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6 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1872–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ryan v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See also Stebbins v. Wells, 766 A.2d 369, 373 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (recognizing the passive concealment exception to the caveat emptor doctrine when vendor of real property has special knowledge, not apparent to the purchaser, and knows that the purchaser is operating under a material misapprehension as to facts that would be important to his decision); Lynn v. Taylor, 7 Kan.App.2d 369, 371 , 642 P.2d 131 (1982) (recognizing that a party to a contract for sale of real estate who has special knowledge of a defect that cannot be found by reasonable diligence must speak, and his silence consti 2008See also Stebbins v. Wells, 766 A.2d 369, 373 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (recognizing the passive concealment exception to the caveat emptor doctrine when vendor of real property has special knowledge, not apparent to the purchaser, and knows that the purchaser is operating under a material misapprehension as to facts that would be important to his decision); Lynn v. Taylor, 7 Kan.App.2d 369, 371 , 642 P.2d 131 (1982) (recognizing that a party to a contract for sale of real estate who has special knowledge of a defect that cannot be found by reasonable diligence must speak, and his silence consti | 1 | 1 |
Stebbins v. Wellsgreen1 sentence2008See also Stebbins v. Wells, 766 A.2d 369, 373 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (recognizing the passive concealment exception to the caveat emptor doctrine when vendor of real property has special knowledge, not apparent to the purchaser, and knows that the purchaser is operating under a material misapprehension as to facts that would be important to his decision); Lynn v. Taylor, 7 Kan.App.2d 369, 371 , 642 P.2d 131 (1982) (recognizing that a party to a contract for sale of real estate who has special knowledge of a defect that cannot be found by reasonable diligence must speak, and his silence consti | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Standard Motor Co. v. Peltzer
green
2 sentences1993The modern and more sensible rule is that applied by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Standard Motor Company v. Peltzer, 147 Md. 509, 510 , 128 A. 451 (1925), where it was held not to be negligence or folly for a buyer to rely on what had been told him. 212 Md. at 593 , 130 A.2d at 576 . 1993The modern and more sensible rule is that applied by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Standard Motor Company v. Peltzer, 147 Md. 509, 510 , 128 A. 451 (1925), where it was held not to be negligence or folly for a buyer to rely on what had been told him. 212 Md. at 593 , 130 A.2d at 576 . | 2 | 1957–1993 |
Farmers & Planters Bank v. Martin
green
2 sentences1880To all such cases the doctrine of caveat emptor applies. 7 Md., 342 ; 19 Md., 391 . 1872To all such cases the doctrine of caveat emptor applies. 7 Md., 342 ; 19 Md., 391 . | 2 | 1872–1880 |
Lynn v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2008See also Stebbins v. Wells, 766 A.2d 369, 373 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (recognizing the passive concealment exception to the caveat emptor doctrine when vendor of real property has special knowledge, not apparent to the purchaser, and knows that the purchaser is operating under a material misapprehension as to facts that would be important to his decision); Lynn v. Taylor, 7 Kan.App.2d 369, 371 , 642 P.2d 131 (1982) (recognizing that a party to a contract for sale of real estate who has special knowledge of a defect that cannot be found by reasonable diligence must speak, and his silence consti 2008See also Stebbins v. Wells, 766 A.2d 369, 373 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (recognizing the passive concealment exception to the caveat emptor doctrine when vendor of real property has special knowledge, not apparent to the purchaser, and knows that the purchaser is operating under a material misapprehension as to facts that would be important to his decision); Lynn v. Taylor, 7 Kan.App.2d 369, 371 , 642 P.2d 131 (1982) (recognizing that a party to a contract for sale of real estate who has special knowledge of a defect that cannot be found by reasonable diligence must speak, and his silence consti | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Wilhite v. Mays
green
2 sentences2008The passive concealment fraud theory "places upon the seller a duly to disclose in situations where he or she has special knowledge not apparent to the buyer and is aware that the buyer is acting under a misapprehension as to facts which would be important to the buyer and would probably affect its decision.” Wilhite v. Mays, 140 Ga.App. 816, 818 , 232 S.E.2d 141 (1976). 2008The passive concealment fraud theory "places upon the seller a duly to disclose in situations where he or she has special knowledge not apparent to the buyer and is aware that the buyer is acting under a misapprehension as to facts which would be important to the buyer and would probably affect its decision.” Wilhite v. Mays, 140 Ga.App. 816, 818 , 232 S.E.2d 141 (1976). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Schmidt v. Millhauser
green
2 sentences1993The modern and more sensible rule is that applied by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Standard Motor Company v. Peltzer, 147 Md. 509, 510 , 128 A. 451 (1925), where it was held not to be negligence or folly for a buyer to rely on what had been told him. 212 Md. at 593 , 130 A.2d at 576 . 1993The modern and more sensible rule is that applied by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Standard Motor Company v. Peltzer, 147 Md. 509, 510 , 128 A. 451 (1925), where it was held not to be negligence or folly for a buyer to rely on what had been told him. 212 Md. at 593 , 130 A.2d at 576 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Byrd v. Day
neutral
1 sentence1963The appellants having filed their exceptions prior to the sale’s ratification, this question would seem to be answered by the flat statement of this Court in Byrd v. Day, 138 Md. 442, 445 , as follows: “It is also claimed on behalf of the appellant that the rule of caveat emptor applies to the present case [one of a mortgage foreclosure], but it has been repeatedly held both in this State and elsewhere that the rule of caveat emptor has no application where a judicial sale is involved until after the sale has been finally ratified.” However, the appellees urge the somewhat unusual claim that t | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Tomlinson v. McKaig
green
1 sentence1963As early as the case of Tomlinson v. McKaig, 5 Gill 256, 276 , this Court said: “Before the ratification * * * all objections to a sale are open for consideration, and the sale will be set aside upon the proof of error, mistake, misunderstanding or misrepresentation as to the terms or manner of the sale. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.