18 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2021 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hayes v. Northern Hills General Hospitalgreen2 sentences2021Hosp., 590 N.W.2d 243, 250 (S.D. 1999) (stating that it must be “reasonably probable that [the] prospective economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendants’ conduct” (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). 27 [¶56] We need not answer the question whether NEA, as the controlling shareholder in ACT, shares a unity of interest with ACT preventing it also from being a viable defendant, see, e.g., Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783, 801 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding under Michigan law that the interests of a controlling shareholder are t 2021Hosp., 590 N.W.2d 243, 250 (S.D. 1999) (stating that it must be “reasonably probable that [the] prospective economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendants’ conduct” (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). 27 [¶56] We need not answer the question whether NEA, as the controlling shareholder in ACT, shares a unity of interest with ACT preventing it also from being a viable defendant, see, e.g., Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783, 801 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding under Michigan law that the interests of a controlling shareholder are t | 2 | 2 |
Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co. Ltd. Moog, Inc.green2 sentences2021Hosp., 590 N.W.2d 243, 250 (S.D. 1999) (stating that it must be “reasonably probable that [the] prospective economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendants’ conduct” (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). 27 [¶56] We need not answer the question whether NEA, as the controlling shareholder in ACT, shares a unity of interest with ACT preventing it also from being a viable defendant, see, e.g., Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783, 801 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding under Michigan law that the interests of a controlling shareholder are t 2021Hosp., 590 N.W.2d 243, 250 (S.D. 1999) (stating that it must be “reasonably probable that [the] prospective economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendants’ conduct” (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). 27 [¶56] We need not answer the question whether NEA, as the controlling shareholder in ACT, shares a unity of interest with ACT preventing it also from being a viable defendant, see, e.g., Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783, 801 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding under Michigan law that the interests of a controlling shareholder are t | 2 | 2 |
Rutland v. Mullengreen2 sentences2016The plaintiff’s action was then brought against the defendant for alleged interference with the plaintiff’s contractual or anticipated beneficial economic relationship with the identified third party. [¶33] In Currie, we outlined the elements of a tortious interference claim as follows: “Tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage requires a plaintiff to prove: (1) that a valid contract or prospective economic advantage existed; (2) that the defendant interfered with that contract or advantage through fraud or intimidation; and (3) that such interference proximately caused dama 2016The plaintiff’s action was then brought against the defendant for alleged interference with the plaintiff’s contractual or anticipated beneficial economic relationship with the identified third party. [¶33] In Currie, we outlined the elements of a tortious interference claim as follows: “Tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage requires a plaintiff to prove: (1) that a valid contract or prospective economic advantage existed; (2) that the defendant interfered with that contract or advantage through fraud or intimidation; and (3) that such interference proximately caused dama | 1 | 7 |
Petit v. Key Bank of Mainegreen2 sentences2016Petit, 688 A.2d at 430 . 2016Petit, 688 A.2d at 430 . | 1 | 3 |
James v. MacDonaldgreen2 sentences2000TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE [¶ 14] Betty asserts that she presented sufficient evidence to establish that the Cummingses and Crest interfered with her relationship with GG & F. To succeed on a tortious interference claim, Betty needed to establish (1) “the existence of a valid contract or prospective economic advantage;” (2) “interference with that contract or advantage through fraud or intimidation;” and (3) “damages proximately caused by the interference.” James v. MacDonald, 1998 ME 148, ¶ 7 , 712 A.2d 1054, 1057 . [¶ 15] Betty failed to establish any interference with her relationship with GG & 2000TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE [¶ 14] Betty asserts that she presented sufficient evidence to establish that the Cummingses and Crest interfered with her relationship with GG & F. To succeed on a tortious interference claim, Betty needed to establish (1) “the existence of a valid contract or prospective economic advantage;” (2) “interference with that contract or advantage through fraud or intimidation;” and (3) “damages proximately caused by the interference.” James v. MacDonald, 1998 ME 148, ¶ 7 , 712 A.2d 1054, 1057 . [¶ 15] Betty failed to establish any interference with her relationship with GG & | 1 | 2 |
Smith v. Natl. W. Lifegreen2 sentences2018"Courts have overwhelmingly found that if a defamation claim fails on the statute of limitations, so too must a tortious interference claim based on the same conduct as the defamation claim." Smith v. National Western Life, 2017 Ohio 4184 ,r 13, 92 N.E.3d 169, 173 (Ohio App. 2017), citing federal and state cases from Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Texas, New York, California, Kansas, New Jersey, and Florida. 2018"Courts have overwhelmingly found that if a defamation claim fails on the statute of limitations, so too must a tortious interference claim based on the same conduct as the defamation claim." Smith v. National Western Life, 2017 Ohio 4184 ,r 13, 92 N.E.3d 169, 173 (Ohio App. 2017), citing federal and state cases from Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Texas, New York, California, Kansas, New Jersey, and Florida. | 1 | 1 |
Burdzel v. Sobusgreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6 , 750 A.2d 573, 575 . *409 [¶ 35] A jury may decide the tortious interference claim adversely to Cunde based on the lack of any direct evidence of intimidation. 2007See, e.g., Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6 , 750 A.2d 573, 575 . *409 [¶ 35] A jury may decide the tortious interference claim adversely to Cunde based on the lack of any direct evidence of intimidation. | 1 | 1 |
Grover v. Minette-Mills, Inc.green1 sentence2006Grover v. Minette-Mills, Inc., 638 A.2d 712, 716 (Me. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
CRY v. Cotegreen1 sentence2004See Avery v. Whately, 670 A.2d 922, 924-25 (Me. 1996) and Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1017 (Me. 1979). | 1 | 1 |
Avery v. Whatleygreen1 sentence2004See Avery v. Whately, 670 A.2d 922, 924-25 (Me. 1996) and Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1017 (Me. 1979). | 1 | 1 |
Withers v. Hackettgreen2 sentences2002See Withers v. Hackett, 1999 ME 117, ¶ 8 , 734 A.2d 189, 191 . [¶ 20] We address the legal issues regarding the compensatory damages award because these issues are likely to reappear on remand. 2002See Withers v. Hackett, 1999 ME 117, ¶ 8 , 734 A.2d 189, 191 . [¶ 20] We address the legal issues regarding the compensatory damages award because these issues are likely to reappear on remand. | 1 | 1 |
Prescott v. State Tax Assessorgreen1 sentence2000See Prescott, 1998 ME 250, ¶ 5 , 721 A.2d at 171-72. [¶ 7] Klemens argues that the court erred when it concluded that his claim for tortious interference was barred by the six-year limitations period of 14 M.R.S.A. § 752 (1980). 4 Klemens contends that given the nature of the tortious interference claim, the limitations period “must ... run only upon the death of the testator” because the claimant typically will not know about the drafting of the decedent’s will and will be unaware of its contents until after the decedent’s death. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Currie v. Industrial Security, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021Hosp., 590 N.W.2d 243, 250 (S.D. 1999) (stating that it must be “reasonably probable that [the] prospective economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendants’ conduct” (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). 27 [¶56] We need not answer the question whether NEA, as the controlling shareholder in ACT, shares a unity of interest with ACT preventing it also from being a viable defendant, see, e.g., Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783, 801 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding under Michigan law that the interests of a controlling shareholder are t 2021Hosp., 590 N.W.2d 243, 250 (S.D. 1999) (stating that it must be “reasonably probable that [the] prospective economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendants’ conduct” (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). 27 [¶56] We need not answer the question whether NEA, as the controlling shareholder in ACT, shares a unity of interest with ACT preventing it also from being a viable defendant, see, e.g., Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783, 801 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding under Michigan law that the interests of a controlling shareholder are t | 3 | 2016–2021 |
Pombriant v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine
green
2 sentences2021Hosp., 590 N.W.2d 243, 250 (S.D. 1999) (stating that it must be “reasonably probable that [the] prospective economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendants’ conduct” (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). 27 [¶56] We need not answer the question whether NEA, as the controlling shareholder in ACT, shares a unity of interest with ACT preventing it also from being a viable defendant, see, e.g., Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783, 801 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding under Michigan law that the interests of a controlling shareholder are t 2021Hosp., 590 N.W.2d 243, 250 (S.D. 1999) (stating that it must be “reasonably probable that [the] prospective economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendants’ conduct” (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). 27 [¶56] We need not answer the question whether NEA, as the controlling shareholder in ACT, shares a unity of interest with ACT preventing it also from being a viable defendant, see, e.g., Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783, 801 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding under Michigan law that the interests of a controlling shareholder are t | 3 | 2016–2021 |
Gordan v. Cummings
green
2 sentences2019To succeed on a tortious interference claim, a claimant must establish: “(1) the existence of a valid contract or prospective economic advantage; (2) interference with that contract or advantage through fraud or intimidation; and (3) damages proximately caused by the interference.” Gordan v. Cummings, 2000 ME 68, ¶ 14 , 756 A.2d 942 (quotation marks omitted). 2019To succeed on a tortious interference claim, a claimant must establish: “(1) the existence of a valid contract or prospective economic advantage; (2) interference with that contract or advantage through fraud or intimidation; and (3) damages proximately caused by the interference.” Gordan v. Cummings, 2000 ME 68, ¶ 14 , 756 A.2d 942 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Steeves v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.C.
green
2 sentences2014Finally, the court does not find any adequate basis to disturb the jury's finding that the Lilley defendants were professionally negligent. 2 concludes that the following issues raised by the Lilley defendants require further discussion: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide the claim that, absent malpractice by the Lilley defendants, the Sleepers would likely have prevailed on their tortious interference claim before the arbitrator; (2) whether there was adequate evidence to support the damages claimed on the tortious interference claim; (3) whether, given the 2014Finally, the court does not find any adequate basis to disturb the jury's finding that the Lilley defendants were professionally negligent. 2 concludes that the following issues raised by the Lilley defendants require further discussion: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide the claim that, absent malpractice by the Lilley defendants, the Sleepers would likely have prevailed on their tortious interference claim before the arbitrator; (2) whether there was adequate evidence to support the damages claimed on the tortious interference claim; (3) whether, given the | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Baker v. Charles
green
1 sentence2006For that proposition, Remmel relies on a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Maine, in whch that Court found that summary judgment should be granted on a tortious interference claim because "the plaintiffs had no 'economic relationship' with . . . [the] governmental agency." Baker v. Charles, 919 F. Supp. 41 /46 (D. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.