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5 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1990–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dukesgreen2 sentences2016See also State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 122 [ 547 A.2d 10 ] (1988) ([a]ny intrusion upon an occupant’s personal liberty by asking the occupant to exit a vehicle during a motor vehicle infraction stop is de minimis because it serves to protect the officer).’’ (Citation omitted.) The defendant attempts to counter this logic by claim- ing that the trial court misapplied Mimms and Dukes because those cases are limited to stops for motor vehi- cle offenses committed by drivers and this was a Terry stop. 2016See also State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 122 [ 547 A.2d 10 ] (1988) ([a]ny intrusion upon an occupant’s personal liberty by asking the occupant to exit a vehicle during a motor vehicle infraction stop is de minimis because it serves to protect the officer).’’ (Citation omitted.) The defendant attempts to counter this logic by claim- ing that the trial court misapplied Mimms and Dukes because those cases are limited to stops for motor vehi- cle offenses committed by drivers and this was a Terry stop. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Perkins
green
2 sentences2017Our Supreme Court has explained the logic of this rule as follows: "The waiver rule supports fact-finding and the ultimate truth seeking function of a trial ... [because it] eliminates the bizarre result that could occur in its absence, namely, that a [judgment] could be reversed for evidentiary insufficiency, despite evidence in the record sufficiently establishing [liability]." (Citations omitted.) State v. Perkins , 271 Conn. 218 , 237-38, 856 A.2d 917 (2004). 2017Our Supreme Court has explained the logic of this rule as follows: "The waiver rule supports fact-finding and the ultimate truth seeking function of a trial ... [because it] eliminates the bizarre result that could occur in its absence, namely, that a [judgment] could be reversed for evidentiary insufficiency, despite evidence in the record sufficiently establishing [liability]." (Citations omitted.) State v. Perkins , 271 Conn. 218 , 237-38, 856 A.2d 917 (2004). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In Re Marriage Cases
red
2 sentences2008We are persuaded, rather, by the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 841-43 , 76 Cal. Rptr.3d 683 , 183 P.3d 384 , and by the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Kaye in Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 387-89 , 821 N.Y.S.2d 770 , 855 N.E.2d 1 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 2008We are persuaded, rather, by the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 841-43 , 76 Cal. Rptr.3d 683 , 183 P.3d 384 , and by the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Kaye in Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 387-89 , 821 N.Y.S.2d 770 , 855 N.E.2d 1 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hernandez v. Robles
green
2 sentences2008We are persuaded, rather, by the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 841-43 , 76 Cal. Rptr.3d 683 , 183 P.3d 384 , and by the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Kaye in Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 387-89 , 821 N.Y.S.2d 770 , 855 N.E.2d 1 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 2008We are persuaded, rather, by the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 841-43 , 76 Cal. Rptr.3d 683 , 183 P.3d 384 , and by the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Kaye in Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 387-89 , 821 N.Y.S.2d 770 , 855 N.E.2d 1 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Burns v. Board of Education
green
1 sentence2002The logic of this exception is that municipal officers only have a duty to a foreseeable victim to protect against "dangers that may be anticipated." Id., 228 Conn. 649 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
The United States of America v. Terry Yazzie
green
1 sentence1990“The logic of the rule that intoxication is not a defense to a crime . . . dictates that it should not be available as a partial defense, effective in conjunction with [self-defense] . . . .” United States v. Yazzie, supra. The defendant would have us abandon the requirement that his conduct be judged ultimately against that of a reasonably prudent person and replace it with what might be euphemistically called the “reasonably prudent drunk” rule. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.