logic rule in California

2025Trust & Savings Assn. (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812-813 .) Applying the logic of claim 13 preclusion to the revival provision of section 340.1, subdivision (q), Family Services argues that a claim for damages based on derivative liability should not be revived.

2025Trust & Savings Assn. (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 812-813 .) Applying the logic of claim 13 preclusion to the revival provision of section 340.1, subdivision (q), Family Services argues that a claim for damages based on derivative liability should not be revived.

1933Oil Co. v. Bacigalupi, 167 Cal. 381 [ 139 Pac. 802 ].) We see no escape from the logic of the rule so invoked and its application to the conditions here presented for our consideration.” There is a marked difference between that case and the present one.

1933Oil Co. v. Bacigalupi, 167 Cal. 381 [ 139 Pac. 802 ].) We see no escape from the logic of the rule so invoked and its application to the conditions here presented for our consideration.” There is a marked difference between that case and the present one.

2021It is clearly unproductive to deprive a trial court of the opportunity to correct such a purported defect by allowing a litigant to raise the claimed error for the first time on appeal.’ ” (Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1350 .) The logic of this rule is even stronger in bail forfeiture proceedings because of the strict time limits applicable in these cases.3 As we noted above, the trial court is required to enter summary judgment once the appearance period has expired, but must act within 90 days.

2019The logic analysis requires a court to consider “ ‘whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.’ ” (PG Pub., supra, 705 F.3d at p. 110 .) The Supreme Court has identified various utilitarian attributes or benefits of open trials, which help explain why they are entitled to constitutional protection: (1) they “enhance the performance and accuracy of trial proceedings, educate the public, and serve a ‘therapeutic’ value to the community”; (2) they “serve to demonstrate that justice is meted out fairly, thereby promoting public

2019The logic analysis requires a court to consider “ ‘whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.’ ” (PG Pub., supra, 705 F.3d at p. 110 .) The Supreme Court has identified various utilitarian attributes or benefits of open trials, which help explain why they are entitled to constitutional protection: (1) they “enhance the performance and accuracy of trial proceedings, educate the public, and serve a ‘therapeutic’ value to the community”; (2) they “serve to demonstrate that justice is meted out fairly, thereby promoting public

2017(See Breverman , supra , 19 Cal.4th 142 , 164-178, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 .) Here, defendant is arguing that the trial court failed to instruct on lesser related offenses, and it follows from the logic of our analysis in Breverman that such an error should likewise be reviewed for prejudice under the Watson standard.

2017(See Breverman , supra , 19 Cal.4th 142 , 164-178, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 .) Here, defendant is arguing that the trial court failed to instruct on lesser related offenses, and it follows from the logic of our analysis in Breverman that such an error should likewise be reviewed for prejudice under the Watson standard.

2008It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.’ ” (Duplan Corporation v. Deering Milliken, Inc. (D.S.C. 1975) 397 F.Supp. 1146, 1162 .) 6 We reject plaintiffs’ contention that section 919 sets forth the exclusive circumstances under which coercion arises.

2001A criminal defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair trial, and specifically the Sixth Amendment right `to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,' cannot be deemed to include the right to call a witness who cannot be subjected to proper cross-examination...." ( Fost v. Superior Court, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 724, 735-736 , 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 620 , fn. omitted.) In this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to strike Johnson's testimony in its entirety when Johnson refused to testify about the firearm found in the car on the night of August

2001A criminal defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair trial, and specifically the Sixth Amendment right `to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,' cannot be deemed to include the right to call a witness who cannot be subjected to proper cross-examination...." ( Fost v. Superior Court, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 724, 735-736 , 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 620 , fn. omitted.) In this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to strike Johnson's testimony in its entirety when Johnson refused to testify about the firearm found in the car on the night of August

2000(Stutz Motor Car of America v. Reebok Intern., Ltd., supra, 909 F.Supp. 1353 .) 8 Glue-Fold insists that the logic of applying the rule to the cause of action for breach should extend to. its last claim. *1030 This skirmishing illuminates a number of intriguing byways, but we have no need to explore them.

2000(Stutz Motor Car of America v. Reebok Intern., Ltd., supra, 909 F.Supp. 1353 .) 8 Glue-Fold insists that the logic of applying the rule to the cause of action for breach should extend to. its last claim. *1030 This skirmishing illuminates a number of intriguing byways, but we have no need to explore them.

2000Proc., rule 24(c)(3), as amended Apr. 29, 1999, effective Dec 1, 1999 [empowering court to retain alternates after deliberations commence and to replace regular juror with alternate during deliberations].) [18] Of course, the decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on us; they have only persuasive force. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 989 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122 , 846 P.2d 704 .) Further the logic of a rule which would require a court to retain a juror, where that juror has committed misconduct but may also have difficulty with the sufficiency of the evidence, escapes us.

2000Proc., rule 24(c)(3), as amended Apr. 29, 1999, effective Dec 1, 1999 [empowering court to retain alternates after deliberations commence and to replace regular juror with alternate during deliberations].) [18] Of course, the decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on us; they have only persuasive force. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 989 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122 , 846 P.2d 704 .) Further the logic of a rule which would require a court to retain a juror, where that juror has committed misconduct but may also have difficulty with the sufficiency of the evidence, escapes us.

1998In People v. Mattson (1984) 37 Cal.3d 85 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 278 , 688 P.2d 887 ], we concluded that “the corpus delicti of felony-based special circumstances must be established independently of an accused’s extrajudicial statements.” (Id. at p. 94.) We reached that conclusion on the basis of former section 190.4, subdivision (a), requiring that the underlying felony “be charged and proved pursuant to the general law applying to the trial and conviction of the crime.” Proving the underlying felony “pursuant to the general law,” we reasoned in Mattson , included satisfying the corpus delicti rule

1998In People v. Mattson (1984) 37 Cal.3d 85 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 278 , 688 P.2d 887 ], we concluded that “the corpus delicti of felony-based special circumstances must be established independently of an accused’s extrajudicial statements.” (Id. at p. 94.) We reached that conclusion on the basis of former section 190.4, subdivision (a), requiring that the underlying felony “be charged and proved pursuant to the general law applying to the trial and conviction of the crime.” Proving the underlying felony “pursuant to the general law,” we reasoned in Mattson , included satisfying the corpus delicti rule

1996App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 502 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 467 P.2d 833 ].

1996App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 502 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 467 P.2d 833 ].

1995For example, in People v. Mendoza (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 667 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 1 ] the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment convicting defendant of false imprisonment and attempted rape.

1995For example, in People v. Mendoza (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 667 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 1 ] the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment convicting defendant of false imprisonment and attempted rape.

1986We find in Afiles support for this interpretation by that court’s omission of the words “under sentence” and “of imprisonment” in favor of the more general word “term”: “The court need only determine that the defendant was not already serving a term for an unrelated offense when restraints related to the new charge were imposed on him, . ...” (In re Atiles, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 810 ; see People v. Joyner (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 364, 370 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 636 ], White P. J., dissenting.) Our application oí Rojas and Afiles is consistent with the Legislature’s intent, as evidenced by section 2900.

1964(People v. Mason, 184 Cal.App.2d 317, 367-368 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 627 ], cert. den. 366 U.S. 904 [ 81 S.Ct. 1046 , 6 L.Ed.2d 203 ].) Moreover, it has been held that a husband can be convicted of conspiracy with others against his wife (People v. Brown, 131 Cal.App.2d 643 [ 281 P.2d 319 ]), and *881 the logic of this rule would extend to a wife who conspires with others against her husband.

1964(People v. Mason, 184 Cal.App.2d 317, 367-368 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 627 ], cert. den. 366 U.S. 904 [ 81 S.Ct. 1046 , 6 L.Ed.2d 203 ].) Moreover, it has been held that a husband can be convicted of conspiracy with others against his wife (People v. Brown, 131 Cal.App.2d 643 [ 281 P.2d 319 ]), and *881 the logic of this rule would extend to a wife who conspires with others against her husband.

1964(People v. Mason, 184 Cal.App.2d 317, 367-368 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 627 ], cert. den. 366 U.S. 904 [ 81 S.Ct. 1046 , 6 L.Ed.2d 203 ].) Moreover, it has been held that a husband can be convicted of conspiracy with others against his wife (People v. Brown, 131 Cal.App.2d 643 [ 281 P.2d 319 ]), and *881 the logic of this rule would extend to a wife who conspires with others against her husband.

1964(People v. Mason, 184 Cal.App.2d 317, 367-368 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 627 ], cert. den. 366 U.S. 904 [ 81 S.Ct. 1046 , 6 L.Ed.2d 203 ].) Moreover, it has been held that a husband can be convicted of conspiracy with others against his wife (People v. Brown, 131 Cal.App.2d 643 [ 281 P.2d 319 ]), and *881 the logic of this rule would extend to a wife who conspires with others against her husband.

1958Rev., 88 F.2d 807, 813 , that, in determining the value of an annuity promised to be paid to a transferor in consideration of a transfer of property to the transferee, the net income received from the transferred property or at least the income which the transferor might have normally been expected to have received from the transferred property or on its commuted value, must be deducted in determining the value of the consideration (annuity) given for the transferred property.

1958We see no escape from the logic of the principle enunciated in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Thayer-Martin, 118 N.J.L. 277 [ 192 A. 74, 80 ] and Updike v. Commissioner of Int.

1958We see no escape from the logic of the principle enunciated in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Thayer-Martin, 118 N.J.L. 277 [ 192 A. 74, 80 ] and Updike v. Commissioner of Int.