17 California opinions name it 2 courts 1902–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gustafson v. Dunman, Inc.green2 sentences1974In the normal sale of land and buildings, courts have traditionally applied the doctrine of caveat emptor, with the buyer assuming the risk on quality absent express warranty, fraud, or misrepresentation. ( Gustafson v. Dunman, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal. App.2d 10, 13 [ 22 Cal. Rptr. 161 ]; Murphy v. Sheftel (1932) 121 Cal. App. 533, 539 [ 9 P.2d 568 ].) In contrast, in the sale or furnishing of tangible chattels, warranties of quality and fitness have been implied ( Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]), and in California statutes dealing with such warranties now govern the sale 1974In the normal sale of land and buildings, courts have traditionally applied the doctrine of caveat emptor, with the buyer assuming the risk on quality absent express warranty, fraud, or misrepresentation. ( Gustafson v. Dunman, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal. App.2d 10, 13 [ 22 Cal. Rptr. 161 ]; Murphy v. Sheftel (1932) 121 Cal. App. 533, 539 [ 9 P.2d 568 ].) In contrast, in the sale or furnishing of tangible chattels, warranties of quality and fitness have been implied ( Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]), and in California statutes dealing with such warranties now govern the sale | 2 | 2 |
Murphy v. Sheftelgreen2 sentences1974In the normal sale of land and buildings, courts have traditionally applied the doctrine of caveat emptor, with the buyer assuming the risk on quality absent express warranty, fraud, or misrepresentation. ( Gustafson v. Dunman, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal. App.2d 10, 13 [ 22 Cal. Rptr. 161 ]; Murphy v. Sheftel (1932) 121 Cal. App. 533, 539 [ 9 P.2d 568 ].) In contrast, in the sale or furnishing of tangible chattels, warranties of quality and fitness have been implied ( Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]), and in California statutes dealing with such warranties now govern the sale 1974In the normal sale of land and buildings, courts have traditionally applied the doctrine of caveat emptor, with the buyer assuming the risk on quality absent express warranty, fraud, or misrepresentation. ( Gustafson v. Dunman, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal. App.2d 10, 13 [ 22 Cal. Rptr. 161 ]; Murphy v. Sheftel (1932) 121 Cal. App. 533, 539 [ 9 P.2d 568 ].) In contrast, in the sale or furnishing of tangible chattels, warranties of quality and fitness have been implied ( Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]), and in California statutes dealing with such warranties now govern the sale | 2 | 2 |
Karoutas v. HomeFed Bankgreen2 sentences2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Cantygreen2 sentences2011For example, Ribeiro cites Corpus Juris Secundum to show that caveat emptor may be relaxed at judicial sales to allow claims of mistake. (50A CJ.S. (2008) Judicial Sales, § 101, pp. 88-90.) But in other sections that encyclopedia states caveat emptor is normally applied at tax sales, absent a statutory remedy. (85 CJ.S. (2010) Taxation, § 1554, p. 613; 64A C.J.S. (1999) Municipal Corporations, § 1854, pp. 507-508.) Prior to 1913, the California Supreme Court held that if a prior owner sued in equity to quiet title based on an invalid tax sale, the owner had to do equity by reimbursing the buye 2011For example, Ribeiro cites Corpus Juris Secundum to show that caveat emptor may be relaxed at judicial sales to allow claims of mistake. (50A CJ.S. (2008) Judicial Sales, § 101, pp. 88-90.) But in other sections that encyclopedia states caveat emptor is normally applied at tax sales, absent a statutory remedy. (85 CJ.S. (2010) Taxation, § 1554, p. 613; 64A C.J.S. (1999) Municipal Corporations, § 1854, pp. 507-508.) Prior to 1913, the California Supreme Court held that if a prior owner sued in equity to quiet title based on an invalid tax sale, the owner had to do equity by reimbursing the buye | 1 | 1 |
East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.green2 sentences2008Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval (1986) 476 U.S. 858, 872, fn. 7 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 865 , 106 S.Ct. 2295 ] [noting that “the Uniform Commercial Code . . . has been adopted by 49 States”]; Hricik, Remedies of the Infringer: The Use by the Infringer of Implied and Common Law Federal Rights, State Law Claims, and Contract to Shift Liability for Infringement of Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks (1997) 28 Tex. Tech L.Rev. 1027, 1065 [recognizing that “section 312(3) of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code” has been “[e]nacted by virtually every state”].) The statutory warranties contained in Uniform C 2008Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval (1986) 476 U.S. 858, 872, fn. 7 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 865 , 106 S.Ct. 2295 ] [noting that “the Uniform Commercial Code . . . has been adopted by 49 States”]; Hricik, Remedies of the Infringer: The Use by the Infringer of Implied and Common Law Federal Rights, State Law Claims, and Contract to Shift Liability for Infringement of Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks (1997) 28 Tex. Tech L.Rev. 1027, 1065 [recognizing that “section 312(3) of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code” has been “[e]nacted by virtually every state”].) The statutory warranties contained in Uniform C | 1 | 1 |
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Islandgreen2 sentences2000Since colonial times, commercial speech, operating through advertising, had played a major role in the life of the press, primarily as a source of revenue but also as a kind of editorial content, inasmuch as it was "thought to have independent value in educating and informing the reading public." (Troy, Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, supra, 16 Yale J. on Reg. at p. 100; see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 495 , 116 S.Ct. 1495 (plur. opn. of Stevens, J.).) And, of course, since colonial times, the press had itself played a major role in the life of the polity. 2000Since colonial times, commercial speech, operating through advertising, had played a major role in the life of the press, primarily as a source of revenue but also as a kind of editorial content, inasmuch as it was "thought to have independent value in educating and informing the reading public." (Troy, Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, supra, 16 Yale J. on Reg. at p. 100; see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 495 , 116 S.Ct. 1495 (plur. opn. of Stevens, J.).) And, of course, since colonial times, the press had itself played a major role in the life of the polity. | 1 | 1 |
Sabella v. Wislergreen1 sentence1986In Sabella , the court rejected an argument that since the builder neither fraudulently misrepresented nor concealed, he was protected by the doctrine of caveat emptor, stating: “[S]ince Wisler’s liability is predicated solely upon negligence in the construction of the dwelling, rather than upon alleged misrepresentation or any implied warranty, it does not appear that the doctrine of caveat emptor has any application to the instant action. [Citations.]” (Sabella v. Wisler, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 27.) Under the reasoning of Sabella , although an “as is” provision may under some circumstances e | 1 | 1 |
Pierce County v. Evansgreen2 sentences1984We also note that subsequent to the Anderson decision, other Washington cases have eroded the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to Washington tax sales. ( Wingard v. Heinkel (1967) 70 Wn.2d 730 [ 424 P.2d 1010 ]; see also Pierce County v. Evans (1977) 17 Wn.App. 201 [ 563 P.2d 1263 ].) Defendants contend that because Revenue and Taxation Code sections 3725-3731 provide a remedy for a purchaser at an invalid or irregular tax sale, and because Revenue and Taxation Code sections 3518 and 3711 provide that a duly acknowledged or proved tax deed is conclusive evidence of the regularity of tax sa 1984We also note that subsequent to the Anderson decision, other Washington cases have eroded the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to Washington tax sales. ( Wingard v. Heinkel (1967) 70 Wn.2d 730 [ 424 P.2d 1010 ]; see also Pierce County v. Evans (1977) 17 Wn.App. 201 [ 563 P.2d 1263 ].) Defendants contend that because Revenue and Taxation Code sections 3725-3731 provide a remedy for a purchaser at an invalid or irregular tax sale, and because Revenue and Taxation Code sections 3518 and 3711 provide that a duly acknowledged or proved tax deed is conclusive evidence of the regularity of tax sa | 1 | 1 |
Brewster v. DeFremerygreen1 sentence1974Thus, under traditional common law rules, the landlord owed no duty to place leased premises in a habitable condition and no obligation to repair the premises. (3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (5th ed. 1966) pp. 122-123; see, e.g., Brewster v. DeFremery (1867) 33 Cal. 341, 345-346 .) These original common law precepts perhaps suited the agrarianism of the early Middle Ages which was their matrix; at such time, the primary value of a lease lay in the land itself and whatever simple living structures may have been included in the leasehold were of secondary importance and were readily rep | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gagne v. Bertran
green
2 sentences1974In the normal sale of land and buildings, courts have traditionally applied the doctrine of caveat emptor, with the buyer assuming the risk on quality absent express warranty, fraud, or misrepresentation. ( Gustafson v. Dunman, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal. App.2d 10, 13 [ 22 Cal. Rptr. 161 ]; Murphy v. Sheftel (1932) 121 Cal. App. 533, 539 [ 9 P.2d 568 ].) In contrast, in the sale or furnishing of tangible chattels, warranties of quality and fitness have been implied ( Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]), and in California statutes dealing with such warranties now govern the sale 1974In the normal sale of land and buildings, courts have traditionally applied the doctrine of caveat emptor, with the buyer assuming the risk on quality absent express warranty, fraud, or misrepresentation. ( Gustafson v. Dunman, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal. App.2d 10, 13 [ 22 Cal. Rptr. 161 ]; Murphy v. Sheftel (1932) 121 Cal. App. 533, 539 [ 9 P.2d 568 ].) In contrast, in the sale or furnishing of tangible chattels, warranties of quality and fitness have been implied ( Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]), and in California statutes dealing with such warranties now govern the sale | 2 | 1974–1974 |
Courtney v. Farthing
neutral
2 sentences2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Routh v. Quinn
green
1 sentence2011(See Annot., Tax Officer— Personal Liability (1944) 149 A.L.R. 220 [Routh as the lead case].) The buyer had already lost a suit by the redeeming owner based on the invalidity of the tax sale. ( Routh, supra, 20 Cal.2d 488, 489-490 .) Routh stated the general rule, that “[t]he essence of [caveat emptor] is that the buyer beware; that he is bound to inform himself of the regularity of the tax proceedings, and that he assumes the risk of any error in the computation of the tax.” (Id. at p. 493.) Although Routh involved a claim of negligence, the California Supreme Court held the caveat emptor doc | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Norton v. Nebraska Loan & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Webster v. Haworth
green
1 sentence2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Castleman's Adm'r v. Castleman
neutral
2 sentences2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Peardon v. Markley
green
2 sentences2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Quarg v. Scher
green
2 sentences2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 2011(Quarg v. Scher (1902) 136 Cal. 406 [ 69 P. 96 ] [private sale]; Webster v. Haworth (1857) 8 Cal. 21 [sheriff’s sale]; Peardon v. Markley (1920) 50 Cal.App. 257 [ 195 P. 70 ] [private sale]; Courtney v. Farthing (1940) 282 Ky. 54 [ 137 S.W.2d 703 ] [judicial sale]; Castleman v. Castleman (1910) 67 W.Va. 407 [ 68 S.E. 34 ] [judicial sale]; Norton v. Taylor (1892) 35 Neb. 466 [ 53 N.W. 481 ] [judicial sale]; Hayes v. Stiger (1878) 29 N.J.Eq. 196 [ 2 Stewart 196 ] [judicial sale]; 1 Hunter & Rowley, Modem Law of Contracts (2011) Warranties, § 9.4; cf. Karoutas v. HomeFed Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Green v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2001In Green, supra, 10 Cal.3d 616 , the Supreme Court traced—beginning in the Middle Ages—the property law principle that a landlord had no duty to place leased premises in a habitable condition and no duty to repair based on the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, or “let the buyer beware.” The court discussed modem urbanization, the change in the contemporary housing market, modem legal decisions discarding the caveat emptor approach in order to protect consumers, and the widespread enactment of comprehensive housing codes throughout the nation. ( Green, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 622-627.) The cou 2001In Green, supra, 10 Cal.3d 616 , the Supreme Court traced—beginning in the Middle Ages—the property law principle that a landlord had no duty to place leased premises in a habitable condition and no duty to repair based on the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, or “let the buyer beware.” The court discussed modem urbanization, the change in the contemporary housing market, modem legal decisions discarding the caveat emptor approach in order to protect consumers, and the widespread enactment of comprehensive housing codes throughout the nation. ( Green, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 622-627.) The cou | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Harvey v. Whyte
green
2 sentences1991An appraisal dated March 20, 1986, valued the home between $331,200 and $281,500. 2 Ninety percent of $331,200 = $298,080. 3 Appellant cites Harvey v. Whyte (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 685 [ 323 P.2d 162 ] for the suggestion that the purchaser at a sheriff’s sale is responsible “for any defects which may be present in the title purchased and the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to such Sheriff’s sale.” Appellant misconstrues the holding in Harvey . 1991An appraisal dated March 20, 1986, valued the home between $331,200 and $281,500. 2 Ninety percent of $331,200 = $298,080. 3 Appellant cites Harvey v. Whyte (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 685 [ 323 P.2d 162 ] for the suggestion that the purchaser at a sheriff’s sale is responsible “for any defects which may be present in the title purchased and the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to such Sheriff’s sale.” Appellant misconstrues the holding in Harvey . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Everet L. Hagan v. George L. Gardner, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Flintridge Heights, Inc., a Bankrupt Corporation
green
1 sentence1986A sale by a trustee in bankruptcy is a judicial sale. [Citation.] The purchaser is bound to know that the only title which can be sold by the trustee is his own right, title and interest, and the doctrine of caveat emptor, applicable generally to judicial sales, applies to a sale under order of a bankruptcy court. ” (Hagan v. Gardner (9th Cir. 1960) 283 F.2d 643, 646 , italics added.) While the record does not contain a copy of the trustee’s deed in this case, it is our expectation the trustee’s deed to Lister is nothing more than the quitclaim deed usually involved in such a conveyance. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Wingard v. Heinkel
neutral
2 sentences1984We also note that subsequent to the Anderson decision, other Washington cases have eroded the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to Washington tax sales. ( Wingard v. Heinkel (1967) 70 Wn.2d 730 [ 424 P.2d 1010 ]; see also Pierce County v. Evans (1977) 17 Wn.App. 201 [ 563 P.2d 1263 ].) Defendants contend that because Revenue and Taxation Code sections 3725-3731 provide a remedy for a purchaser at an invalid or irregular tax sale, and because Revenue and Taxation Code sections 3518 and 3711 provide that a duly acknowledged or proved tax deed is conclusive evidence of the regularity of tax sa 1984We also note that subsequent to the Anderson decision, other Washington cases have eroded the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to Washington tax sales. ( Wingard v. Heinkel (1967) 70 Wn.2d 730 [ 424 P.2d 1010 ]; see also Pierce County v. Evans (1977) 17 Wn.App. 201 [ 563 P.2d 1263 ].) Defendants contend that because Revenue and Taxation Code sections 3725-3731 provide a remedy for a purchaser at an invalid or irregular tax sale, and because Revenue and Taxation Code sections 3518 and 3711 provide that a duly acknowledged or proved tax deed is conclusive evidence of the regularity of tax sa | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Blankenship v. Whaley
green
2 sentences1949Appellant leased such title . as the decedent Jiad at his death and it was respondent’s duty to ascertain before bidding, the nature of that title, for it could not, after confirmation, complain of any defects therein.” [Emphasis added.] (See, also, Blankenship v. Whaley, 124 Cal. 300 [ 57 P. 79 ]; Estate of Verwoert, 177 Cal. 488 [ 171 P. 105 ].) Thus it is clear that the basis for the caveat emptor rule is that the administrator cannot sell or convey anything except the interest of the deceased at the time of his death; he is the mere instrumentality who, under supervision of the court (conf 1949Appellant leased such title . as the decedent Jiad at his death and it was respondent’s duty to ascertain before bidding, the nature of that title, for it could not, after confirmation, complain of any defects therein.” [Emphasis added.] (See, also, Blankenship v. Whaley, 124 Cal. 300 [ 57 P. 79 ]; Estate of Verwoert, 177 Cal. 488 [ 171 P. 105 ].) Thus it is clear that the basis for the caveat emptor rule is that the administrator cannot sell or convey anything except the interest of the deceased at the time of his death; he is the mere instrumentality who, under supervision of the court (conf | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Verwoert v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences1949Appellant leased such title . as the decedent Jiad at his death and it was respondent’s duty to ascertain before bidding, the nature of that title, for it could not, after confirmation, complain of any defects therein.” [Emphasis added.] (See, also, Blankenship v. Whaley, 124 Cal. 300 [ 57 P. 79 ]; Estate of Verwoert, 177 Cal. 488 [ 171 P. 105 ].) Thus it is clear that the basis for the caveat emptor rule is that the administrator cannot sell or convey anything except the interest of the deceased at the time of his death; he is the mere instrumentality who, under supervision of the court (conf 1949Appellant leased such title . as the decedent Jiad at his death and it was respondent’s duty to ascertain before bidding, the nature of that title, for it could not, after confirmation, complain of any defects therein.” [Emphasis added.] (See, also, Blankenship v. Whaley, 124 Cal. 300 [ 57 P. 79 ]; Estate of Verwoert, 177 Cal. 488 [ 171 P. 105 ].) Thus it is clear that the basis for the caveat emptor rule is that the administrator cannot sell or convey anything except the interest of the deceased at the time of his death; he is the mere instrumentality who, under supervision of the court (conf | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Barnes v. Barnes
green
1 sentence1945(Bragg v. Bragg, supra, 219 Cal. 715; Barnes v. Barnes, supra, 110 Cal. 418 .) In the latter case it was said that the doctrine of caveat emptor governs, and forecloses reliance upon express or implied representations of either of the parties as a ground for annulment. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Bragg v. Bragg
green
1 sentence1945(Bragg v. Bragg, supra, 219 Cal. 715; Barnes v. Barnes, supra, 110 Cal. 418 .) In the latter case it was said that the doctrine of caveat emptor governs, and forecloses reliance upon express or implied representations of either of the parties as a ground for annulment. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Loomis v. County of Los Angeles
neutral
1 sentence1942(Coleman v. County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 714 [ 182 Pac. 440 ]; Loomis v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 456 ; Brooks v. Tulare County, 117 Cal. 465 [ 49 Pac. 469 ]; Holland v. Hotchkiss, supra; Moyer v. Wilson, 166 Cal. 261 [ 135 Pac. 1125 ].) That rule was founded upon the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Brooks v. County of Tulare
green
2 sentences1942(Coleman v. County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 714 [ 182 Pac. 440 ]; Loomis v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 456 ; Brooks v. Tulare County, 117 Cal. 465 [ 49 Pac. 469 ]; Holland v. Hotchkiss, supra; Moyer v. Wilson, 166 Cal. 261 [ 135 Pac. 1125 ].) That rule was founded upon the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor. 1942(Coleman v. County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 714 [ 182 Pac. 440 ]; Loomis v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 456 ; Brooks v. Tulare County, 117 Cal. 465 [ 49 Pac. 469 ]; Holland v. Hotchkiss, supra; Moyer v. Wilson, 166 Cal. 261 [ 135 Pac. 1125 ].) That rule was founded upon the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Drew v. Superior Court of Mendocino County
green
1 sentence1942(Coleman v. County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 714 [ 182 Pac. 440 ]; Loomis v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 456 ; Brooks v. Tulare County, 117 Cal. 465 [ 49 Pac. 469 ]; Holland v. Hotchkiss, supra; Moyer v. Wilson, 166 Cal. 261 [ 135 Pac. 1125 ].) That rule was founded upon the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Coleman v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence1942(Coleman v. County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 714 [ 182 Pac. 440 ]; Loomis v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 456 ; Brooks v. Tulare County, 117 Cal. 465 [ 49 Pac. 469 ]; Holland v. Hotchkiss, supra; Moyer v. Wilson, 166 Cal. 261 [ 135 Pac. 1125 ].) That rule was founded upon the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Moyer v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1942(Coleman v. County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 714 [ 182 Pac. 440 ]; Loomis v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 456 ; Brooks v. Tulare County, 117 Cal. 465 [ 49 Pac. 469 ]; Holland v. Hotchkiss, supra; Moyer v. Wilson, 166 Cal. 261 [ 135 Pac. 1125 ].) That rule was founded upon the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor. 1942(Coleman v. County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 714 [ 182 Pac. 440 ]; Loomis v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 456 ; Brooks v. Tulare County, 117 Cal. 465 [ 49 Pac. 469 ]; Holland v. Hotchkiss, supra; Moyer v. Wilson, 166 Cal. 261 [ 135 Pac. 1125 ].) That rule was founded upon the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| People v. Ribera neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Daley v. Quick green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Hornthal v. . Burwell neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Jones v. Warnock green | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.