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12 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1874–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Humber v. Mortongreen2 sentences1984It does a disservice not only to the ordinary prudent purchaser, but to the industry itself by lending encouragement to the unscrupulous, fly-by-night operator and purveyor of shoddy work." Id.; quoting Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex.1968). 1976As said in Humber v. Morton, supra at 562, “The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is an anachronism patently out of harmony with modern home buying practices. | 2 | 2 |
Lyon v. Wardgreen1 sentence1981App. 446, 450 , 221 S.E. 2d 727, 729 (1976), this Court interpreted Hartley “to stand for the proposition that a builder-vendor impliedly warrants to the initial purchaser that a house and all its fixtures will provide the service or protection for which it was intended under normal use and conditions.” Judge Hedrick noted the inequities of the doctrine of caveat emptor, in that it does a disservice, not only to the ordinary prudent purchaser, but to the housing industry as well, by encouraging poor quality work and unscrupulous operations. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oates v. Jag, Inc.green2 sentences1984But see Oates v. Jag, Inc., 66 N.C.App. 244 , 311 S.E.2d 369 (1984) (third purchasers of a dwelling house barred from recovery for negligent construction from the original builder on the basis of judicial reluctance to further limit traditional doctrine of caveat emptor). 1984But see Oates v. Jag, Inc., 66 N.C.App. 244 , 311 S.E.2d 369 (1984) (third purchasers of a dwelling house barred from recovery for negligent construction from the original builder on the basis of judicial reluctance to further limit traditional doctrine of caveat emptor). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Buckman v. . Bragaw
neutral
2 sentences1984Buckman *248 v. Bragaw, 192 N.C. 152 , 134 S.E. 422 (1926). 1984Buckman *248 v. Bragaw, 192 N.C. 152 , 134 S.E. 422 (1926). | 2 | 1981–1984 |
Phillips Walsh v. . Rufus D. Hall
green
2 sentences1945In the absence of any fraud, mistake or overreaching, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N. C., 757 , 36 S. E., 153 ; Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C., 233 . 1905These two cases are contrary to the trend of modern decisions; were expressly disapproved as to the point for which they are now cited, in the case of Walsh v. Hall, supra, and have since been ignored as authority. | 2 | 1905–1945 |
Oates v. Jag, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Id. at 278–79, 333 S.E.2d at 224 . 2020Id. at 278–79, 333 S.E.2d at 224 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Levy v. C. Young Construction Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence1984Absent any covenant binding defendant to sell a well constructed house, plaintiffs cannot sue on an implied warranty. [Williston, Contracts, § 926 (Rev. ed. 1936).] Id. at 296, 134 A. 2d at 719 . [T]he policy reasons underlying the rule that the acceptance of a deed without covenants as to construction is the cut-off point so far as the vendor’s liability is concerned, are rather obvious. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Hinson v. Jefferson
green
2 sentences1981In Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422 , 215 S.E. 2d 102 (1975), the Supreme Court referred to the theory of implied warranty as a “well-reasoned exception” to the caveat emptor doctrine, and extended it to a situation where a grantor conveys land subject to restrictive covenants that limit its use to the construction of a single-family dwelling, and, due to subsequent disclosures, both *57 unknown to and not reasonably discoverable by the grantee before or at the time of conveyance, the property cannot be used by the grantee, or by any subsequent grantees through mesne conveyances, for the spec 1981In Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422 , 215 S.E. 2d 102 (1975), the Supreme Court referred to the theory of implied warranty as a “well-reasoned exception” to the caveat emptor doctrine, and extended it to a situation where a grantor conveys land subject to restrictive covenants that limit its use to the construction of a single-family dwelling, and, due to subsequent disclosures, both *57 unknown to and not reasonably discoverable by the grantee before or at the time of conveyance, the property cannot be used by the grantee, or by any subsequent grantees through mesne conveyances, for the spec | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Whitaker v. Wood
neutral
2 sentences1980Whitaker v. Wood, 258 N.C. 524 , 128 S.E. 2d 753 (1963). 1980Whitaker v. Wood, 258 N.C. 524 , 128 S.E. 2d 753 (1963). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
A & M Land Development Co. v. Miller
green
1 sentence1975The closest mistaken assumption case we have found to our fact situation is A & M Land Development Co. v. Miller, 354 *432 Mich. 681, 94 N.W. 2d 197 (1959). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Rickets v. Dickens
green
1 sentence1953Foy v. Haughton, 85 N.C. 168 ; Peacock v. Barnes, 139 N.C. 196 ; Rickets v. Dickens, 5 N.C. 343 ; Zimmerman v. Lynch, 130 N.C. 61 ; Guy v. Bank, 205 N.C. 357 , 171 S.E. 341 ; Turpin v. Jackson County, 225 N.C. 389 , 35 S.E. 2d 180 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Turpin v. County of Jackson
neutral
2 sentences1953Foy v. Haughton, 85 N.C. 168 ; Peacock v. Barnes, 139 N.C. 196 ; Rickets v. Dickens, 5 N.C. 343 ; Zimmerman v. Lynch, 130 N.C. 61 ; Guy v. Bank, 205 N.C. 357 , 171 S.E. 341 ; Turpin v. Jackson County, 225 N.C. 389 , 35 S.E. 2d 180 . 1953Foy v. Haughton, 85 N.C. 168 ; Peacock v. Barnes, 139 N.C. 196 ; Rickets v. Dickens, 5 N.C. 343 ; Zimmerman v. Lynch, 130 N.C. 61 ; Guy v. Bank, 205 N.C. 357 , 171 S.E. 341 ; Turpin v. Jackson County, 225 N.C. 389 , 35 S.E. 2d 180 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Peacock v. Barnes.
neutral
1 sentence1953Foy v. Haughton, 85 N.C. 168 ; Peacock v. Barnes, 139 N.C. 196 ; Rickets v. Dickens, 5 N.C. 343 ; Zimmerman v. Lynch, 130 N.C. 61 ; Guy v. Bank, 205 N.C. 357 , 171 S.E. 341 ; Turpin v. Jackson County, 225 N.C. 389 , 35 S.E. 2d 180 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Zimmerman v. Lynch.
neutral
1 sentence1953Foy v. Haughton, 85 N.C. 168 ; Peacock v. Barnes, 139 N.C. 196 ; Rickets v. Dickens, 5 N.C. 343 ; Zimmerman v. Lynch, 130 N.C. 61 ; Guy v. Bank, 205 N.C. 357 , 171 S.E. 341 ; Turpin v. Jackson County, 225 N.C. 389 , 35 S.E. 2d 180 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Guy v. First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank of Columbia
neutral
2 sentences1953Foy v. Haughton, 85 N.C. 168 ; Peacock v. Barnes, 139 N.C. 196 ; Rickets v. Dickens, 5 N.C. 343 ; Zimmerman v. Lynch, 130 N.C. 61 ; Guy v. Bank, 205 N.C. 357 , 171 S.E. 341 ; Turpin v. Jackson County, 225 N.C. 389 , 35 S.E. 2d 180 . 1953Foy v. Haughton, 85 N.C. 168 ; Peacock v. Barnes, 139 N.C. 196 ; Rickets v. Dickens, 5 N.C. 343 ; Zimmerman v. Lynch, 130 N.C. 61 ; Guy v. Bank, 205 N.C. 357 , 171 S.E. 341 ; Turpin v. Jackson County, 225 N.C. 389 , 35 S.E. 2d 180 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Foy v. . Haughton
neutral
1 sentence1953Foy v. Haughton, 85 N.C. 168 ; Peacock v. Barnes, 139 N.C. 196 ; Rickets v. Dickens, 5 N.C. 343 ; Zimmerman v. Lynch, 130 N.C. 61 ; Guy v. Bank, 205 N.C. 357 , 171 S.E. 341 ; Turpin v. Jackson County, 225 N.C. 389 , 35 S.E. 2d 180 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Smathers v. . Gilmer
green
2 sentences1945In the absence of any fraud, mistake or overreaching, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N. C., 757 , 36 S. E., 153 ; Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C., 233 . 1945In the absence of any fraud, mistake or overreaching, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N. C., 757 , 36 S. E., 153 ; Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C., 233 . | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Credle v. . Swindell
neutral
1 sentence1905In Vernoy's case, supra, there was no claim or evidence tending to show actual fraud, and this opinion intimates that, in case of actual fraud, the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply as was said by the same judge writing the opinion in Hill v. Brower, supra. The only cases which give support to the plaintiffs’ position are those of Lytle v. Bird and Credle v. Swindell, supra, in both of which it was expressly held that an action for deceit would lie in no case, on the sale of land for fraudulent representation as to the quantity sold or what particular land was included in the deed; and | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Hill v. . Brower
neutral
1 sentence1905In Vernoy's case, supra, there was no claim or evidence tending to show actual fraud, and this opinion intimates that, in case of actual fraud, the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply as was said by the same judge writing the opinion in Hill v. Brower, supra. The only cases which give support to the plaintiffs’ position are those of Lytle v. Bird and Credle v. Swindell, supra, in both of which it was expressly held that an action for deceit would lie in no case, on the sale of land for fraudulent representation as to the quantity sold or what particular land was included in the deed; and | 1 | 1905–1905 |
State v. . Phifer
green
1 sentence1874After the very thorough discussion of the crime of cheating by false tokens, pretences, etc., and the citation of authorities, by READE, J., in State v. Phifer , 65 N.C. 321 , it would be useless to pursue the subject further. | 1 | 1874–1874 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.