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10 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tracey Scott and Lorrenzo Hampton, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Revclaims, LLCgreen2 sentences2025App. 231, at 27 , 688 S.W.3d at 440 . 15 Martin v. Smith, 2019 Ark. 232, at 4 , 576 S.W.3d 32, 35 . 16 Id. 17 Id. 8 Importantly, “[t]he standard is whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a fact issue, not whether the evidence is sufficient to compel a conclusion.18 For the reasons discussed below, MNB is entitled to summary judgment on three of Tilley’s claims: the ADTPA claim, the tortious-interference claim, and the negligence claim. 2025App. 231, at 27 , 688 S.W.3d at 440. 15 Martin v. Smith, 2019 Ark. 232, at 4 , 576 S.W.3d 32, 35 . 16 Id. 17 Id. 8 Importantly, “[t]he standard is whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a fact issue, not whether the evidence is sufficient to compel a conclusion.18 For the reasons discussed below, MNB is entitled to summary judgment on three of Tilley’s claims: the ADTPA claim, the tortious-interference claim, and the negligence claim. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martin v. Smith
green
2 sentences2025App. 231, at 27 , 688 S.W.3d at 440 . 15 Martin v. Smith, 2019 Ark. 232, at 4 , 576 S.W.3d 32, 35 . 16 Id. 17 Id. 8 Importantly, “[t]he standard is whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a fact issue, not whether the evidence is sufficient to compel a conclusion.18 For the reasons discussed below, MNB is entitled to summary judgment on three of Tilley’s claims: the ADTPA claim, the tortious-interference claim, and the negligence claim. 2025App. 231, at 27 , 688 S.W.3d at 440 . 15 Martin v. Smith, 2019 Ark. 232, at 4 , 576 S.W.3d 32, 35 . 16 Id. 17 Id. 8 Importantly, “[t]he standard is whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a fact issue, not whether the evidence is sufficient to compel a conclusion.18 For the reasons discussed below, MNB is entitled to summary judgment on three of Tilley’s claims: the ADTPA claim, the tortious-interference claim, and the negligence claim. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Belin v. West
green
2 sentences2011Belin v. West, 315 Ark. 61 , 864 S.W.2d 838 (1993). 2011Belin v. West, 315 Ark. 61 , 864 S.W.2d 838 (1993). | 2 | 1995–2011 |
The Ballard Grp. Inc. v. BP Lubricants USA Inc.
green
1 sentence2014Ballard’s 15 Cite as 2014 Ark. 276 first amended complaint alleged that King and BP “discussed and encouraged Jason Curtis . . . to seek employment with Threads . . . on at least two occasions during 2009.” This allegation, when considered with the allegations previously recited in our consideration of Ballard’s trade-secrets claim, sufficiently pleads facts to state a claim for tortious interference with a contract, and the circuit court abused its discretion in overlooking this aspect of Ballard’s tortious-interference claim. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Thola v. Henschell
green
1 sentence2013The Thola court held that the plaintiffs tortious-interference claim was not preempted where the tortious-interference claim was not based on the former employee’s misappropriation of a client list, but rather on the former employee’s in-person solicitation of the former employer’s clients to terminate their business relationship with the former employer and follow the former employee to the new business. 164 P.3d at 530 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
JKP Foods, Inc. v. McDonald's Corporation
neutral
1 sentence2010Foods, a district judge in the Eastern District of Arkansas used the “stranger” language in dismissing a tortious-interference claim but actually held that a franchisor is not a stranger to a contract to sell the franchise and cannot be liable for tortious interference with a contract to sell the franchise. 420 F.Supp.2d at 969 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
John M. Shank, Jr., and Access International Markets, Ltd. v. William R. Hague, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Shank v. Hague, Inc., 192 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1999), concluded that Wisconsin had adopted a narrow view of business expectancy, such that a plaintiff must show at least a “bargained for right” or at a bare minimum a “sufficiently certain, concrete and prospective relationship,” with a third party in order to bring a tortious-interference claim. 2005Hague, Inc., 192 F.3d 675 (7th Cir.1999), concluded that Wisconsin had adopted a narrow view of business expectancy, such that a plaintiff must show at least a "bargained for right" or at a bare minimum a "sufficiently certain, concrete and prospective relationship," with a third party in order to bring a tortious-interference claim. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Hunt v. Riley
green
2 sentences1998To confuse matters further, the court’s opinion in Fisher not only misstated the rule firmly announced in Walt Bennett Ford, but also it listed factors from the Restatement (Second) of Torts needed to determine whether an interference is “improper.” Only making the situation worse, we later decided Hunt v. Riley, 322 Ark. 453 , 909 S.W.2d 329 (1995), and citing both Fisher and Walt Bennett Ford, the Hunt court set out the four elements of a tortious interference claim, but added that, “for an interference to be actionable, it must be improper.” This court in Fisher and Hunt never mentioned any 1998To confuse matters further, the court’s opinion in Fisher not only misstated the rule firmly announced in Walt Bennett Ford, but also it listed factors from the Restatement (Second) of Torts needed to determine whether an interference is “improper.” Only making the situation worse, we later decided Hunt v. Riley, 322 Ark. 453 , 909 S.W.2d 329 (1995), and citing both Fisher and Walt Bennett Ford, the Hunt court set out the four elements of a tortious interference claim, but added that, “for an interference to be actionable, it must be improper.” This court in Fisher and Hunt never mentioned any | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Fisher v. Jones
green
2 sentences1995Belin v. West, 315 Ark. 61 , 864 S.W.2d 838 (1993); Fisher v. Jones, 311 Ark. 450 , 844 S.W.2d 954 (1993); Walt Bennett Ford v. Pulaski County Special Sch. 1995Belin v. West, 315 Ark. 61 , 864 S.W.2d 838 (1993); Fisher v. Jones, 311 Ark. 450 , 844 S.W.2d 954 (1993); Walt Bennett Ford v. Pulaski County Special Sch. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
United Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Sampson
green
2 sentences1993United Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Sampson, 310 Ark. 47 , 832 S.W.2d 502 (1992). 1993United Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Sampson, 310 Ark. 47 , 832 S.W.2d 502 (1992). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.