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36 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1948–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lunsford v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2010With respect to the discovery on net worth, our Supreme Court held in Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1988) that: “Our rules of civil procedure and evidence do not require similar practices *114 [i.e., that a prima facie right to punitive damages be established or delaying the production until the jury hears evidence sufficient to submit a punitive damage issue] before net worth may be discovered. 2010With respect to the discovery on net worth, our Supreme Court held in Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1988) that: “Our rules of civil procedure and evidence do not require similar practices [i.e., that a prima facie right to punitive damages be established or delaying the production until the jury hears evidence sufficient to submit a punitive damage issue] before net worth may be discovered. | 5 | 5 |
City of Keller v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2011See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807, 810 . 2011See City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 807, 810 . | 2 | 2 |
Kajima International, Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USAgreen2 sentences2006See Kajima, 15 S.W.3d at 293-94 . 2006See Kajima, 15 S.W.3d at 293-94 . | 2 | 2 |
Exxon Mobil Corporation, Whm Custom Services, Inc., and Disa, Inc. v. Gilberto Rinconesgreen1 sentence2021See Rincones, 520 S.W.3d at 579 . | 1 | 1 |
Kerry Heckman, on Behalf of Themselves and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Williamson Countygreen1 sentence2020See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 162 . * * * Because Buzbee had standing to assert a damage claim under subsection 253.131(c), the trial court could not have permissibly dismissed that claim on jurisdictional grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Peeler v. Hughes & Lucegreen1 sentence2014See id. at 497 . | 1 | 1 |
City of Houston v. Southern Electrical Services, Inc.green1 sentence2011Servs., Inc. , 273 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (holding pleadings alleged sufficient facts to establish waiver of immunity from suit and to defeat plea to jurisdiction and declining to “adjudicate” the plaintiff’s damage claim through plea to jurisdiction). | 1 | 1 |
Felts v. Harris Countygreen1 sentence2001See Felts v. Harris County, 915 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Duran v. Credit Bureau of Yuma, Inc.green1 sentence1987R.CIV.P. 23 (advisory committee note to 1966 amendment); see also Wilcox Development Co. v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A., 97 F.R.D. 440, 444 (D.Ore.1983); Duran v. Credit Bureau of Yuma, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 607, 609 (D.Ariz.1982) (subsection (b)(2) is available “only where in-junctive or declaratory relief is the primary reason for bringing the action and is not subordinate to a damage claim”). | 1 | 1 |
Wilcox Development Co. v. First Interstate Bankgreen1 sentence1987R.CIV.P. 23 (advisory committee note to 1966 amendment); see also Wilcox Development Co. v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A., 97 F.R.D. 440, 444 (D.Ore.1983); Duran v. Credit Bureau of Yuma, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 607, 609 (D.Ariz.1982) (subsection (b)(2) is available “only where in-junctive or declaratory relief is the primary reason for bringing the action and is not subordinate to a damage claim”). | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. Brooksgreen1 sentence1986See 14 DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE sec. 336.-07[4] (1985); see also Uvalde Const. Co. v. Joiner, 132 Tex. 593 , 126 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1939); Dixon v. Brooks, 604 S.W.2d 330, 334-35 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Reynolds Brothers, Incorporated v. Dodson, 380 S.W.2d 678, 681-82 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1964, no writ); Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1963, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Blum v. Elkinsgreen1 sentence1986See 14 DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE sec. 336.-07[4] (1985); see also Uvalde Const. Co. v. Joiner, 132 Tex. 593 , 126 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1939); Dixon v. Brooks, 604 S.W.2d 330, 334-35 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Reynolds Brothers, Incorporated v. Dodson, 380 S.W.2d 678, 681-82 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1964, no writ); Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1963, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Reynolds Brothers, Incorporated v. Dodsongreen1 sentence1986See 14 DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE sec. 336.-07[4] (1985); see also Uvalde Const. Co. v. Joiner, 132 Tex. 593 , 126 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1939); Dixon v. Brooks, 604 S.W.2d 330, 334-35 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Reynolds Brothers, Incorporated v. Dodson, 380 S.W.2d 678, 681-82 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1964, no writ); Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1963, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Uvalde Construction Co. v. Joinergreen2 sentences1986See 14 DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE sec. 336.-07[4] (1985); see also Uvalde Const. Co. v. Joiner, 132 Tex. 593 , 126 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1939); Dixon v. Brooks, 604 S.W.2d 330, 334-35 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Reynolds Brothers, Incorporated v. Dodson, 380 S.W.2d 678, 681-82 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1964, no writ); Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1963, no writ). 1986See 14 DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE sec. 336.-07[4] (1985); see also Uvalde Const. Co. v. Joiner, 132 Tex. 593 , 126 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1939); Dixon v. Brooks, 604 S.W.2d 330, 334-35 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Reynolds Brothers, Incorporated v. Dodson, 380 S.W.2d 678, 681-82 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1964, no writ); Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1963, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co.
green
2 sentences2009However, when the wrongdoer “has provided for those damages, either by personal payment or insurance payment, the damage claim has been satisfied”; to permit the injured party in such circumstances to keep the insurance money and also collect from the wrongdoer “would be a double recovery not sanctioned by law.” Id. at 935 (citing Publix Theatres Corp. v. Powell, 71 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1934)). 2009However, when the wrongdoer “has provided for those damages, either by personal payment or insurance payment, the damage claim has been satisfied”; to permit the injured party in such circumstances to keep the insurance money and also collect from the wrongdoer “would be a double recovery not sanctioned by law.” Id. at 935 (citing Publix Theatres Corp. v. Powell, 123 Tex. 304 , 71 S.W.2d 237 (1934)). | 3 | 1982–2009 |
Publix Theatres Corp. v. Powell
green
2 sentences2009However, when the wrongdoer “has provided for those damages, either by personal payment or insurance payment, the damage claim has been satisfied”; to permit the injured party in such circumstances to keep the insurance money and also collect from the wrongdoer “would be a double recovery not sanctioned by law.” Id. at 935 (citing Publix Theatres Corp. v. Powell, 71 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1934)). 2009However, when the wrongdoer “has provided for those damages, either by personal payment or insurance payment, the damage claim has been satisfied”; to permit the injured party in such circumstances to keep the insurance money and also collect from the wrongdoer “would be a double recovery not sanctioned by law.” Id. at 935 (citing Publix Theatres Corp. v. Powell, 123 Tex. 304 , 71 S.W.2d 237 (1934)). | 3 | 1982–2009 |
County of Bexar v. Santikos
green
2 sentences2008Santikos, 144 S.W.3d at 459 ; Interstate Northborough, 66 S.W.3d at 220 . 1. 2008Santikos, 144 S.W.3d at 459 ; Interstate Northborough, 66 S.W.3d at 220 . 1. | 3 | 2007–2008 |
Interstate Northborough Partnership v. State
green
2 sentences2008Santikos, 144 S.W.3d at 459 ; Interstate Northborough, 66 S.W.3d at 220 . 1. 2008Santikos, 144 S.W.3d at 459 ; Interstate Northborough, 66 S.W.3d at 220 . 1. | 3 | 2007–2008 |
Leleaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Independent School District
green
1 sentence2021In other words, the damage claim must be based on “more than mere involvement of property”; rather, “the use or operation ‘must have actually caused the injury.’” Id. (quoting Tex. Nat. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Rentech Steel, L.L.C. v. Teel
green
1 sentence2019After explaining the purpose of the collateral source rule, the Eastland Court of Appeals stated, “However, when the wrongdoer ‘has provided for those damages, either by personal payment or insurance payment, the damage claim has been satisfied’; to permit the injured party in such circumstances to keep the insurance money and also collect from the wrongdoer ‘would be a double recovery not sanctioned by law.’” Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Henry v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Henry, 70 S.W.3d at 809 (quoting Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 804 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Fodge
green
1 sentence2018Henry, 70 S.W.3d at 809 (quoting Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 804 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Manuel
green
1 sentence2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 35 DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Manuel, 362 S.W.3d 160 (2012) Chrysler provides no case law stating that parol evidence of the parties' true intent as an issue of fact is required when a contract is ambiguous. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Perez v. Hung Kien Luu
green
1 sentence2015Note that the general damage standard was changed in 1995 from "actual damages," to "economic damages." Actual damages, however, remains the damage standard under section 17.SO(h) for violation of"tie-in" statutes. 145 id. at§ 17.45(11 ). 146 ln Perez v. Luu, 244 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App. Eastland 2007, no pet.h.), the court apparently did not understand the purpose of the benefit of the bargain rule, and its objectives. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lexington Insurance Company, as Subrogee of Burr Computer Environments, Inc. and J. Supor and Sons Trucking and Rigging Co. v. Daybreak Express, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Liberty Seafood, Inc. v. Herndon Marine Products, Inc.
green
1 sentence1999Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.
green
2 sentences1996The Court said, however, "Here we hold that where the requirement of a jury trial has been satisfied by a verdict according to law upon one issue of fact, that requirement does not compel a new trial of that issue even though another and separable issue must be tried again." Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. at 499 , 51 S.Ct. at 515 . 1996The Court said, however, "Here we hold that where the requirement of a jury trial has been satisfied by a verdict according to law upon one issue of fact, that requirement does not compel a new trial of that issue even though another and separable issue must be tried again." Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. at 499 , 51 S.Ct. at 515 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Holt Atherton Industries, Inc. v. Heine
green
1 sentence1994In Heine , the supreme court reversed an award of lost profits to a plaintiff who had two bulldozers, debilitating damage to one of which was the basis of the damage claim. 835 S.W.2d at 84-85 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ex Parte Coffee
green
2 sentences1980Ex parte Coffee, 160 Tex. 224 , 328 S.W.2d 283 . 1980Ex parte Coffee, 160 Tex. 224 , 328 S.W.2d 283 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Inman v. Padrezas green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Crutcher-Rolfs-Cummings, Inc. v. Ballard
green
1 sentence1978Crutcher-Rolfs-Cummings, Inc. v. Ballard, supra; Inman v. Padrezas, supra; Whitson Company, Inc., v. Bluff Creek Oil Company, supra. The gist of this argument, as we understand it, is that the damage clause contained in the deed obligates lessee to compensate plaintiffs for any damages caused to the plaintiffs’ surface estate by lessee’s drilling operations. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| City of Fort Worth v. Satterwhite neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Iron Gate Bank v. Brady green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Patton v. Brady green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Lassell v. City of Gloversville neutral | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.