to eliminate from the computation of such time the period during which the railroads were under Federal control.