logic principle in Wisconsin

2025If it is clear that no modification is justified under the circumstances alleged by the defendant, it does not matter if there is a new factor. ¶10 Turning to our review of the postconviction court’s ruling on the justification-for-modification determination, if we determine that the court did in fact exercise discretion (and here Doe does not dispute that the postconviction court exercised its discretion on this issue), we reverse only if the court “‘applied the wrong legal standard or did not ground its decision on a logical interpretation of the facts.’” See State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1,

2025If it is clear that no modification is justified under the circumstances alleged by the defendant, it does not matter if there is a new factor. ¶10 Turning to our review of the postconviction court’s ruling on the justification-for-modification determination, if we determine that the court did in fact exercise discretion (and here Doe does not dispute that the postconviction court exercised its discretion on this issue), we reverse only if the court “‘applied the wrong legal standard or did not ground its decision on a logical interpretation of the facts.’” See State v. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1,

2002Furthermore, because the lawyer-client privilege is " 'an obstacle to the investigation of the truth' it should be 'strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of the principle.'" Jax, 73 Wis. 2d at 579 (quoting Jacobi, 23 Wis. 2d at 157 ). ¶ 22.

2002Furthermore, because the lawyer-client privilege is "`an obstacle to the investigation of the truth' it should be `strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of the principle.'" Jax, 73 Wis. 2d at 579 (quoting Jacobi, 23 Wis. 2d at 157 ). ¶ 22.

1995In a criminal case all 12 jurors must agree in order to arrive at a verdict." Our supreme court has adopted the logic and analysis of United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977), when deciding jury unanimity issues.

1992"In the instant case, inasmuch as [appellant] failed to proceed to seek a determination of the motion, but proceeded to trial[,] . . . this conduct constituted waiver or abandonment of the motion ... precluding its consideration in this appeal." In re Ferrill, 97 N.M. at 396 , 640 P.2d at 502 .

1992"In the instant case, inasmuch as [appellant] failed to proceed to seek a determination of the motion, but proceeded to trial[,] . . . this conduct constituted waiver or abandonment of the motion ... precluding its consideration in this appeal." In re Ferrill, 97 N.M. at 396 , 640 P.2d at 502 .

1989Although the issue in Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372 , 376 N.W.2d 839 (1985), was whether consideration of a spouse's pension for purposes of maintenance warranted exclusion of the asset from the marital estate for purposes of property division, the logic and analysis of the supreme court is relevant to the discussion here.

1989Although the issue in Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372 , 376 N.W.2d 839 (1985), was whether consideration of a spouse's pension for purposes of maintenance warranted exclusion of the asset from the marital estate for purposes of property division, the logic and analysis of the supreme court is relevant to the discussion here.

1976It is based upon the recognition of the value of legal advice and assistance based upon full information of the facts and the corollary that full disclosure to counsel will often be unlikely if there is fear that others will be able to compel a breach of the confidence.” Because the attorney-client privilege is “an obstacle to the investigation of the truth” it should be “strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of the principle.” Jacobi v. Podevels, supra, at page 157; Herman v. Schlesinger (1902), 114 Wis. 382 , 90 N. W. 460 ; Tomek v. Farmers Mut.

1976It is based upon the recognition of the value of legal advice and assistance based upon full information of the facts and the corollary that full disclosure to counsel will often be unlikely if there is fear that others will be able to compel a breach of the confidence.” Because the attorney-client privilege is “an obstacle to the investigation of the truth” it should be “strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of the principle.” Jacobi v. Podevels, supra, at page 157; Herman v. Schlesinger (1902), 114 Wis. 382 , 90 N. W. 460 ; Tomek v. Farmers Mut.

1958Although the name was not used, the conditions that must be established to permit recovery in this type of case were first stated by this court in Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co. 215 Wis. 47 , 254 N. W. 351 .

1958Although the name was not used, the conditions that must be established to permit recovery in this type of case were first stated by this court in Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co. 215 Wis. 47 , 254 N. W. 351 .

1917By the same logic the doctrine of Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517 , 93 N. W. 440 , and similar cases, has no application here.

1917By the same logic the doctrine of Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517 , 93 N. W. 440 , and similar cases, has no application here.

1888Hoffman v. Wheelock, 62 Wis. 435 ; Straka v. Lander, 60 Wis. 115 ; Lerdall v. Charter Oak L.