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13 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Munozgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 , 128 n.12, 659 A.2d 683 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s challenges to probable cause hearing and therefore declining to reconsider holdings that flawed probable cause hearing deprives court of personal jurisdiction over defendant); State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 , 74 n.13, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) (declining to reconsider and overrule State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 323 , because trial court properly found probable cause). 2006See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 , 128 n.12, 659 A.2d 683 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s challenges to probable cause hearing and therefore declining to reconsider holdings that flawed probable cause hearing deprives court of personal jurisdiction over defendant); State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 , 74 n.13, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) (declining to reconsider and overrule State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 323 , because trial court properly found probable cause). | 1 | 1 |
United States of America, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Alfred J. Rioux, Appellant/cross-Appelleegreen2 sentences2000Both the absolute disparity and comparative disparity models, although more widely used than the substantial impact test, are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue represents a very small portion of the community; see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); and the statistical decision theory’s focus on randomness is, by its very nature, inapplicable to a concededly nonrandom process. 2000Both the absolute disparity and comparative disparity models, although more widely used than the substantial impact test, are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue represents a very small portion of the community; see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); and the statistical decision theory’s focus on randomness is, by its very nature, inapplicable to a concededly nonrandom process. | 1 | 1 |
Rodney E. Thomas v. Robert G. Borg Attorney General, Californiagreen2 sentences2000Both the absolute disparity and comparative disparity models, although more widely used than the substantial impact test, are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue represents a very small portion of the community; see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); and the statistical decision theory’s focus on randomness is, by its very nature, inapplicable to a concededly nonrandom process. 2000Both the absolute disparity and comparative disparity models, although more widely used than the substantial impact test, are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue represents a very small portion of the community; see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); and the statistical decision theory’s focus on randomness is, by its very nature, inapplicable to a concededly nonrandom process. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 343369green1 sentence2000The substantial impact test focuses on “whether the underrepresentation substantially affects the composition of the . . . jury.” State v. Castonguay, supra, 194 Conn. 430 ; see United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1976). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Castonguaygreen2 sentences1993See State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416 , 481 A.2d 56 (1984). 1993See State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416 , 481 A.2d 56 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Griswold v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences1991It is now clearly established that parents have a constitutionally protected interest located "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees;" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 485 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 153 , 93 S.Ct. 1409 , 35 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973); to employ contraceptive techniques to limit the size of their family. 1991It is now clearly established that parents have a constitutionally protected interest located "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees;" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 485 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 153 , 93 S.Ct. 1409 , 35 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973); to employ contraceptive techniques to limit the size of their family. | 2 | 1982–1991 |
Dillon v. Legg
green
2 sentences2015Instead, beginning with the seminal California case of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728 , 441 P.2d 912 , 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), nearly three fourths of the states have adopted some form of what has come to be known as the rule of reasonable foreseeability. 2015Instead, beginning with the seminal California case of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728 , 441 P.2d 912 , 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), nearly three fourths of the states have adopted some form of what has come to be known as the rule of reasonable foreseeability. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
D'Ascanio v. D'Ascanio
green
1 sentence2013We look to our Supreme Court’s opinion in D’Ascanio v. D’Ascanio, supra, 237 Conn. 481 , for guidance on the issue of whether the agreement’s self-executing provision terminating alimony in the event of cohabitation should have been enforced by the court after it found that the plaintiff had cohabited as defined in § 46b-86 (b). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Burns v. Hanson
green
2 sentences2007In Burns v. Hanson, 249 Conn. 809 , 734 A.2d 964 (1999), the plaintiff, the mother of one child, had multiple sclerosis (MS) and was advised that any future pregnancy could be detrimental to her. 2007In Burns v. Hanson, 249 Conn. 809 , 734 A.2d 964 (1999), the plaintiff, the mother of one child, had multiple sclerosis (MS) and was advised that any future pregnancy could be detrimental to her. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ochs v. Borrelli
green
1 sentence2007But public policy cannot support an exception to tort liability when the impact of such an exception would impair the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 258 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence2006See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 , 128 n.12, 659 A.2d 683 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s challenges to probable cause hearing and therefore declining to reconsider holdings that flawed probable cause hearing deprives court of personal jurisdiction over defendant); State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 , 74 n.13, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) (declining to reconsider and overrule State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 323 , because trial court properly found probable cause). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Greenfield
green
2 sentences2006See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 , 128 n.12, 659 A.2d 683 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s challenges to probable cause hearing and therefore declining to reconsider holdings that flawed probable cause hearing deprives court of personal jurisdiction over defendant); State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 , 74 n.13, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) (declining to reconsider and overrule State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 323 , because trial court properly found probable cause). 2006See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 , 128 n.12, 659 A.2d 683 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s challenges to probable cause hearing and therefore declining to reconsider holdings that flawed probable cause hearing deprives court of personal jurisdiction over defendant); State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 , 74 n.13, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) (declining to reconsider and overrule State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 323 , because trial court properly found probable cause). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2004It is well settled that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled “to a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 147 L. 2004It is well settled that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled “to a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 147 L. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Alexander
green
2 sentences2001“An appeal to emotions, passions, or prejudices improperly diverts the jury’s attention away from the facts and makes it more difficult for it to decide the case on the evidence in the record.” State v. Alexander, 254 Conn. 290, 307 , 755 A.2d 868 (2000). 2001“An appeal to emotions, passions, or prejudices improperly diverts the jury’s attention away from the facts and makes it more difficult for it to decide the case on the evidence in the record.” State v. Alexander, 254 Conn. 290, 307 , 755 A.2d 868 (2000). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. McCarthy
green
2 sentences2000We turn, therefore, to the second prong of the test, namely, whether there was an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons in the jury array. 1 Courts traditionally have employed one of four statistical models in order to analyze the question of whether a particular group is underrepresented in a jury pool: (1) absolute disparity; 12 (2) comparative disparity; 13 (3) statistical decision theory; 14 or (4) sub stantial impact. 15 In State v. Castonguay, supra, 194 Conn. 426 , this court stated that “the choice of a statistical method depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” This cou 2000We turn, therefore, to the second prong of the test, namely, whether there was an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons in the jury array. 1 Courts traditionally have employed one of four statistical models in order to analyze the question of whether a particular group is underrepresented in a jury pool: (1) absolute disparity; 12 (2) comparative disparity; 13 (3) statistical decision theory; 14 or (4) sub stantial impact. 15 In State v. Castonguay, supra, 194 Conn. 426 , this court stated that “the choice of a statistical method depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” This cou | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Southland Corp. v. Vernon
green
1 sentence2000That discretion includes . . . the degree of complexity of the factual and legal issues, the likely time requirements for trial, the need for discovery and the degree of discovery which is reasonably required, whether complex defenses will be raised in good faith, the impact of hearing the case on the rest of the summary process docket, and whether other actions for similar relief are pending elsewhere." Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Higinbotham
green
1 sentence1992Thus, “[w]hen faced with a situation such as is presented here, a court should analyze the implications of the violation for the defendant’s prison rehabilitation program as well as the subsidiary concern of the impact of the violation on the defendant’s speedy trial rights.” People v. Higinbotham, supra, 998 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Roe v. Wade
red
1 sentence1991It is now clearly established that parents have a constitutionally protected interest located "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees;" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 485 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 153 , 93 S.Ct. 1409 , 35 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973); to employ contraceptive techniques to limit the size of their family. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Bobek v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1991It is now clearly established that parents have a constitutionally protected interest located "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees;" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 485 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 153 , 93 S.Ct. 1409 , 35 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973); to employ contraceptive techniques to limit the size of their family. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Bruno
green
2 sentences1986State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 336 , 497 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 , 106 S. Ct. 1635 , 90 L. 1986State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 336 , 497 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 , 106 S. Ct. 1635 , 90 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Martin v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1986State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 336 , 497 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 , 106 S. Ct. 1635 , 90 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Hollins v. Powell
green
1 sentence1986State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 336 , 497 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 , 106 S. Ct. 1635 , 90 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Paschall v. United States
green
1 sentence1986State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 336 , 497 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 , 106 S. Ct. 1635 , 90 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.