tortious interference claim in California

2023It has long been the rule, however, that a plaintiff “need not allege an actual or inevitable breach of contract in order to state a claim for disruption of contractual relations.” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1129 .) It is enough that the defendants’ actions make “plaintiff’s performance . . . more costly or more burdensome.” (Ibid.) The July 19, 2018 letter from defendants’ attorney, although phrased as a “request[],” is reasonably interpreted as a threat of litigation if plaintiffs continued to 35 have contact with its clients.

2000In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 791 P.2d 587 ], our Supreme Court stated, “We have affirmed that interference with an at-will contract is *427 actionable interference with the contractual relationship, on the theory that a contract ‘ “at the will of the parties . . . does not make it one at the will of others” ’ [citations].” (Id. at p. 1127; PMC, Inc. v. Satan Entertainment, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 579, 599, fn. 15 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 877 ] [“In California, an at-will contract is an enforceable contract and thus it may be actionabl

2015(See LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 339-340 .) As the California Supreme Court stated in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th 376 , the two torts are analytically distinct.

2015(See LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 339-340 .) As the California Supreme Court stated in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th 376 , the two torts are analytically distinct.

2015(See LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 339-340 .) As the California Supreme Court stated in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th 376 , the two torts are analytically distinct.

2015(See LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 339-340 .) As the California Supreme Court stated in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th 376 , the two torts are analytically distinct.

2015PlaySafe had entered into several sub-distribution agreements, but these were subordinate to the Distribution Agreement and the Playboy License Agreement. 17 PlaySafe acknowledges that the sub-distribution agreements were unenforceable after UMD terminated the Distribution Agreement, but cites Zimmerman v. Bank of America (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 55, 57-58 , for the proposition that unenforceable contracts “qualify as contracts for the purpose of a tortious interference claim.” Zimmerman blurred the distinction between interference with contractual relations and interference with a prospective bu

2015PlaySafe had entered into several sub-distribution agreements, but these were subordinate to the Distribution Agreement and the Playboy License Agreement. 17 PlaySafe acknowledges that the sub-distribution agreements were unenforceable after UMD terminated the Distribution Agreement, but cites Zimmerman v. Bank of America (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 55, 57-58 , for the proposition that unenforceable contracts “qualify as contracts for the purpose of a tortious interference claim.” Zimmerman blurred the distinction between interference with contractual relations and interference with a prospective bu

2024The court in Rosario v. Livaditis (7th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 1013 relied on Video International in reversing the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial on damages.

2023(See Orozco, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 390 .) Defendants contend that eXteres “unilaterally” terminated the contracts at issue, so there is no evidence of causation in support of the tortious interference claim.

2017Additionally, we must consider whether expanding tort liability in the area of public works contracts "would ultimately create social benefits exceeding those created by existing remedies for such conduct, and outweighing any costs and burdens it would impose." ( Cedars - Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 , 8, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 , 954 P.2d 511 .) Courts must act prudently when fashioning damages remedies "in an area of law governed by an extensive statutory scheme." ( Kajima , supra , 23 Cal.4th at p. 317 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 1 P.3d 63 .) In California, public contra

2017Additionally, we must consider whether expanding tort liability in the area of public works contracts "would ultimately create social benefits exceeding those created by existing remedies for such conduct, and outweighing any costs and burdens it would impose." ( Cedars - Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 , 8, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 , 954 P.2d 511 .) Courts must act prudently when fashioning damages remedies "in an area of law governed by an extensive statutory scheme." ( Kajima , supra , 23 Cal.4th at p. 317 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 1 P.3d 63 .) In California, public contra

2017Additionally, we must consider whether expanding tort liability in the area of public works contracts "would ultimately create social benefits exceeding those created by existing remedies for such conduct, and outweighing any costs and burdens it would impose." ( Cedars - Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 , 8, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 , 954 P.2d 511 .) Courts must act prudently when fashioning damages remedies "in an area of law governed by an extensive statutory scheme." ( Kajima , supra , 23 Cal.4th at p. 317 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 1 P.3d 63 .) In California, public contra

2017Additionally, we must consider whether expanding tort liability in the area of public works contracts "would ultimately create social benefits exceeding those created by existing remedies for such conduct, and outweighing any costs and burdens it would impose." ( Cedars - Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 , 8, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 , 954 P.2d 511 .) Courts must act prudently when fashioning damages remedies "in an area of law governed by an extensive statutory scheme." ( Kajima , supra , 23 Cal.4th at p. 317 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 1 P.3d 63 .) In California, public contra

2017Thus, 'no facts are alleged ... showing that the plaintiff had any reasonable expectation of economic advantage which would otherwise have accrued to him....' [Citation.]" ( Ibid . ) Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64 , 233 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 729 P.2d 728 ( Youst ), held that the outcome of a sporting contest involving harness horseracing was too speculative to support a tortious interference claim. ( Id . at p. 74, 233 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 729 P.2d 728 .) The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had driven his horse into the path of the plaintiff's horse during a race and had struck plaintiff's horse

2017Thus, 'no facts are alleged ... showing that the plaintiff had any reasonable expectation of economic advantage which would otherwise have accrued to him....' [Citation.]" ( Ibid . ) Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64 , 233 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 729 P.2d 728 ( Youst ), held that the outcome of a sporting contest involving harness horseracing was too speculative to support a tortious interference claim. ( Id . at p. 74, 233 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 729 P.2d 728 .) The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had driven his horse into the path of the plaintiff's horse during a race and had struck plaintiff's horse

2015In Cedroni Associates, Inc. v. Tomblinson, Harburn Associates, Architects & Planners, Inc. (2012) 492 Mich. 40 (Cedroni Associates), the Michigan Supreme Court, in a summary disposition case, held that the disappointed lowest bidder on a public contract does not have a valid business expectancy for the purpose of sustaining a claim of tortious interference with a business expectancy.

2013(See Navellier v. Sletten (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 763, 773 [litigation privilege “is generally described as one that precludes liability in tort, not liability for breach of contract”].) In addition, our conclusion that the litigation privilege is inapplicable here obviates any need to address whether Regency forfeited the right to invoke the litigation privilege by failing to object during Phase I of the trial, or was estopped from asserting the privilege because it injected the same communications into evidence at trial to support its own claims. 23 Fragomeno, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 830