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30 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Yousuf v. Cohlmiagreen2 sentences2021See id. at 1286-87 (“policy language referencing ‘the offense’ of ‘the publication of … other defamatory or disparaging material’ is broad enough to support coverage of certain claims for intentional inference with contract or business relations” (emphasis added)). 2021See id. at 1286-87 (“policy language referencing ‘the offense’ of ‘the publication of … other defamatory or disparaging material’ is broad enough to support coverage of certain claims for intentional inference with contract or business relations” (emphasis added)). | 3 | 3 |
Ritchey v. Maksingreen2 sentences2015Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly granted Michael's motion for summary judgment on the tortious interference claim. ¶ 79 Malicious Prosecution ¶ 80 For the malicious prosecution claim, plaintiffs needed to show "(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff." Ritchey v. Maksin, 71 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (1978). 2015Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly granted Michael’s motion for summary judgment on the tortious interference claim. ¶ 79 Malicious Prosecution ¶ 80 For the malicious prosecution claim, plaintiffs needed to show “(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.” Ritchey v. Maksin, 71 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Complete Conference Coordinators, Inc. v. Kumon North America, Inc.green2 sentences2011A claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship consists of the following elements: “(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and another; (2) the defendant's awareness of the contract; (3) the defendant's intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of the contract; (4) a subsequent breach by the other, caused by the defendant's conduct; and (5) damages.” Complete Conference Coordinators, Inc. v. Kumon North America, Inc., 394 Ill. 2011A claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship consists of the following elements: “(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and another; (2) the defendant’s awareness of the contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of the contract; (4) a subsequent breach by the other, caused by the defendant’s conduct; and (5) damages.” Complete Conference Coordinators, Inc. v. Kumon North America, Inc., 394 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Authoritygreen2 sentences2025It is well established that “Illinois courts require that a tortious interference claim be supported by allegations that the defendant acted 3 This cause of action is also known as “intentional interference with prospective economic advantage” (Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 406 (1996)). 540 North Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n v. MCZ Development Corp., 2025 IL App (1st) 230733, ¶ 37. -7- 2025 IL App (2d) 240703-U toward a third party.” Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Authority, 229 Ill. 2025It is well established that “Illinois courts require that a tortious interference claim be supported by allegations that the defendant acted 3 This cause of action is also known as “intentional interference with prospective economic advantage” (Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 406 (1996)). 540 North Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n v. MCZ Development Corp., 2025 IL App (1st) 230733, ¶ 37 . -7- 2025 IL App (2d) 240703-U toward a third party.” Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Authority, 229 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
Fellhauer v. City of Genevagreen2 sentences2023To support this assertion, the court cites our supreme court’s decision in Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 511 (1991), and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Webb v. Frawley, 906 F.3d 569, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2018). 1994(Fellhauer v. City of Geneva (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 495, 511 .) Additionally, Illinois courts require that a tortious interference claim be supported by allegations that the defendant acted toward a third party. | 1 | 2 |
Shriners Hospitals for Children v. Baumangreen2 sentences2012See also In re Estate of Boyar, 2012 IL App (1st) 111013, ¶ 30 . ¶ 24 Ellis went on to reconcile the plain language of subsection (a) with an earlier case in which the court barred a tortious interference claim “where a plaintiff foregoes an opportunity to file a [tortious interference] claim within the six-month period for a will contest.” Ellis, 236 Ill. 2d at 53 . 2012Thus, the “holding in Robinson was limited to not recognizing the tort action where plaintiffs have an opportunity to contest a probated will but choose not to do so, and subsequently enter into an agreement to take no further court action.” Ellis, 236 Ill. 2d at 54 . ¶ 27 In contrast, the court concluded, where a will contest remedy is not “available” to a litigant, that litigant may proceed with a tortious interference claim. | 1 | 2 |
DeWitt v. Ducegreen2 sentences2009The court acknowledged the rule in Florida that “ ‘if adequate relief is available in a probate proceeding, then that remedy must be exhausted before a tortious interference claim may be pursued.’ ” Schilling, 952 So. 2d at 1236 , quoting DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981). 1984Nevertheless, the DeWitt court went on to make the broad general statement that “[t]he rule is that if adequate relief is available in a probate proceeding, then that remedy must be exhausted before a tortious interference claim may be pursued” ( 408 So. 2d 216, 218 ), and suggested that what the plaintiffs might have done was offer the prior will for probate while attacking the later will on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity ( 408 So. 2d 216, 220 ). | 1 | 2 |
Clarage v. Kuzmagreen1 sentence2026See Clarage v. Kuzma, 342 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
540 North Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass'n v. MCZ Development Corp.green2 sentences2025It is well established that “Illinois courts require that a tortious interference claim be supported by allegations that the defendant acted 3 This cause of action is also known as “intentional interference with prospective economic advantage” (Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 406 (1996)). 540 North Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n v. MCZ Development Corp., 2025 IL App (1st) 230733, ¶ 37. -7- 2025 IL App (2d) 240703-U toward a third party.” Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Authority, 229 Ill. 2025It is well established that “Illinois courts require that a tortious interference claim be supported by allegations that the defendant acted 3 This cause of action is also known as “intentional interference with prospective economic advantage” (Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 406 (1996)). 540 North Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n v. MCZ Development Corp., 2025 IL App (1st) 230733, ¶ 37 . -7- 2025 IL App (2d) 240703-U toward a third party.” Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Authority, 229 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Boffa Surgical Group LLC v. Managed Healthcare Associates Ltd.green2 sentences2025See, e.g., Boffa, 2015 IL App (1st) 142984, ¶ 28 (“It is not enough for the defendant’s -9- 2025 IL App (2d) 240703-U action to impact a third party; rather, the defendant’s action must be directed towards the third party.”). 2025See, e.g., Boffa, 2015 IL App (1st) 142984, ¶ 28 (“It is not enough for the defendant’s -9- 2025 IL App (2d) 240703-U action to impact a third party; rather, the defendant’s action must be directed towards the third party.”). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Vanden Dorpelgreen2 sentences2025It is well established that “Illinois courts require that a tortious interference claim be supported by allegations that the defendant acted 3 This cause of action is also known as “intentional interference with prospective economic advantage” (Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 406 (1996)). 540 North Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n v. MCZ Development Corp., 2025 IL App (1st) 230733, ¶ 37. -7- 2025 IL App (2d) 240703-U toward a third party.” Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Authority, 229 Ill. 2025It is well established that “Illinois courts require that a tortious interference claim be supported by allegations that the defendant acted 3 This cause of action is also known as “intentional interference with prospective economic advantage” (Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 406 (1996)). 540 North Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n v. MCZ Development Corp., 2025 IL App (1st) 230733, ¶ 37 . -7- 2025 IL App (2d) 240703-U toward a third party.” Du Page Aviation Corp. v. Du Page Airport Authority, 229 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Nicholas Webb v. Michael Frawleygreen1 sentence2023To support this assertion, the court cites our supreme court’s decision in Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 511 (1991), and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Webb v. Frawley, 906 F.3d 569, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Landmark Properties, Inc. v. Architects International-Chicagogreen1 sentence2023See Landmark Properties, Inc. v. Architects International-Chicago, 172 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Kemper v. Worcestergreen1 sentence2023App. 3d 191, 195 (1990) (explaining that a tortious interference claim without an enforceable contract, such as a physician-patient’s terminable at will relationship, may be brought as a claim of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage); Kemper v. Worcester, 106 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleasongreen1 sentence2022Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 484 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Fletchergreen1 sentence2013See Turner, 302 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
In re Estate of Boyargreen1 sentence2012See also In re Estate of Boyar, 2012 IL App (1st) 111013, ¶ 30 . ¶ 24 Ellis went on to reconcile the plain language of subsection (a) with an earlier case in which the court barred a tortious interference claim “where a plaintiff foregoes an opportunity to file a [tortious interference] claim within the six-month period for a will contest.” Ellis, 236 Ill. 2d at 53 . | 1 | 1 |
Clifton-Strode, No. 2, Inc. v. Kentgreen1 sentence1994App. 3d 525, 529 , 442 N.E.2d 666, 668 (Heiple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that in a tortious interference claim, plaintiff need only prove that defendant acted intentionally and without justification). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello
green
2 sentences2023In fact, the record lacks any indication that Jacqueline and Kristen knew or should have known of the inter vivos transfers that they allege were the product of Judith’s coercion and fraud. ¶ 12 Jacqueline and Kristen argue that the cases the court relied upon, Robinson, 97 Ill. 2d 174 , and Ellis, 236 Ill. 2d 45 , are distinguishable because those plaintiffs did not file will contests within section 8-1 of the Act’s six-month limitations period but subsequently filed tort claims that required the courts to determine whether they could proceed. 2021Id. at 185-86 . | 5 | 2010–2023 |
Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass'n
green
1 sentence2026Lewis v. Lead Industries Association, 2020 IL 124107, ¶ 54 . ¶ 47 However, because we find that Panos is entitled to reversal on the trial court’s ruling granting summary judgment against him on the tortious interference claim, the basis for granting summary judgment on the civil conspiracy claim is no longer present. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. The City of Naperville
green
1 sentence2025See 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2022); id. §§ 2-615, 2-619. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bjork v. O'Meara
green
1 sentence2023Bjork, 2013 IL 114044, ¶ 21 . ¶ 11 The record does not support the circuit court’s finding that Jacqueline and Kristen’s “prior pleadings” in the probate division show that they were aware of and had an opportunity to file a tortious interference claim within section 8-1 of the Act’s time limitation. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. v. Abbas Holding I
green
1 sentence2019Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. v. Abbas Holding I, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 111296, ¶ 19 . 1-18-0724 contract claims, count III was a tortious interference claim, and count IV was an accounting claim. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
McCarthy v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2018On February 27, 2015, the circuit court dismissed the tortious interference claim with prejudice pursuant to section 2-619(a)(4) of the Code ( id. § 2-619(a)(4) ) based on the doctrine of res judicata , where the cause of action essentially asked the circuit court to relitigate the issues determined in the 2013 case, namely, the veracity of the Trust amendment. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
DeHart v. DeHart
green
2 sentences2013“The remedy is not setting aside of the will, but a judgment against the individual defendant, which would include money damages in the amount of the benefit tortiously acquired.” DeHart, 2013 IL 114137, ¶ 39 . ¶ 78 According to DeHart, the element of damages in a tortious interference claim cannot be known until the will contest has been resolved. 2013DeHart, 2013 IL 114137, ¶ 40 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Schilling v. Herrera
green
1 sentence2009The court acknowledged the rule in Florida that “ ‘if adequate relief is available in a probate proceeding, then that remedy must be exhausted before a tortious interference claim may be pursued.’ ” Schilling, 952 So. 2d at 1236 , quoting DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Stefani v. Baird & Warner, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995The court in Stefani v. Baird & Warner, Inc. (1987), 157 Ill. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Regan v. Garfield Ridge Trust & Savings Bank
green
1 sentence1993(Regan, 220 Ill. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Willcutts v. Galesburg Clinic Ass'n
green
1 sentence1992(Willcutts v. Galesburg Clinic Association (1990), 201 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Mucklow v. John Marshall Law School
green
1 sentence1991(Mucklow v. John Marshall Law School (1988), 176 Ill. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Stevens v. Tillman green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.