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8 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wells v. Smithgreen2 sentences2017On remand, we instructed that “the plaintiff is free to develop the claim for civil conspiracy, but unless the damages are separate and distinct from those already obtained on the invasion of privacy verdict, there can be no recovery under Harless.” 33 Slack , 188 W.Va. *444 at 156, 423 S.E.2d at 559 ; see also Wells v. Smith, 171 W.Va. 97, 105-06 , 297 S.E.2d 872, 880 (1982) (overruled on other grounds in Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991) (finding that had “jury been properly instructed on the appellants’ 'conspiracy theory they may well have returned a ve 2017On remand, we instructed that “the plaintiff is free to develop the claim for civil conspiracy, but unless the damages are separate and distinct from those already obtained on the invasion of privacy verdict, there can be no recovery under Harless.” 33 Slack , 188 W.Va. *444 at 156, 423 S.E.2d at 559 ; see also Wells v. Smith, 171 W.Va. 97, 105-06 , 297 S.E.2d 872, 880 (1982) (overruled on other grounds in Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991) (finding that had “jury been properly instructed on the appellants’ 'conspiracy theory they may well have returned a ve | 2 | 2 |
Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc.green2 sentences2017On remand, we instructed that “the plaintiff is free to develop the claim for civil conspiracy, but unless the damages are separate and distinct from those already obtained on the invasion of privacy verdict, there can be no recovery under Harless.” 33 Slack , 188 W.Va. *444 at 156, 423 S.E.2d at 559 ; see also Wells v. Smith, 171 W.Va. 97, 105-06 , 297 S.E.2d 872, 880 (1982) (overruled on other grounds in Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991) (finding that had “jury been properly instructed on the appellants’ 'conspiracy theory they may well have returned a ve 2017On remand, we instructed that “the plaintiff is free to develop the claim for civil conspiracy, but unless the damages are separate and distinct from those already obtained on the invasion of privacy verdict, there can be no recovery under Harless.” 33 Slack , 188 W.Va. *444 at 156, 423 S.E.2d at 559 ; see also Wells v. Smith, 171 W.Va. 97, 105-06 , 297 S.E.2d 872, 880 (1982) (overruled on other grounds in Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991) (finding that had “jury been properly instructed on the appellants’ 'conspiracy theory they may well have returned a ve | 2 | 2 |
Coury v. Tsapisgreen2 sentences2012In Farley , this Court recognized the "substantial similarity between our Rule 55(b)(2) and the federal counterpart.” 170 W.Va. at 427 , 294 S.E.2d at 281 ; see also Coury v. Tsapis, 172 W.Va. 103, 106 , 304 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1983) (discussing effect of federal rule's distinction between default and default judgment for appeal purposes and observing that state rule makes no such distinction). . - Petitioners’ former counsel, Michael Snyder, represented to the trial court at the damage hearing that he was there on behalf of Ms. Drumheller, D.F. 2012In Farley , this Court recognized the "substantial similarity between our Rule 55(b)(2) and the federal counterpart.” 170 W.Va. at 427 , 294 S.E.2d at 281 ; see also Coury v. Tsapis, 172 W.Va. 103, 106 , 304 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1983) (discussing effect of federal rule's distinction between default and default judgment for appeal purposes and observing that state rule makes no such distinction). . - Petitioners’ former counsel, Michael Snyder, represented to the trial court at the damage hearing that he was there on behalf of Ms. Drumheller, D.F. | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Unified School District No. 377green1 sentence1997See Hayes v. Unified School District No. 377, 877 F.2d 809, 814 (10th Cir.1989) (stating that exhaustion requirements “should not be applied inflexibly.”) Moreover, the appellants are correct in their assertion that the circuit court action was essentially a damage claim involving allegations of the intentional or reckless violation of the appellants’ rights, and that, as such, the action was unrelated to the purpose of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Slack v. Kanawha County Housing & Redevelopment Authority
green
2 sentences2017We recognized the “identicality of the damage claim asserted under the civil conspiracy theory,” but declined to address “whether, from a substantive standpoint, there was sufficient evidence to prove such a theory.” Id. at 156 , 423 S.E.2d at 559 . 2017We recognized the “identicality of the damage claim asserted under the civil conspiracy theory,” but declined to address “whether, from a substantive standpoint, there was sufficient evidence to prove such a theory.” Id. at 156 , 423 S.E.2d at 559 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Farley v. Economy Garage
green
2 sentences2012In Farley , this Court recognized the "substantial similarity between our Rule 55(b)(2) and the federal counterpart.” 170 W.Va. at 427 , 294 S.E.2d at 281 ; see also Coury v. Tsapis, 172 W.Va. 103, 106 , 304 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1983) (discussing effect of federal rule's distinction between default and default judgment for appeal purposes and observing that state rule makes no such distinction). . - Petitioners’ former counsel, Michael Snyder, represented to the trial court at the damage hearing that he was there on behalf of Ms. Drumheller, D.F. 2012In Farley , this Court recognized the "substantial similarity between our Rule 55(b)(2) and the federal counterpart.” 170 W.Va. at 427 , 294 S.E.2d at 281 ; see also Coury v. Tsapis, 172 W.Va. 103, 106 , 304 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1983) (discussing effect of federal rule's distinction between default and default judgment for appeal purposes and observing that state rule makes no such distinction). . - Petitioners’ former counsel, Michael Snyder, represented to the trial court at the damage hearing that he was there on behalf of Ms. Drumheller, D.F. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Williams v. New Mexico State Highway Commission
green
2 sentences1993In Syllabus Point 2, we stated: "Suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State." In other jurisdictions which have a similar type of statutory insurance provision, courts have also reached the result that, insofar as a plaintiff's damage claim is covered by the state's insurance policy barring the assertion of the state's constitutional immunity, the suit may be maintained. [5] See, e.g., Pigg v. Brockman, 1993In Syllabus Point 2, we stated: “Suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the State’s liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State.” In other jurisdictions which have a similar type of statutory insurance provision, courts have also reached the result that, insofar as a plaintiff’s damage claim is covered by the state’s insurance policy barring the assertion of the state’s constitutional immunity, the suit may be maintained. 5 See, e.g., Pigg v. Brockman, 79 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
McCloud v. City of La Follette
green
2 sentences1993In Syllabus Point 2, we stated: "Suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State." In other jurisdictions which have a similar type of statutory insurance provision, courts have also reached the result that, insofar as a plaintiff's damage claim is covered by the state's insurance policy barring the assertion of the state's constitutional immunity, the suit may be maintained. [5] See, e.g., Pigg v. Brockman, 1993In Syllabus Point 2, we stated: "Suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State." In other jurisdictions which have a similar type of statutory insurance provision, courts have also reached the result that, insofar as a plaintiff's damage claim is covered by the state's insurance policy barring the assertion of the state's constitutional immunity, the suit may be maintained. [5] See, e.g., Pigg v. Brockman, | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Pigg v. Brockman
green
2 sentences1993In Syllabus Point 2, we stated: "Suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State." In other jurisdictions which have a similar type of statutory insurance provision, courts have also reached the result that, insofar as a plaintiff's damage claim is covered by the state's insurance policy barring the assertion of the state's constitutional immunity, the suit may be maintained. [5] See, e.g., Pigg v. Brockman, 1993In Syllabus Point 2, we stated: “Suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the State’s liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State.” In other jurisdictions which have a similar type of statutory insurance provision, courts have also reached the result that, insofar as a plaintiff’s damage claim is covered by the state’s insurance policy barring the assertion of the state’s constitutional immunity, the suit may be maintained. 5 See, e.g., Pigg v. Brockman, 79 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Sansom v. Physicians Associates, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992It is our determination that Keyes and Chand were not joint tortfeasors, but instead were successive and independent tortfeasors, defined by this Court as those whose negligence “did not ‘in point of time and place concur,’ which is [the] test for joint or concurrent negligence.” Sansom v. Physicians Associates, Inc., 182 W.Va. 113 , 386 S.E.2d 480 (1989). 1992It is our determination that Keyes and Chand were not joint tortfeasors, but instead were successive and independent tortfeasors, defined by this Court as those whose negligence “did not ‘in point of time and place concur,’ which is [the] test for joint or concurrent negligence.” Sansom v. Physicians Associates, Inc., 182 W.Va. 113 , 386 S.E.2d 480 (1989). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1983Adkins v. Smith, 142 W.Va. 772 , 98 S.E.2d 712 (1957); Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, 134 W.Va. 815 , 62 S.E.2d 126 (1950); * see, Annot., 18 A.L.R.3rd 10, § 70 (1968). 1983Adkins v. Smith, 142 W.Va. 772 , 98 S.E.2d 712 (1957); Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, 134 W.Va. 815 , 62 S.E.2d 126 (1950); * see, Annot., 18 A.L.R.3rd 10, § 70 (1968). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Abdulla v. Pittsburgh and Weirton Bus Co.
green
2 sentences1983Although, if narrowly construed, Yurko’s Instruction # 5 would prevent an award of damages for injuries suffered as the result of improper treatment, the inclusion of instructions concerning improper treatment throughout the charge diminished the likelihood of such a construction by the jury. 3 In Syllabus Point 8 of Abdulla v. Pittsburgh and Weirton Bus Co., 158 W.Va. 592 , 213 S.E.2d 810 (1975), this Court stated, “A charge to the jury must be considered in relation to the whole case, and if it is apparent that mere technical errors in instructions could not have misled the jury, such errors 1983Although, if narrowly construed, Yurko’s Instruction # 5 would prevent an award of damages for injuries suffered as the result of improper treatment, the inclusion of instructions concerning improper treatment throughout the charge diminished the likelihood of such a construction by the jury. 3 In Syllabus Point 8 of Abdulla v. Pittsburgh and Weirton Bus Co., 158 W.Va. 592 , 213 S.E.2d 810 (1975), this Court stated, “A charge to the jury must be considered in relation to the whole case, and if it is apparent that mere technical errors in instructions could not have misled the jury, such errors | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Adkins v. Smith
green
2 sentences1983Adkins v. Smith, 142 W.Va. 772 , 98 S.E.2d 712 (1957); Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, 134 W.Va. 815 , 62 S.E.2d 126 (1950); * see, Annot., 18 A.L.R.3rd 10, § 70 (1968). 1983Adkins v. Smith, 142 W.Va. 772 , 98 S.E.2d 712 (1957); Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, 134 W.Va. 815 , 62 S.E.2d 126 (1950); * see, Annot., 18 A.L.R.3rd 10, § 70 (1968). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.