caveat emptor doctrine in Washington

18 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

Case	Followed	Cited
ATHERTON CONDO APARTMENT-OWNERS ASS'N BD OF DIRECTORS v. Blume Dev. Co.green wash · 1990 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008Atherton, 115 Wash.2d at 517-18 , 799 P.2d 250 . ¶ 23 Washington has followed Carpenter v. Donohoe [1] in abandoning the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to the sale of new residential dwellings by builder-vendors and in recognizing an implied warranty. 2008Atherton, 115 Wn.2d at 517-18 (footnote omitted). ¶23 Washington has followed Carpenter 1 in abandoning the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to the sale of new residential dwellings by builder-vendors and in recognizing an implied warranty.	1	2
Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jeffersongreen mass · 1979 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 2 sentences 2020See, e.g., Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162, 168 , 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1980) (“In the line of cases creating and applying the implied warranty of habitability, we have overthrown the doctrine of caveat emptor.” (citing Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196 , 396 N.E.2d 981 (1979))). -23- Gerlach v. The Cove Apartments, LLC, et al., 97325-3 injuries caused by the landlord’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a straightforward question of common law negligence. 2020See, e.g., Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162, 168 , 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1980) (“In the line of cases creating and applying the implied warranty of habitability, we have overthrown the doctrine of caveat emptor.” (citing Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196 , 396 N.E.2d 981 (1979))). -23- Gerlach v. The Cove Apartments, LLC, et al., 97325-3 injuries caused by the landlord’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a straightforward question of common law negligence.	1	1
Young v. Garwackigreen mass · 1980 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 2 sentences 2020See, e.g., Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162, 168 , 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1980) (“In the line of cases creating and applying the implied warranty of habitability, we have overthrown the doctrine of caveat emptor.” (citing Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196 , 396 N.E.2d 981 (1979))). -23- Gerlach v. The Cove Apartments, LLC, et al., 97325-3 injuries caused by the landlord’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a straightforward question of common law negligence. 2020See, e.g., Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162, 168 , 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1980) (“In the line of cases creating and applying the implied warranty of habitability, we have overthrown the doctrine of caveat emptor.” (citing Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196 , 396 N.E.2d 981 (1979))). -23- Gerlach v. The Cove Apartments, LLC, et al., 97325-3 injuries caused by the landlord’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a straightforward question of common law negligence.	1	1
Humber v. Mortongreen tex · 1968 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 283-91 , 398 A.2d 1283 (1979); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 557-62 (Tex. 1968).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (22)

Case	Cited	Years
House v. Thornton green wash · 1969 2 sentences 1990In House v. Thornton, 76 Wn.2d 428 , 457 P.2d 199 (1969), Washington followed Carpenter and abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to the sale of new residential dwellings by builder-vendors, and recognized an implied warranty. 1990In House v. Thornton, 76 Wn.2d 428 , 457 P.2d 199 (1969), Washington followed Carpenter and abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to the sale of new residential dwellings by builder-vendors, and recognized an implied warranty.	5	1973–2008
Strand v. Griffith green ca8 · 1899 2 sentences 1912Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of purchasers from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” The court then quotes from Strand v. Griffith, 97 Fed. 854 , where it was said: “There is no rule of law which requires men in their business transactions to act upon the presumption that all men are knaves and liars, and which declares them guilty of negligence and ref 1910Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of purchasers from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor”; citing Strand v. Griffith, 97 Fed. 854 , and Noyes v. Belding, 5 S. D. 603, 59 N. W. 1069 , where it was said: “The unmistakable drift is towards the doctrine that the wrongdoer cannot shield himself from liability by asking the law to condemn the credulity of his victi	4	1909–1915
Conta v. Corgiat neutral wash · 1913 2 sentences 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929). 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929).	2	1956–1970
Noyes v. Belding green sd · 1894 2 sentences 1912The fraudulent vendor cannot escape from liability by asking the law to applaud his fraud and condemn his victim for his credulity. ‘No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder for the simple reason that his victim is by chance a fool;’ ” and citing Noyes v. Belding, 5 S. D. 603, 59 N. W. 1069 , where the court said: “The unmistakable drift is toward the doctrine that the wrongdoer cannot shield himself from liability by asking the law to condemn the credulity of his victim and 14 Am. & Eng. 1910Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of purchasers from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor”; citing Strand v. Griffith, 97 Fed. 854 , and Noyes v. Belding, 5 S. D. 603, 59 N. W. 1069 , where it was said: “The unmistakable drift is towards the doctrine that the wrongdoer cannot shield himself from liability by asking the law to condemn the credulity of his victi	2	1910–1912
McDonald v. Mianecki green nj · 1979 2 sentences 2015McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 283-91 , 398 A.2d 1283 (1979); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 557-62 (Tex. 1968). 2015McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 283-91 , 398 A.2d 1283 (1979); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 557-62 (Tex. 1968).	1	2015–2015
Car Wash Enterprises, Inc. v. Kampanos green washctapp · 1994 2 sentences 2010Car Wash Enters., Inc. v. Kampanos, 74 Wash.App. 537, 544-45 , 874 P.2d 868 (1994). [23] The Leaches also contend that the risk of latent tank defects fell solely to the Greys under the doctrine of caveat emptor. 2010Car Wash Enters., Inc. v. Kampanos, 74 Wash.App. 537, 544-45 , 874 P.2d 868 (1994). [23] The Leaches also contend that the risk of latent tank defects fell solely to the Greys under the doctrine of caveat emptor.	1	2010–2010
Wooddy v. Benton Water Co. green wash · 1909 2 sentences 1980Seventy years ago, this court noted that "the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor." Wooddy v. Benton Water Co., 54 Wash. 124, 127 , 102 P. 1054 (1909). 1980Seventy years ago, this court noted that "the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor." Wooddy v. Benton Water Co., 54 Wash. 124, 127 , 102 P. 1054 (1909).	1	1980–1980
Pierce County v. Newbegin green wash · 1947 2 sentences 1977Pierce County v. Newbegin, 27 Wn.2d 451 , 178 P.2d 742 (1947); Shelton v. Klickitat County, 152 Wash. 193 , 277 P. 839 (1929). 1977Pierce County v. Newbegin, 27 Wn.2d 451 , 178 P.2d 742 (1947); Shelton v. Klickitat County, 152 Wash. 193 , 277 P. 839 (1929).	1	1977–1977
Shelton v. Klickitat County green wash · 1929 2 sentences 1977Pierce County v. Newbegin, 27 Wn.2d 451 , 178 P.2d 742 (1947); Shelton v. Klickitat County, 152 Wash. 193 , 277 P. 839 (1929). 1977Pierce County v. Newbegin, 27 Wn.2d 451 , 178 P.2d 742 (1947); Shelton v. Klickitat County, 152 Wash. 193 , 277 P. 839 (1929).	1	1977–1977
Walquist v. Johnson neutral wash · 1918 1 sentence 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 *327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929).	1	1970–1970
Hurley v. Lindsay neutral wash · 1919 2 sentences 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929). 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929).	1	1970–1970
Narup v. Benson green wash · 1929 2 sentences 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929). 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929).	1	1970–1970
Dixon v. MacGillivray green wash · 1947 2 sentences 1970The caveat emptor doctrine, as applied in Conta , was discussed in Dixon v. MacGillivray, 29 Wn.2d 30, 35 , 185 P.2d 109 (1947), and its proper application clarified by Justice Millard speaking for the court as follows: That is, where the boundaries are reasonably ascertainable, the rule of caveat emptor applies; but where, as in the case at bar, there was no defined physical boundary on the northwesterly side of the lots, and there was no way respondents could have determined the true boundary in the absence of a survey, respondents had a right to rely upon the representation of appellants. 1970The caveat emptor doctrine, as applied in Conta , was discussed in Dixon v. MacGillivray, 29 Wn.2d 30, 35 , 185 P.2d 109 (1947), and its proper application clarified by Justice Millard speaking for the court as follows: That is, where the boundaries are reasonably ascertainable, the rule of caveat emptor applies; but where, as in the case at bar, there was no defined physical boundary on the northwesterly side of the lots, and there was no way respondents could have determined the true boundary in the absence of a survey, respondents had a right to rely upon the representation of appellants.	1	1970–1970
Hegberg v. Tripp neutral wash · 1918 2 sentences 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929). 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929).	1	1970–1970
Wilson v. Mills green wash · 1916 2 sentences 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929). 1970Appellants contend the caveat emptor doctrine is controlling as expressed in a line of cases beginning with Conta v. Corgiat, 74 Wash. 28 , 132 P. 746 (1913), and continuing with Wilson v. Mills, 91 Wash. 71 , 157 P. 467 (1916); Hegberg v. Tripp, 99 Wash. 298 , 169 P. 822 (1918); Walquist v. Johnson, 103 327 Wash. 30, 173 P. 735 (1918); Hurley v. Lindsay, 105 Wash. 559 , 178 P. 626 (1919); Narup v. Benson, 154 Wash. 646 , 283 P. 179 (1929).	1	1970–1970
Rumpf v. Barto neutral wash · 1894 2 sentences 1932This case is similar in facts and principle to Rumpf v. Barto, 10 Wash. 382 , 38 Pac. 1129 , which involved the replevin of jewelry that had been delivered under an agreement that no sale would take place until the owner approved. 1932This case is similar in facts and principle to Rumpf v. Barto, 10 Wash. 382 , 38 Pac. 1129 , which involved the replevin of jewelry that had been delivered under an agreement that no sale would take place until the owner approved.	1	1932–1932
Simons v. Cissna neutral wash · 1910 2 sentences 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar	1	1914–1914
Wilson v. Clark neutral wash · 1911 2 sentences 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar	1	1914–1914
Kuehl v. Scott neutral wash · 1911 2 sentences 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar	1	1914–1914
Breese v. Hunt neutral wash · 1912 2 sentences 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar	1	1914–1914
Grant v. Huschke green wash · 1913 2 sentences 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar	1	1914–1914
McMillen v. Hillman neutral wash · 1911 2 sentences 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar 1914“Strong language has been used by this and other courts in defining the duties of a purchaser from which it might be inferred that vendors have an unbridled license to lie and deceive, but such has never been the law, and the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.” See, also, McMillen v. Hillman, 66 Wash. 27 , 118 Pac. 903 ; Kuehl v. Scott, 66 Wash. 318 , 119 Pac. 742 ; Breese v. Hunt, 67 Wash. 398 , 121 Pac. 853 ; Simons v. Cissna, 60 Wash. 141 , 110 Pac. 1011 ; Grant v. Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 , 133 Pac. 447 ; and Wilson v. Clar	1	1914–1914

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.310 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 74 (1914–2026) OH 70 (1910–2026) AL 42 (1871–2016) NJ 22 (1925–2019) GA 21 (1923–2008) FL 21 (1954–2021) IL 20 (1924–2021) OK 20 (1910–2019) MO 19 (1907–2016) WA 18 (1909–2020) CA 17 (1902–2011) VA 15 (1978–2008) PA 14 (1965–2023) SC 14 (1877–2023) NC 12 (1874–2020) KY 11 (1915–2006) TX 10 (1959–2019) MS 9 (1946–2015) TN 7 (1932–2026) WY 7 (1931–2007) IN 7 (1932–2006) IA 7 (1914–2008) AZ 6 (1963–2021) WV 6 (1914–1997) MA 6 (1878–2002) MD 6 (1872–2008) DE 5 (1948–2023) RI 5 (1994–2005) UT 4 (1922–2002) AK 4 (1980–2014) WI 4 (1920–2017) CT 4 (1970–2003) MI 4 (1917–1970) ME 4 (1922–2025) AR 3 (1884–1983) CO 3 (1915–1995) MT 3 (1981–1989) KS 3 (1912–1940) DC 2 (1992–2014) OR 2 (1906–1922)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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