caveat emptor doctrine in New Jersey

1995The Court used the occasion to note that the doctrine of caveat emptor “as applied to new houses is an anachronism patently out of harmony with modern home buying practices.” Id. at 290, 398 A.2d 1283 (quoting Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex.1968)).

1988In McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275 (1979), Justice Pashman discussed in great detail the history and viability of the doctrine of caveat emptor.

1993The opinion noted that: "These factors have produced persuasive arguments for reevaluation of the caveat emptor doctrine ..." Reste was cited in Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, 456 , 317 A. 2d 68 (1974).

1993The opinion noted that: "These factors have produced persuasive arguments for reevaluation of the caveat emptor doctrine ..." Reste was cited in Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, 456 , 317 A. 2d 68 (1974).

2008The purpose of the Act is "to protect new homeowners and abandon the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor." Ingraham v. Trowbridge Builders, 297 N.J.Super. 72, 80 , 687 A. 2d 785 (App.Div. 1997).

2008The purpose of the Act is "to protect new homeowners and abandon the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor." Ingraham v. Trowbridge Builders, 297 N.J.Super. 72, 80 , 687 A. 2d 785 (App.Div. 1997).

1998The statute was evidently adopted to shift the burden of unearthing the existence and approximate amount of superior liens from bidders to the selling mortgagee. 2 Thirdly, as we have already indicated, the result contended for by R & H Partnership is consistent with the implied holding of Craig, supra, the only reported case directly on point, and with 30 New Jersey Practice, supra, an authoritative New Jersey treatise on the subject, and this result is not inconsistent with any of the other reported cases that we have found which have considered the subject.

1991Id. at 403 , 569 A. 2d 908 .

1991Prospect, 238 N.J.

1991Super. 228 , 546 A. 2d 570 (App.Div. 1988), aff'd 123 N.J. 371 , 587 A. 2d 1249 (1991), it was held that the doctrine of caveat emptor is not a defense to an absolute liability claim by a purchaser against a prior landowner [9] .

1989This issue came up again in Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra , and the court followed T & E and held that the New Jersey Supreme Court would impose strict liability as between successive landowners for conducting an abnormally dangerous activity.

1982In the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision, Dixon v. City Nat'l Bank of Metropolis, 81 Ill. 2d 429 , 43 Ill.Dec. 710 , 410 N.E. 2d 843 (1980), what is referred to as the prevailing view was reaffirmed: that, upon a complete failure of title, the purchaser has no right of recovery against the judgment creditor, under the doctrine of caveat emptor and because of the policy consideration in favor of the permanency and stability of judicial sales.

1982In the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision, Dixon v. City Nat'l Bank of Metropolis, 81 Ill. 2d 429 , 43 Ill.Dec. 710 , 410 N.E. 2d 843 (1980), what is referred to as the prevailing view was reaffirmed: that, upon a complete failure of title, the purchaser has no right of recovery against the judgment creditor, under the doctrine of caveat emptor and because of the policy consideration in favor of the permanency and stability of judicial sales.

1981The principle underlying the caveat emptor rule was more highly regarded in the former times than it is today; but it was never any credit to the law to allow one who had defrauded another to defend on the ground that his own word should not have been believed. [at 505] In Pryor v. Aviola, 301 A. 2d 306 (Del.

1978Accordingly, the recovery against Crawley was proper. [at 745] In Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Super. 476, 266 A. 2d 200 (Super.

1978They reaffirmed their holding in Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467 , 346 A. 2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1975).

1978They reaffirmed their holding in Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467 , 346 A. 2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1975).

1978In Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295 , 262 A. 2d 461 (1970), the Supreme Court of Vermont, after reviewing a wealth of authority on the subject, held that the law will imply a warranty against structural defects and rejected the argument of the defense that there are sound reasons for retaining *14 the doctrine of caveat emptor.

1978In Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295 , 262 A. 2d 461 (1970), the Supreme Court of Vermont, after reviewing a wealth of authority on the subject, held that the law will imply a warranty against structural defects and rejected the argument of the defense that there are sound reasons for retaining *14 the doctrine of caveat emptor.

1978In Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W. 2d 743 (1969), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held: Because the caveat emptor rule is completely unrealistic and inequitable as applied in the case of the ordinarily inexperienced buyer of a new house from the professional builder-seller, and because a contract by the builder to sell a new house is not much distinguishable from a contract to build a house for another, we are disposed to adopt the minority view to the extent of holding that in the sale of a new dwelling by the builder there is an implied warranty that in its major structural features the dwelli

1970These factors have produced persuasive arguments for reevaluation of the caveat emptor doctrine and, for imposition of an implied warranty that the premises are suitable for tbe leased purposes and conform to local codes and zoning laws.” See also Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P. 2d 470 (Sup. Ct. Hawaii 1969).

1958Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane *87 Holding Co., 24 N.J. 139, 145 (1957); Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., supra; 2 Stevenson, Law of Negligence (1954), sec. 489, pp. 733-735.

1930Referring particularly to the situation now before us, we find that in White v. Stretch, 22 N.J.

1928Eq. 184 (to obtain an abatement in a foreclosure suit); Condon v. Sandhowe, 97 N.J.

1928Eq. 209 (where the doctrine of caveat emptor was applied to the plea of innocent purchaser in a creditor's suit); Industrial Savings and Loan Co. v. Plummer, 84 N.J.

1927These views will be found to be adequately supported in the cases cited in Kuhnen v. Parker, 56 N.J.

1925That was decided by Vice-Chancellor Lane in the case of Giammares v. Allemenia Fire Insurance Co., 91 N.J.