logic principle in New York

1934Co. ( 84 Hun, 103 , 110; affd., 164 N. Y. 594 ), where the court said: ‘ The provisions of the bonds meet the eye of the purchaser and are designed by the corporation to influence their sale, and they cannot be nullified by an inconsistent provision contained in the trust deed.’ “ Defendant’s primary covenant to pay at maturity contained in the bonds themselves is not qualified by the collateral promises and agreements of defendant mentioned in the indenture.

1933Co. ( 84 Hun, 103 , 110; affd., 164 N. Y. 594 ), where the court said: “ The provisions of the bonds meet the eye of the purchaser and are designed by the corporation to influence their sale, and they cannot be nullified by an inconsistent provision contained in the trust deed.” Defendant’s primary covenant to pay at maturity contained in the bonds themselves is not qualified by the collateral promises and agreements of defendant mentioned in the indenture.

1934Co. ( 84 Hun, 103 , 110; affd., 164 N. Y. 594 ), where the court said: ‘ The provisions of the bonds meet the eye of the purchaser and are designed by the corporation to influence their sale, and they cannot be nullified by an inconsistent provision contained in the trust deed.’ “ Defendant’s primary covenant to pay at maturity contained in the bonds themselves is not qualified by the collateral promises and agreements of defendant mentioned in the indenture.

1933Co. ( 84 Hun, 103 , 110; affd., 164 N. Y. 594 ), where the court said: “ The provisions of the bonds meet the eye of the purchaser and are designed by the corporation to influence their sale, and they cannot be nullified by an inconsistent provision contained in the trust deed.” Defendant’s primary covenant to pay at maturity contained in the bonds themselves is not qualified by the collateral promises and agreements of defendant mentioned in the indenture.

2004We do not doubt that this can and does in fact occasionally happen, but because we find it more reasonable to believe that the bare presence in the vehicle is culpable, we think it reasonable to presume culpability in the direction which the proven facts already point.” Case law appears to suggest the applicability of the presumption to marihuana (cf., Matter of Boyd v Constantine, 81 NY2d 189 [1993]; People v Bennett, 47 AD2d 322 [1st Dept 1975]).

2004We do not doubt that this can and does in fact occasionally happen, but because we find it more reasonable to believe that the bare presence in the vehicle is culpable, we think it reasonable to presume culpability in the direction which the proven facts already point.” Case law appears to suggest the applicability of the presumption to marihuana (cf., Matter of Boyd v Constantine, 81 NY2d 189 [1993]; People v Bennett, 47 AD2d 322 [1st Dept 1975]).

2002We reiterate, however, that our view precisely follows the Court of Appeals decisions in People v McCaleb (supra) and People v Roby (supra).

2002We reiterate, however, that our view precisely follows the Court of Appeals decisions in People v McCaleb (supra) and People v Roby (supra).

1993The logic of this requirement is apparent when tested against pleadings drawn in terms of more familiar mixed legal-factual issues, like probable cause or reasonable suspicion (see, e.g., People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 477-478 ).

1984Given such a possible scenario, the logic of the inquiry by defendant’s attorney is obvious (cf. People v Acomb, 87 AD2d 1, 8 ).

1984Anyone who solicits or even considers taking a bribe to testify or to refrain from testifying is subject to, at least, some measure of doubt (see People v Acomb, supra, pp 7-9 ).

1982Thus, it has been frequently said that the privilege “ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle” (8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2291, at p 554; see, also, Matter of Priest v Hennessy, supra, p 68; Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 NY2d 215, 219-222 ; Finn v Morgan, 46 AD2d 229, 234 ; People ex rel.

1982Vogelstein v Warden of County Jail of County of N. Y., 150 Misc 714, 720 , affd 242 App Div 611 ; Matter of Horowitz, 482 F2d 72, 81-82).

1982Vogelstein v Warden of County Jail of County of N. Y., 150 Misc 714, 720 , affd 242 App Div 611 ; Matter of Horowitz, 482 F2d 72, 81-82).

1979It must be emphasized that it is vital to a claim of privilege that the communications between client and attorney were made in confidence and have been maintained in confidence.” (Matter of Horowitz, 482 F2d 72, 81-82; emphasis added.) For petitioner to prevail then, the burden is upon him to establish his claim of privilege (Bankers’ Money Order Assn. v Nachod, 120 App Div 732 ) by showing that the information elicited was: (a) a confidential communication; (b) between an attorney and his client; (c) made during the course of professional employment for the purpose of obtaining legal advice

1978Bensky v Warden, 258 N. Y. 55, 59-60 , supra; Marsh v Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309, 312 .)” In Seltzer v Fields ( 20 AD2d 60, 62 , affd 14 NY2d 624 , supra), Chief Judge Breitel, then an Associate Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, writing for a unanimous court, held that writing and words used in the course of judicial proceedings and possibly bearing on the litigation are absolutely privileged, even if immaterial and irrelevant: "At least for the law of defamation, therefore, whatever may be the logic or the rule elsewhere, the possibly pertinent need be neither relevant nor mat

1978Bensky v Warden, 258 N. Y. 55, 59-60 , supra; Marsh v Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309, 312 .)” In Seltzer v Fields ( 20 AD2d 60, 62 , affd 14 NY2d 624 , supra), Chief Judge Breitel, then an Associate Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, writing for a unanimous court, held that writing and words used in the course of judicial proceedings and possibly bearing on the litigation are absolutely privileged, even if immaterial and irrelevant: "At least for the law of defamation, therefore, whatever may be the logic or the rule elsewhere, the possibly pertinent need be neither relevant nor mat

1978Bensky v Warden, 258 N. Y. 55, 59-60 , supra; Marsh v Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309, 312 .)” In Seltzer v Fields ( 20 AD2d 60, 62 , affd 14 NY2d 624 , supra), Chief Judge Breitel, then an Associate Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, writing for a unanimous court, held that writing and words used in the course of judicial proceedings and possibly bearing on the litigation are absolutely privileged, even if immaterial and irrelevant: "At least for the law of defamation, therefore, whatever may be the logic or the rule elsewhere, the possibly pertinent need be neither relevant nor mat

1978Bensky v Warden, 258 N. Y. 55, 59-60 , supra; Marsh v Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309, 312 .)” In Seltzer v Fields ( 20 AD2d 60, 62 , affd 14 NY2d 624 , supra), Chief Judge Breitel, then an Associate Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, writing for a unanimous court, held that writing and words used in the course of judicial proceedings and possibly bearing on the litigation are absolutely privileged, even if immaterial and irrelevant: "At least for the law of defamation, therefore, whatever may be the logic or the rule elsewhere, the possibly pertinent need be neither relevant nor mat

1976"If foreseeability be the sole test, then once liability is extended the logic of the principle would not and could not remain confined.” (Tobin v Grossman, supra, p 616 .) It would extend endlessly, like the rippling of the waters, far beyond the zone of danger of the explosion, to all who suffered injury or economic loss caused by the absence of electrical power.

1961The logic of this rule is forcefully stated in Matter of Finsilver, Still & Moss v. Goldberg, Maas & Co. ( 253 N. Y. 382 ) where Chief Judge Cabdozo, writing for a unanimous court, said (pp. 390-391): “ If in truth there is no contract at all or none calling for arbitration, the self-constituted tribunal is a nullity, without power to bind or loose by force of its decision. * * * In the absence of a contract expressing a consent to arbitrate, an award by an arbitrator is an act of usurpation.” (Emphasis supplied.) Simply put, the legal existence of the arbitral tribunal depends on contract.

1933(Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N. Y. 263, 268 ; Beach v. Supreme Tent K. of M., 177 id. 100, 105; Goodjon v. United Bond & Building Corp., 226 App. Div. 137, 142 .) The logic of this principle was well stated in Rothschild v. Rio Grande Western R.

1933(Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N. Y. 263, 268 ; Beach v. Supreme Tent K. of M., 177 id. 100, 105; Goodjon v. United Bond & Building Corp., 226 App. Div. 137, 142 .) The logic of this principle was well stated in Rothschild v. Rio Grande Western R.

1923The necessity of turning over the gains on a basis somewhat analogous to that of a trustee who has acquired profits by wrongful use from the property of the recipient of the trust, is the logic of the claim; for which reason this court, for the purpose of administering complete relief, will dispose of such claims rather than remit the party damaged to another forum, and, as was said in Hamilton Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers, 240 U. S. 251, 259 , “ and profits are then allowed as an equitable measure of compensation upon the theory of a trust ex maleficio.” In other words, the right to decree an ac

1923De Bekker v. Stokes, 219 N. Y. 573 , was a case involving a similar consideration.

1921Tracing the logic of the rule to the situation here presented, we find it equally applicable, and so it has been recently held in Goodyear Tire S Rubber Co. v. Vulcanized Products Co., 228 N. Y. 118,125 .