damage claim in Georgia

2002Under these circumstances, we find that the claim for pain and suffering is a claim “arising out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence” set forth in the original complaint pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-15 (c), see, e.g., Day v. Norman, 207 Ga. App. 37 ( 427 SE2d 31 ) (1993), and may be treated as an amendment by a party plaintiff relating back to the date of the original complaint for statute of limitation purposes.

2002Under these circumstances, we find that the claim for pain and suffering is a claim “arising out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence” set forth in the original complaint pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-15 (c), see, e.g., Day v. Norman, 207 Ga. App. 37 ( 427 SE2d 31 ) (1993), and may be treated as an amendment by a party plaintiff relating back to the date of the original complaint for statute of limitation purposes.

1990See Agnor's Georgia Evidence (2nd ed.), § 11-18; Massee-Felton Lumber Co. v. Sirmans, 122 Ga. 297, 299-300 (2) ( 50 SE 92 ) (1905).

1990See Agnor’s Georgia Evidence (2nd ed.), § 11-18; Massee-Felton Lumber Co. v. Sirmans, 122 Ga. 297, 299-300 (2) ( 50 SE 92 ) (1905).

1987If a private home instead of a "dance club" had been involved in this case, such high-handedness would not have been approved by the majority of this court. "[T]he definition of property interest under the damage clause in inverse condemnation cases ... is broader than under direct condemnation where all or part of the fee is taken." MARTA v. Trussell, 247 Ga. 148 , 150 n. 5 ( 273 SE2d 859 ) (1981).

1987If a private home instead of a "dance club" had been involved in this case, such high-handedness would not have been approved by the majority of this court. "[T]he definition of property interest under the damage clause in inverse condemnation cases ... is broader than under direct condemnation where all or part of the fee is taken." MARTA v. Trussell, 247 Ga. 148 , 150 n. 5 ( 273 SE2d 859 ) (1981).

1987The majority, thus, ignores a fundamental distinction when it relies on a direct condemnation case, Housing Auth. of Decatur v. Schroeder, 222 Ga. 417 ( 151 SE2d 226 ) (1966), to support the proposition that losses occurring before actual condemnation "are not compensable." Here, no direct condemnation has occurred, but damage to the appellant's property interest, a leasehold interest, has undoubtedly occurred as a result of the actions of the DOT and the local governments involved.

1987The majority, thus, ignores a fundamental distinction when it relies on a direct condemnation case, Housing Auth. of Decatur v. Schroeder, 222 Ga. 417 ( 151 SE2d 226 ) (1966), to support the proposition that losses occurring before actual condemnation "are not compensable." Here, no direct condemnation has occurred, but damage to the appellant's property interest, a leasehold interest, has undoubtedly occurred as a result of the actions of the DOT and the local governments involved.

1982A factual situation similar to that presented here was addressed in Cotton v. Federal Land Bank, 246 Ga. 188 ( 269 SE2d 422 ) (1980), the only pertinent difference being that in Cotton a copy of the answer filed in district court was attached to the removal petition filed in superior court.

1982A factual situation similar to that presented here was addressed in Cotton v. Federal Land Bank, 246 Ga. 188 ( 269 SE2d 422 ) (1980), the only pertinent difference being that in Cotton a copy of the answer filed in district court was attached to the removal petition filed in superior court.

1981Compare Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432 ( 249 SE2d 235 ) (1978); Bowers v. Fulton County, 221 Ga. 731 ( 146 SE2d 884 ) (1966). 6 We here express no opinion as to the propriety of a permanent injunction.

1981Compare Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432 ( 249 SE2d 235 ) (1978); Bowers v. Fulton County, 221 Ga. 731 ( 146 SE2d 884 ) (1966). 6 We here express no opinion as to the propriety of a permanent injunction.

1981Such a requirement makes little sense in a case such as this, for the primary reason that the claim for damages in a suit brought against a county under § 95A-305 (a) is really against the DOT, and it is the DOT which has the authority to settle the damage claim. 3 But see Evans County v. McDonald, 133 Ga. App. 955 (1) ( 213 SE2d 82 ) (1975) (holding that in a suit against a county under § 95A-305 (a), notice of the claim must be given to the county as required by § 23-1602).

1981Such a requirement makes little sense in a case such as this, for the primary reason that the claim for damages in a suit brought against a county under § 95A-305 (a) is really against the DOT, and it is the DOT which has the authority to settle the damage claim. 3 But see Evans County v. McDonald, 133 Ga. App. 955 (1) ( 213 SE2d 82 ) (1975) (holding that in a suit against a county under § 95A-305 (a), notice of the claim must be given to the county as required by § 23-1602).

1943If it be so defective as not to protect the plaintiff in fi. fa., and no amendment be offered, the claim will be dismissed.” Lee v. Mills, 69 Ga. 740 . 2.

1929Where property was levied upon by virtue of a distress warrant, and was claimed by a third person from whom the sheriff accepted the usual damage and claim bonds, and to whom he delivered the property, the sheriff could not afterwards discharge or waive any of the terms of the claim bond “so as to affect the interest therein of the plaintiff in fi. fa., without his consent.” Boyd v. Crews, 32 Ga. App. 138 (5) ( 122 S. E. 802 ), Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Cochran, 37 Ga. App. 794 (1) ( 141 S. E. 919 ).

1929Where property was levied upon by virtue of a distress warrant, and was claimed by a third person from whom the sheriff accepted the usual damage and claim bonds, and to whom he delivered the property, the sheriff could not afterwards discharge or waive any of the terms of the claim bond “so as to affect the interest therein of the plaintiff in fi. fa., without his consent.” Boyd v. Crews, 32 Ga. App. 138 (5) ( 122 S. E. 802 ), Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Cochran, 37 Ga. App. 794 (1) ( 141 S. E. 919 ).

1929Where property was levied upon by virtue of a distress warrant, and was claimed by a third person from whom the sheriff accepted the usual damage and claim bonds, and to whom he delivered the property, the sheriff could not afterwards discharge or waive any of the terms of the claim bond “so as to affect the interest therein of the plaintiff in fi. fa., without his consent.” Boyd v. Crews, 32 Ga. App. 138 (5) ( 122 S. E. 802 ), Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Cochran, 37 Ga. App. 794 (1) ( 141 S. E. 919 ).

1929Where property was levied upon by virtue of a distress warrant, and was claimed by a third person from whom the sheriff accepted the usual damage and claim bonds, and to whom he delivered the property, the sheriff could not afterwards discharge or waive any of the terms of the claim bond “so as to affect the interest therein of the plaintiff in fi. fa., without his consent.” Boyd v. Crews, 32 Ga. App. 138 (5) ( 122 S. E. 802 ), Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Cochran, 37 Ga. App. 794 (1) ( 141 S. E. 919 ).