tortious interference claim in Utah

2023England, 2019 UT 8, ¶ 42 .) But Commercial Club offers no authority to support the proposition that engaging in a voidable transfer is “independently wrongful or tortious conduct” that establishes not only a cause of action under the UVTA but also the improper means element of a tortious interference claim. ¶62 Even assuming that the conduct described in subsection (1)(b) constitutes “independently tortious or wrongful conduct,” 20200747-CA 24 2023 UT App 37 Commercial Club v. Global Rescue the jury’s verdict voiding the transfer does not establish that Global Rescue used improper means to tor

2019Agency, Inc., 2013 UT App 202, ¶ 20 , 309 P.3d 267 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 Cite as: 2019 UT 8 Opinion of the Court ¶47 For example, in Walker v. Anderson-Oliver Title Insurance Agency, Inc., the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment against a plaintiff’s tortious interference claim because “the evidence [the plaintiff] offer[ed] [was] legally insufficient to establish a title insurance industry standard,” and, therefore, the plaintiff could not prove improper means. 84 In doing so, the court explained that “[e]stablishing an industry standard requires mor

2023Here, however, the district court’s entry of JNOV rested on the court’s earlier ruling that granted partial summary judgment on the tortious interference claim. ¶54 To succeed on a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, the plaintiff must prove: “(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s existing or potential economic relations, (2) by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.” Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 70 , 345 P.3d 553 (cleaned up).

2023Here, however, the district court’s entry of JNOV rested on the court’s earlier ruling that granted partial summary judgment on the tortious interference claim. ¶54 To succeed on a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, the plaintiff must prove: “(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s existing or potential economic relations, (2) by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.” Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 70 , 345 P.3d 553 (cleaned up).

2019Ky. 2009) ("Under Kentucky law, significantly wrongful conduct certainly includes fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, coercion, threats of illegal conduct, and physical violence, which are specifically highlighted as improper acts."); Carvel Corp. v. Noonan , 3 N.Y.3d 182 , 785 N.Y.S.2d 359 , 818 N.E.2d 1100 , 1102-03 (2004) (requiring proof of an "independently unlawful act" to prevail on a tortious interference claim); Thimjon Farms P'ship v. First Int'l Bank & Tr. , 837 N.W.2d 327 , 335 (N.D. 2013) ("[I]n order to recover for wrongful interference with business, the plaintiff must prove t

2019Ky. 2009) ("Under Kentucky law, significantly wrongful conduct certainly includes fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, coercion, threats of illegal conduct, and physical violence, which are specifically highlighted as improper acts."); Carvel Corp. v. Noonan , 3 N.Y.3d 182 , 785 N.Y.S.2d 359 , 818 N.E.2d 1100 , 1102-03 (2004) (requiring proof of an "independently unlawful act" to prevail on a tortious interference claim); Thimjon Farms P'ship v. First Int'l Bank & Tr. , 837 N.W.2d 327 , 335 (N.D. 2013) ("[I]n order to recover for wrongful interference with business, the plaintiff must prove t

2026Civil Conspiracy ¶18 To prove the tort of civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show “clear and convincing evidence” of “(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof.” Pyper v. Reil, 2018 UT App 200, ¶ 16 , 437 P.3d 493 (cleaned up).

2026Civil Conspiracy ¶18 To prove the tort of civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show “clear and convincing evidence” of “(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof.” Pyper v. Reil, 2018 UT App 200, ¶ 16 , 437 P.3d 493 (cleaned up).

2026Tortious Interference ¶16 “To recover damages for tortious interference a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.” Musselman v. Keele, 2024 UT App 143, ¶ 21 , 559 P.3d 64 (cleaned up).

2026Tortious Interference ¶16 “To recover damages for tortious interference a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.” Musselman v. Keele, 2024 UT App 143, ¶ 21 , 559 P.3d 64 (cleaned up).

2024England’s aims. 20220997-CA 29 2024 UT App 137 England Logistics v. Kelleֹ’s Transport And such a determination is affirmed so long as the court’s “decision about who prevailed was based on an approach that was flexible and reasoned.” Neff, 2011 UT 6, ¶ 70 .

2024England’s aims. 20220997-CA 29 2024 UT App 137 England Logistics v. Kelleֹ’s Transport And such a determination is affirmed so long as the court’s “decision about who prevailed was based on an approach that was flexible and reasoned.” Neff, 2011 UT 6, ¶ 70 .

2023We also vacate the district court’s alter ego determination and remand for further findings because the basis for the court’s finding that an inequitable result would occur is not clear on the record. 20200747-CA 2 2023 UT App 37 Commercial Club v. Global Rescue ¶5 For its part, Commercial Club challenges the district court’s grant of JNOV in favor of Global Rescue on the tortious interference claim.

2023But in ruling on Global Rescue’s motion for partial summary judgment, the court dismissed the tortious interference claim except to the extent it alleged, as the improper means, “a fraudulent transfer based on actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor.” The court reasoned that an intentional fraudulent transfer under Utah Code subsection 25-6-202(1)(a) “involves conduct similar to deceit and misrepresentation,” which our supreme court has identified as 20200747-CA 21 2023 UT App 37 Commercial Club v. Global Rescue improper means. 9 Utah Code § 25-6-202(1)(a).

2023Because the jury did not find intentional fraudulent transfer, we have no occasion to review the district court’s pre-trial ruling that a transfer by a debtor “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor” constitutes improper means for purposes of a tortious interference claim against the transferee. 20200747-CA 22 2023 UT App 37 Commercial Club v. Global Rescue same litigation.” IHC Health Services., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 26 , 196 P.3d 588 (cleaned up).

2023Because the jury did not find intentional fraudulent transfer, we have no occasion to review the district court’s pre-trial ruling that a transfer by a debtor “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor” constitutes improper means for purposes of a tortious interference claim against the transferee. 20200747-CA 22 2023 UT App 37 Commercial Club v. Global Rescue same litigation.” IHC Health Services., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 26 , 196 P.3d 588 (cleaned up).

2021“The rule is that if adequate relief is available in a probate proceeding, then that remedy must be exhausted before a tortious interference claim may be pursued.” Id. at 218 .

2021Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court in DeWitt v. Duce reaffirmed Florida’s recognition of the “cause of action for wrongful interference with a testamentary expectancy,” but also held that “if adequate relief is available in a probate proceeding, then that remedy must be exhausted before a tortious interference claim may be pursued.” 408 So. 2d at 218 .

2020She attacked the elements of defamation and defamation per se that provide a statement is defamatory when it is false and not subject to privilege, see Jacob, 2009 UT 37, ¶ 21 ; Westmont Residential, 2014 UT App 291, ¶ 22 , and also consequently attacked the improper means element necessary to establish a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, see Anderson Dev.

2020Infra ¶ 8. 20190450-CA 3 2020 UT App 137 Eskamani v. Auto-Owners Ins. “statements [were] not defamatory and not actionable,” there was no basis for the tortious interference claim.

2020Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ¶ 20 , 116 P.3d 323 (quotation simplified). ¶29 In her first motion for summary judgment, Eskamani argued only that Auto-Owners’ “causes of action against [her] fail[ed] because . . . the statements alleged in [Auto-Owners’ complaint] are not capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning, as they are vague statements of opinion,” and “even if the statements were defamatory, the statements are privileged and not actionable.” Moreover, she argued that because her “statements are not defamatory and not actionable,” the tortious interference claim also failed because “there

2020Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ¶ 20 , 116 P.3d 323 (quotation simplified). ¶29 In her first motion for summary judgment, Eskamani argued only that Auto-Owners’ “causes of action against [her] fail[ed] because . . . the statements alleged in [Auto-Owners’ complaint] are not capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning, as they are vague statements of opinion,” and “even if the statements were defamatory, the statements are privileged and not actionable.” Moreover, she argued that because her “statements are not defamatory and not actionable,” the tortious interference claim also failed because “there

2020She attacked the elements of defamation and defamation per se that provide a statement is defamatory when it is false and not subject to privilege, see Jacob, 2009 UT 37, ¶ 21 ; Westmont Residential, 2014 UT App 291, ¶ 22 , and also consequently attacked the improper means element necessary to establish a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, see Anderson Dev.

2019Agency, Inc., 2013 UT App 202, ¶ 20 , 309 P.3d 267 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 Cite as: 2019 UT 8 Opinion of the Court ¶47 For example, in Walker v. Anderson-Oliver Title Insurance Agency, Inc., the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment against a plaintiff’s tortious interference claim because “the evidence [the plaintiff] offer[ed] [was] legally insufficient to establish a title insurance industry standard,” and, therefore, the plaintiff could not prove improper means. 84 In doing so, the court explained that “[e]stablishing an industry standard requires mor

2019Agency, Inc., 2013 UT App 202, ¶ 20 , 309 P.3d 267 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 Cite as: 2019 UT 8 Opinion of the Court ¶47 For example, in Walker v. Anderson-Oliver Title Insurance Agency, Inc., the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment against a plaintiff’s tortious interference claim because “the evidence [the plaintiff] offer[ed] [was] legally insufficient to establish a title insurance industry standard,” and, therefore, the plaintiff could not prove improper means. 84 In doing so, the court explained that “[e]stablishing an industry standard requires mor

2015In order to adjudicate that claim, a court would have to determine whether the defendant used a legal process "primarily to accomplish a purpose for which .it is not designed." (Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT 65, ¶ 17 , 981 P.2d 841 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2015In order to adjudicate that claim, a court would have to determine whether the defendant used a legal process "primarily to accomplish a purpose for which .it is not designed." (Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT 65, ¶ 17 , 981 P.2d 841 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).