tortious interference claim in Minnesota

2015The court of appeals affirmed, citing our decision in Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 362 (Minn.1998), for the proposition that “a party who relies on the advice of outside counsel may be justified in interfering with a contractual relationship.” Sysdyne Corp. v. Rousslang, No. A13-0898, 2014 WL 902713 , at *4 (Minn.App.

2015The court of appeals affirmed, citing our decision in Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 362 (Minn. 1998), for the proposition that “a party who relies on the advice of outside counsel may be justified in interfering with a contractual relationship.” Sysdyne Corp. v. Rousslang, No. A13-0898, 2014 WL 902713 , at *4 (Minn. App. Mar. 10, 2014).

1995See Royal, 244 Minn. at 292, 69 N.W.2d at 671 (plaintiff must prove existence of contract). 6.

1995See Royal, 244 Minn. at 292, 69 N.W.2d at 671 (plaintiff must prove existence of contract). 6.

2026See Krause v. Farber, 379 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Minn. App. 1985) (analyzing intentional torts), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1986).

2014“The mere hope that some ... past customers may choose to buy again cannot be the basis for a tortious interference claim.” Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So.2d 812, 815 (Fla.1994).

2014Conservation Dist., 29 Kan.App.2d 746 , 31 P.3d 970, 976 (2001) (stating that an allegation of “general damage to [plaintiffs] reputation as a business” is insufficient for a tortious interference claim) We recognize, as Gieseke testified, that Diversified could no longer conduct its business after IDCA seized the company’s equipment.

2014Conservation Dist., 29 Kan.App.2d 746 , 31 P.3d 970, 976 (2001) (stating that an allegation of “general damage to [plaintiffs] reputation as a business” is insufficient for a tortious interference claim) We recognize, as Gieseke testified, that Diversified could no longer conduct its business after IDCA seized the company’s equipment.

2011In Hoffman , we similarly concluded that, although claims that involve judicial enforcement of a tariff do not “infringe on discretionary authority vested in the agency,” claims that “seek to expand services beyond what is provided for in the tariff ... indirectly challenge the reasonableness of the filed rates, and the filed rate doctrine bars the judiciary from considering such claims.” 764 N.W.2d at 44 (emphasis added) (citing ICOM Holding, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 238 F.3d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir.2001)).

2011In Hoffman , we similarly concluded that, although claims that involve judicial enforcement of a tariff do not “infringe on discretionary authority vested in the agency,” claims that “seek to expand services beyond what is provided for in the tariff ... indirectly challenge the reasonableness of the filed rates, and the filed rate doctrine bars the judiciary from considering such claims.” 764 N.W.2d at 44 (emphasis added) (citing ICOM Holding, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 238 F.3d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir.2001)).

2002In Nordling , the supreme court reserved the issue of “[w]hether a tortious interference claim against a [non-supervisory] co-employee * * * might ever lie.” Id. at 507 .

2002Id. at 505 (emphasis added); see Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 361 (Minn.1998) (stating that its holding in Nordling was “that third party ‘meddlers’ should not be permitted to interfere with an at-will employment agreement”).

1993See id. (purchase agreement contingent on preceding owner’s declining to exercise statutory right of first refusal constituted contract for purposes of tortious interference claim).

1993See Midway Manor Convalescent & Nursing Home v. Adcock, 386 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn.App.1986) (applying discretionary tort immunity under Minn. Stat. § 466.03 , subd. 6 to claim of tortious interference with business relations).

1988See American Warehousing, 414 N.W.2d at 558 .