tortious interference claim in Iowa

2026“In such cases a tort remedy is not necessary as the plaintiff has an adequate remedy for breach of contract.” Baysden v. Hitchcock, 553 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); see also Tyler v. Percell, 506 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (“The rationale behind such a holding is where both parties are parties to the contract, it is a breach of the agreement and the proper remedy is a suit for breach of contract.”); Irons v. Cmty. State Bank, 461 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the “trial court erred by instructing the jury that a party may [tortiously] interfere [with] i

2026“In such cases a tort remedy is not necessary as the plaintiff has an adequate remedy for breach of contract.” Baysden v. Hitchcock, 553 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); see also Tyler v. Percell, 506 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (“The rationale behind such a holding is where both parties are parties to the contract, it is a breach of the agreement and the proper remedy is a suit for breach of contract.”); Irons v. Cmty. State Bank, 461 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the “trial court erred by instructing the jury that a party may [tortiously] interfere [with] i

2026“In such cases a tort remedy is not necessary as the plaintiff has an adequate remedy for breach of contract.” Baysden v. Hitchcock, 553 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); see also Tyler v. Percell, 506 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (“The rationale behind such a holding is where both parties are parties to the contract, it is a breach of the agreement and the proper remedy is a suit for breach of contract.”); Irons v. Cmty. State Bank, 461 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the “trial court erred by instructing the jury that a party may [tortiously] interfere [with] i

2026“In such cases a tort remedy is not necessary as the plaintiff has an adequate remedy for breach of contract.” Baysden v. Hitchcock, 553 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); see also Tyler v. Percell, 506 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (“The rationale behind such a holding is where both parties are parties to the contract, it is a breach of the agreement and the proper remedy is a suit for breach of contract.”); Irons v. Cmty. State Bank, 461 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the “trial court erred by instructing the jury that a party may [tortiously] interfere [with] i

2026Generally, it is not “possible to tortiously interfere with a contract to which one is a party,” and we have “decline[d] to recognize a tortious interference claim” when “[n]o third parties were involved.” Klooster v. N. Iowa State Bank, 30 404 N.W.2d 564, 570 (Iowa 1987).

2026Generally, it is not “possible to tortiously interfere with a contract to which one is a party,” and we have “decline[d] to recognize a tortious interference claim” when “[n]o third parties were involved.” Klooster v. N. Iowa State Bank, 30 404 N.W.2d 564, 570 (Iowa 1987).

2026In Tyler v. Percell, the court of appeals reinstated a tortious interference claim between parties to a contract when the breaching defendant separately conspired with third parties to withhold rents from the plaintiff. 506 N.W.2d at 807, 808.

2026In Tyler v. Percell, the court of appeals reinstated a tortious interference claim between parties to a contract when the breaching defendant separately conspired with third parties to withhold rents from the plaintiff. 506 N.W.2d at 807, 808 .

2020After all, the same issues are present in both cases—the testator who is “not available to testify” and the difficulty of 20 “distinguish[ing] ordinary permissible influences . . . from improper coercion.” See id. at 105 .

2020See Burkhalter, 841 N.W.2d at 106 (“[U]ndue influence must dominate the motives of the testator in executing his will.” (quoting In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Iowa 1984))); In re Estate of Bayer, 574 N.W.2d 667, 671 (Iowa 1998) (“Undue influence must be such as to substitute the will of the person exercising the influence for that of the testator, thereby making the writing express, not the purpose and intent of the testator, but that of the person exercising the influence.” (quoting In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d at 531–32)).

2020See Burkhalter, 841 N.W.2d at 106 (“[U]ndue influence must dominate the motives of the testator in executing his will.” (quoting In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Iowa 1984))); In re Estate of Bayer, 574 N.W.2d 667, 671 (Iowa 1998) (“Undue influence must be such as to substitute the will of the person exercising the influence for that of the testator, thereby making the writing express, not the purpose and intent of the testator, but that of the person exercising the influence.” (quoting In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d at 531–32)).

2020See, e.g., Hainer v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 78 Iowa 245, 252 , 43 N.W. 185, 187 (1889) (“One who has taken a beneficial interest under a will is thereby held to have confirmed and ratified every other part of the same, and he will not be permitted to set up any right or claim of his own, however legal and well founded it may otherwise have been, which would defeat or in any way prevent the full operation of the will.” (quoting Bigelow, Estop. 642)).

2020See, e.g., Hainer v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 78 Iowa 245, 252 , 43 N.W. 185, 187 (1889) (“One who has taken a beneficial interest under a will is thereby held to have confirmed and ratified every other part of the same, and he will not be permitted to set up any right or claim of his own, however legal and well founded it may otherwise have been, which would defeat or in any way prevent the full operation of the will.” (quoting Bigelow, Estop. 642)).

2020See Burkhalter, 841 N.W.2d at 106 (“[U]ndue influence must dominate the motives of the testator in executing his will.” (quoting In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Iowa 1984))); In re Estate of Bayer, 574 N.W.2d 667, 671 (Iowa 1998) (“Undue influence must be such as to substitute the will of the person exercising the influence for that of the testator, thereby making the writing express, not the purpose and intent of the testator, but that of the person exercising the influence.” (quoting In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d at 531–32)).

2020See Burkhalter, 841 N.W.2d at 106 (“[U]ndue influence must dominate the motives of the testator in executing his will.” (quoting In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Iowa 1984))); In re Estate of Bayer, 574 N.W.2d 667, 671 (Iowa 1998) (“Undue influence must be such as to substitute the will of the person exercising the influence for that of the testator, thereby making the writing express, not the purpose and intent of the testator, but that of the person exercising the influence.” (quoting In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d at 531–32)).

2019See id.

1987In Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Iowa 1982), we left open the question of whether it is possible to tortiously interfere with a contract to which one is a party.