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14 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1877–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rutledge v. Dodenhoffgreen2 sentences2011See Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 412 , 175 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1970) ("The doctrine of caveat emptor . . . has, in the absence of fraud and misrepresentation long governed the obligations of the parties in the sale of real estate in this State."). 2011See Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 412 , 175 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1970) ("The doctrine of caveat emptor . . . has, in the absence of fraud and misrepresentation long governed the obligations of the parties in the sale of real estate in this State."). | 3 | 5 |
Sapp v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2023Horton, Inc., 417 S.C. at 50 , 790 S.E.2d at 4 (citing Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 147-48 , 687 S.E.2d 47, 49-50 (stating that South Carolina's "courts have shifted from following the doctrine of caveat emptor ('let the buyer beware') to the doctrine of caveat venditor ('let the seller beware')")). 2023Horton, Inc., 417 S.C. at 50 , 790 S.E.2d at 4 (citing Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 147-48 , 687 S.E.2d 47, 49-50 (stating that South Carolina's "courts have shifted from following the doctrine of caveat emptor ('let the buyer beware') to the doctrine of caveat venditor ('let the seller beware')")). | 2 | 3 |
Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences2016Co., 299 S.C. 335, 343 , 384 S.E.2d 730, 735-36 (1989); cf. Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 147-48 , 687 S.E.2d 47, 49-50 (2009) (stating that South Carolina’s “courts have shifted from following the doctrine of caveat emptor (‘let the buyer beware’) to the doctrine of caveat venditor (‘let the seller beware’)”). 2016Co., 299 S.C. 335, 343 , 384 S.E.2d 730, 735-36 (1989); cf. Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 147-48 , 687 S.E.2d 47, 49-50 (2009) (stating that South Carolina’s “courts have shifted from following the doctrine of caveat emptor (‘let the buyer beware’) to the doctrine of caveat venditor (‘let the seller beware’)”). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lawson v. Citizens & Southern National Bank Ex Rel. Will of Cleveland
green
2 sentences1993Bank of S.C., 259 S.C. 477 , 193 S.E.2d 124 (1972), we said: "... the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply in cases of fraud." Henderson also argues in his brief that by assuming responsibility to repair all damage to the property, Nine took it upon himself to determine the extent of damage. 1993Bank of S.C., 259 S.C. 477 , 193 S.E.2d 124 (1972), we said: "... the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply in cases of fraud." Henderson also argues in his brief that by assuming responsibility to repair all damage to the property, Nine took it upon himself to determine the extent of damage. | 3 | 1980–1993 |
Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Horton, Inc., 417 S.C. at 50 , 790 S.E.2d at 4 (citing Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 147-48 , 687 S.E.2d 47, 49-50 (stating that South Carolina's "courts have shifted from following the doctrine of caveat emptor ('let the buyer beware') to the doctrine of caveat venditor ('let the seller beware')")). 2023Horton, Inc., 417 S.C. at 50 , 790 S.E.2d at 4 (citing Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 147-48 , 687 S.E.2d 47, 49-50 (stating that South Carolina's "courts have shifted from following the doctrine of caveat emptor ('let the buyer beware') to the doctrine of caveat venditor ('let the seller beware')")). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Frasher v. Cofer
green
1 sentence1970Frasher v. Cofer, 251 S. C. 112, 160 S. E. (2d) 560 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Lowe v. FRANCIS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
green
1 sentence1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Glisan v. Smolenske
green
2 sentences1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on 1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Belote Ex Rel. Parker v. Memphis Development Co.
green
2 sentences1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on 1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Carpenter v. Donohoe
green
2 sentences1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on 1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Sabella v. Wisler
green
2 sentences1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on 1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Dow v. Holly Manufacturing Co.
green
1 sentence1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc.
green
1 sentence1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Vanderschrier v. Aaron
green
1 sentence1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Leigh v. Wadsworth
green
1 sentence1968Where the vendor is also the builder he is today, by the weight of modern authority, held liable for damages and injuries occurring after the surrender of title and possession, on one or more of three theories: (1) Implied warranty, an issue not raised in this case; (2) an imminently dangerous condition caused by negligence in construction, and (3) the following proposition from Sec. 353 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d Ed. “(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Jackson ex dem. Tracy v. Hayner
green
1 sentence1877Hayne, ( 12 Johns., 469 ,) cited to sustain the decision below, cannot be regarded as authority upon the question we are considering, for there the action was by a purchaser at Sheriff’s sale, to which the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, the purchaser only getting whatever title the defendant in execution may have had, and of course, therefore, if the assignment of the lease under which such defendant held was void for fraud, the purchaser, though innocent of any participation in or knowledge of such fraud, bought nothing. | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.