caveat emptor rule in Alabama

2010Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415 , 131 So.2d 884 (1961).

2010Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415 , 131 So.2d 884 (1961).

2006In DeAravjo, for example, we said: "We reaffirm our recent holding in Morris v. Strickling, 579 So.2d 609 (Ala. 1991), that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies with regard to the purchase of unimproved land: "`The Morrises argue that the exception to the caveat emptor rule as stated in Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439 , 252 So.2d 313 , 314 (1971) (holding that the rule caveat emptor would no longer be applicable to the sale of a newly constructed house, and recognizing an implied warranty of fitness and habitability with regard to such sales), should be extended to situations, such as the one

1991We reaffirm our recent holding in Morris v. Strickling , 579 So.2d 609 (Ala. 1991), that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies with regard to the purchase of unimproved land: "The Morrises argue that the exception to the caveat emptor rule as stated in Cochran v. Keeton , 287 Ala. 439 , 252 So.2d 313 , 314 (1971) (holding that the rule caveat emptor would no longer be applicable to the sale of a newly constructed house, and recognizing an implied warranty of fitness and habitability with regard to such sales), should be extended to situations, such as the one at bar, involving the purchase of

2002Co ., 770 So.2d 1076 (Ala. 2000), 2) that the EIFS is not a "product" for purposes of the AEMLD because once applied it becomes the exterior wall of the building, 3) that the Dryvit defendants owed no duty of disclosure to the Kecks and that there was no evidence indicating that the Dryvit defendants had made any representations directly to the Kecks, and 4) that the Kecks' negligence claims were barred because, the trial court held, the Kecks failed to present substantial evidence of personal injury necessary to avoid the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor.

2002Co., 770 So.2d 1076 (Ala.2000), 2) that the EIFS is not a "product" for purposes of the AEMLD because once applied it becomes the exterior wall of the building, 3) that the Dryvit defendants owed no duty of disclosure to the Kecks and that there was no evidence indicating that the Dryvit defendants had made any representations directly to the Kecks, and 4) that the Kecks' negligence claims were barred because, the trial court held, the Kecks failed to present substantial evidence of personal injury necessary to avoid the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor.

1988Keeler v. Chastang , 472 So.2d 1031 (Ala. 1985)." Id. 502 So.2d at 373 .

1988Keeler v. Chastang , 472 So.2d 1031 (Ala. 1985)." Id. 502 So.2d at 373 .

2010In Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171 (Ala.1987), this Court stated: "`Alabama retains the caveat emptor rule with regard to the resale of used residential real estate.

2010In Massey v. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So.2d 171 (Ala.1987), this Court stated: “ ‘Alabama retains the caveat emptor rule with regard to the resale of used residential real estate.

2006A third exception to the caveat emptor rule in the sale of used residential real estate arises "`if the buyer specifically inquires about a material condition concerning the property.'" In that situation, "`the seller has an obligation to disclose known defects.'" Moore , 849 So.2d at 923 (quoting Commercial Credit Corp. , 579 So.2d at 1294 ).

2006The Hopes' failure to inspect the house before purchasing it cannot insulate them from the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor; therefore, the maxim volenti non fit injuria applies." 557 So.2d at 1211 .

2006Although this Court "has abrogated the rule of caveat emptor in the sale of a new house," the doctrine "still applies to the sale of a `used' house." Nesbitt v. Frederick, 941 So.2d 950 , 956 (Ala. 2006); see Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs.

2006Pursuant to DeAravjo v. Walker, 589 So.2d 1292 (Ala. 1991), such a sale falls within the doctrine of caveat emptor which bars [Kilgore's] claims.

2000The trial court then granted their motions to reconsider, treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 12(b), Ala.R.Civ.P., and granted summary judgment for both defendants. "`In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact' and whether the movant was `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Bussey v. John Deere Co. , 531 So.2d 860 , 863 (Ala. 1988); Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P. "[W]hen the movant makes a prima fa

2000The trial court then granted their motions to reconsider, treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 12(b), Ala.R.Civ.P., and granted summary judgment for both defendants. "`In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact' and whether the movant was `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Bussey v. John Deere Co. , 531 So.2d 860 , 863 (Ala. 1988); Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P. "[W]hen the movant makes a prima fa

2000In applying Soniat to this present case, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: *Page 28 "Moreover, the Soniat court's reversal of the summary judgment as to not only the seller, but also . . . the listing agency, makes [it] clear that no defendant can escape liability for active fraudulent concealment of a material fact merely by asserting the doctrine of caveat emptor , regardless of whether it was a party to the underlying sale transaction." Cole , 783 So.2d at 22 .

2000In applying Soniat to this present case, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: *28 "Moreover, the Soniat court's reversal of the summary judgment as to not only the seller, but also ... the listing agency, makes [it] clear that no defendant can escape liability for active fraudulent concealment of a material fact merely by asserting the doctrine of caveat emptor, regardless of whether it was a party to the underlying sale transaction." Cole, 783 So.2d at 22 .

1997Cato v. Lowder Realty Co. , 630 So.2d 378 , 382 (Ala. 1993) (citing Boswell v. Coker , 519 So.2d 493 (Ala. 1987)).

1997Cato v. Lowder Realty Co., 630 So.2d 378, 382 (Ala.1993) (citing Boswell v. Coker, 519 So.2d 493 (Ala.1987)).

1995Williamson v. Realty Champion , 551 So.2d 1000 (Ala. 1989).

1995Williamson v. Realty Champion, 551 So.2d 1000 (Ala.1989).

1991We find the instant case, however, to be factually distinguishable from those cases and controlled, instead, by Savage v. Wright, 439 So.2d 120 (Ala.1983).

1988Keeler v. Chastang , 472 So.2d 1031 (Ala. 1985)." Id. 502 So.2d at 373 .

1985A purchaser may protect himself by express agreement in the deed or contract for sale. 272 Ala. 417 , 131 So.2d 884 . 399 So.2d at 233 .

1985Wooldridge , supra. The same lack of privity is present in this case.

1985Wooldridge , supra; see also, Ray v. Montgomery , 399 So.2d 230 , 233 (Ala. 1980).