6 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1914–1997 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lengyel v. Lintgreen2 sentences1982We recently stated in Lengyel v. Lint, 167 W.Va. 272 , 280 S.E.2d 66, 69 (1981): “It has long been the law in West Virginia that a vendor of real property may be liable to the vendee in an action for fraud. 1982We recently stated in Lengyel v. Lint, 167 W.Va. 272 , 280 S.E.2d 66, 69 (1981): “It has long been the law in West Virginia that a vendor of real property may be liable to the vendee in an action for fraud. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hood v. Bloch Bros.
green
2 sentences1968The circuit court referred to five principles quoted in Hood v. Bloch, 29 W.Va. 244, 252-253 , 11 S.E. 910 , from Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197 (1868). 1968The circuit court referred to five principles quoted in Hood v. Bloch, 29 W.Va. 244, 252-253 , 11 S.E. 910 , from Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197 (1868). | 2 | 1914–1968 |
Thacker v. Tyree
green
2 sentences1997We reversed the summary judgment in Thacker , but specified that “we express no view as to the ultimate outcome but merely hold that the plaintiff’s case could not be dismissed as a matter of law on summary judgment based on the doctrine of caveat emptor.” Id. at 113 , 297 S.E.2d at 888 . 1997We reversed the summary judgment in Thacker , but specified that “we express no view as to the ultimate outcome but merely hold that the plaintiff’s case could not be dismissed as a matter of law on summary judgment based on the doctrine of caveat emptor.” Id. at 113 , 297 S.E.2d at 888 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Easton v. Strassburger
green
2 sentences1997In Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal.App.3d 90 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 383 (1984), the California court held that a real estate broker representing the seller of residential property has a duty to disclose facts, including “the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residential property listed for sale and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an investigation would reveal.” Id., at 102 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 383 . 1997In Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal.App.3d 90 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 383 (1984), the California court held that a real estate broker representing the seller of residential property has a duty to disclose facts, including “the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residential property listed for sale and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an investigation would reveal.” Id., at 102 , 199 Cal.Rptr. 383 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Young v. Smith
green
2 sentences1931Mountain Yiew Kealty Company argues that the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply to it, basing its contention in that regard on the case of Young & McWhorter v. Smith, 88 W. 1931Va. 445 , 107 S. E. 110 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Litchfield v. Hutchinson
green
1 sentence1917Although the vendor has no actual knowledge of the fact in question, yet if it is one susceptible of accurate personal knowledge on his part, and by reasonable inquiry and examination might be ascertained by him, his positive false representations made as of his own knowledge and for the purpose of inducing the sale are actionable if relied on by the purchaser to his injury.” In Handy v. Roberts, 165 S. W. 37 , the court said apropos of the question of furnishing different material from that which was contracted to be furnished: “If the seller of oats represented that they were of a certain ki | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Handy v. Roberts
neutral
1 sentence1917Although the vendor has no actual knowledge of the fact in question, yet if it is one susceptible of accurate personal knowledge on his part, and by reasonable inquiry and examination might be ascertained by him, his positive false representations made as of his own knowledge and for the purpose of inducing the sale are actionable if relied on by the purchaser to his injury.” In Handy v. Roberts, 165 S. W. 37 , the court said apropos of the question of furnishing different material from that which was contracted to be furnished: “If the seller of oats represented that they were of a certain ki | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.