impact error in Massachusetts

2025The judge properly considered the mother's persistent inability or unwillingness to meet the children's basic needs,7 see Adoption 7 This included the mother's failure to ensure that the children were fed safely and in adequate amounts while they were 6 of Oliver, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 620, 624-625 (1990) (parent found unfit where infant was unable to gain weight, among other issues, and parent showed "no comprehension of [the infant's] problems and d[id] not acknowledge that he ha[d] problems" that were exacerbated by his environment); the mother's inability to manage her temper with the children

2025The judge properly considered the mother's persistent inability or unwillingness to meet the children's basic needs,7 see Adoption 7 This included the mother's failure to ensure that the children were fed safely and in adequate amounts while they were 6 of Oliver, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 620, 624-625 (1990) (parent found unfit where infant was unable to gain weight, among other issues, and parent showed "no comprehension of [the infant's] problems and d[id] not acknowledge that he ha[d] problems" that were exacerbated by his environment); the mother's inability to manage her temper with the children

2025The judge properly considered the mother's persistent inability or unwillingness to meet the children's basic needs,7 see Adoption 7 This included the mother's failure to ensure that the children were fed safely and in adequate amounts while they were 6 of Oliver, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 620, 624-625 (1990) (parent found unfit where infant was unable to gain weight, among other issues, and parent showed "no comprehension of [the infant's] problems and d[id] not acknowledge that he ha[d] problems" that were exacerbated by his environment); the mother's inability to manage her temper with the children

2023The testimony was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence -- the autopsy photographs, Dr. Shah's opinion that wounds nos. 3 and 7 caused the defendant's death, Dr. Shah's testimony about the wound sizes, and Dr. Shah's opinion about "the characteristics of the object probably used to inflict the type of injury observed." Commonwealth v. Emeny, 463 Mass. 138 , 146 6 Until prompted by the judge, the defendant did not object to Dr. Shah's testifying to the facts underlying his own opinion. 7 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 761 (2009). 7 ii.

2018See Commonwealth v. Gunter , 427 Mass. 259 , 274, 692 N.E.2d 515 (1998).

2018See Commonwealth v. Gunter , 427 Mass. 259 , 274, 692 N.E.2d 515 (1998).

2017Santiago, supra at 500 (identifying factors).

2011Commonwealth v. Quinn, 439 Mass. 492 , 496 & n.9 (2003), citing Commonwealth v. Wardell, 128 Mass. 52, 53 (1880).

2005Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 863 (1999).

2005See Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that (1) the Supreme Court describes the right to confrontation as a “bedrock procedural guarantee,” (2) the harmless error standard of review used to assess misapplication of constitutional rules is appropriate where the impact of the error is measurable but its use does not answer the question of whether the constitutional rule increases the likelihood of an accurate conviction or is a bedrock rule of procedure; and (3) because the Confrontation Clause is designed to promote accuracy, “the Crawford’ rule is one without whi

1994Welfare, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 239, 244 (1984) (adopting a “common-sense interpretation” of the relevant provisions rather than the “department’s interpretation of its regulations [that] seems inconsistent with their terms”).

1992They argue that the instruction as given left the jury to speculate about the impact of a warning, rather than permitting an inference that a warning would have been followed. 2 Harlow v. Chin, 405 Mass. 697, 702 (1989).

1989However, the failure of trial counsel to raise the claim at trial “is of signal importance for [he], unlike us, *64 [was] present and could actually hear and assess the impact of the instruction.” Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 110, 133 (1983)(Smith, J., dissenting), S.C., Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 391 Mass. 869 (1984).

1985While a reading of the transcript shows that identification of the defendant by the victims was very strong, 8 “we cannot assume that our view of the credibility of the victim[s] would be the same as that of the jurors.” Commonwealth v. Wood, 380 Mass. 545, 550 (1980). 9 The judge’s order denying the motion for a new trial is reversed.

1985While a reading of the transcript shows that identification of the defendant by the victims was very strong, [8] "we cannot assume that our *828 view of the credibility of the victim[s] would be the same as that of the jurors." Commonwealth v. Wood, 380 Mass. 545, 550 (1980). [9] The judge's order denying the motion for a new trial is reversed.

1984The impact of that instruction was exacerbated by the “natural and probable consequences” language used by the trial judge in response to the jury’s request during deliberations that he “define the distinction between a non-interfering witness to a crime and the partner in concert for a first degree murder, a second degree murder.” Although the instructions contained statements about reasonable inferences and the Commonwealth’s burden to prove the elements of the indictments, the instructions viewed as a whole, see Commonwealth v. Zezima, 387 Mass. 748, 751 (1982), did not make clear that the

1984The impact of that instruction was exacerbated by the "natural and probable consequences" language used by the trial judge in response to the jury's request during deliberations that he "define the distinction between a non-interfering witness to a crime and the partner in concert for a first degree murder, a second degree murder." Although the instructions contained statements about reasonable inferences and the Commonwealth's burden to prove the elements of the indictments, the instructions viewed as a whole, see Commonwealth v. Zezima, 387 Mass. 748, 751 (1982), did not make clear that the

1984Contrast Commonwealth v. Repoza, 382 Mass. 119, 134 (1980).

1984Contrast Commonwealth v. Repoza, 382 Mass. 119, 134 (1980).

1982See Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974); Carlinville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 63 Ill.

1982See Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1974); Carlinville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 63 Ill.

1982George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 255 (1971).

1982George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 255 (1971).

1982See Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974); Carlinville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 63 Ill.

1982See Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1974); Carlinville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 63 Ill.

1978The result has been that, as a matter of policy, courts have decided not to give full effect to reasonable foreseeability and have adopted limitations on liability, such as the impact rule or the zone of danger rule. [11] *568 Every effort must be made to avoid arbitrary lines which "unnecessarily produce incongruous and indefensible results." Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 365 (1975) (Braucher, J., dissenting).

1978The result has been that, as a matter of policy, courts have decided not to give full effect to reasonable foreseeability and have adopted limitations on liability, such as the impact rule or the zone of danger rule. 11 Every effort must be made to avoid arbitrary lines which “unnecessarily produce incongruous and indefensible results.” Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 365 (1975) (Braucher, J., dissenting).