impact exception (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
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impact exception in Connecticut

13 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Munozgreen
conn · 1995 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 , 128 n.12, 659 A.2d 683 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s challenges to probable cause hearing and therefore declining to reconsider holdings that flawed probable cause hearing deprives court of personal jurisdiction over defendant); State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 , 74 n.13, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) (declining to reconsider and overrule State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 323 , because trial court properly found probable cause).

2006See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 , 128 n.12, 659 A.2d 683 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s challenges to probable cause hearing and therefore declining to reconsider holdings that flawed probable cause hearing deprives court of personal jurisdiction over defendant); State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 , 74 n.13, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) (declining to reconsider and overrule State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 323 , because trial court properly found probable cause).

11
United States of America, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Alfred J. Rioux, Appellant/cross-Appelleegreen
ca2 · 1996 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Both the absolute disparity and comparative disparity models, although more widely used than the substantial impact test, are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue represents a very small portion of the community; see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); and the statistical decision theory’s focus on randomness is, by its very nature, inapplicable to a concededly nonrandom process.

2000Both the absolute disparity and comparative disparity models, although more widely used than the substantial impact test, are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue represents a very small portion of the community; see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); and the statistical decision theory’s focus on randomness is, by its very nature, inapplicable to a concededly nonrandom process.

11
Rodney E. Thomas v. Robert G. Borg Attorney General, Californiagreen
ca9 · 1998 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Both the absolute disparity and comparative disparity models, although more widely used than the substantial impact test, are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue represents a very small portion of the community; see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); and the statistical decision theory’s focus on randomness is, by its very nature, inapplicable to a concededly nonrandom process.

2000Both the absolute disparity and comparative disparity models, although more widely used than the substantial impact test, are considered inaccurate when the distinctive group at issue represents a very small portion of the community; see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); and the statistical decision theory’s focus on randomness is, by its very nature, inapplicable to a concededly nonrandom process.

11
cluster 343369green
ca10 · 1976 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000The substantial impact test focuses on “whether the underrepresentation substantially affects the composition of the . . . jury.” State v. Castonguay, supra, 194 Conn. 430 ; see United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1976).

11
State v. Castonguaygreen
conn · 1984 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993See State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416 , 481 A.2d 56 (1984).

1993See State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416 , 481 A.2d 56 (1984).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (18)

CaseCitedYears
Griswold v. Connecticut green
scotus · 1965
2 sentences

1991It is now clearly established that parents have a constitutionally protected interest located "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees;" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 485 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 153 , 93 S.Ct. 1409 , 35 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973); to employ contraceptive techniques to limit the size of their family.

1991It is now clearly established that parents have a constitutionally protected interest located "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees;" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 485 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 153 , 93 S.Ct. 1409 , 35 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973); to employ contraceptive techniques to limit the size of their family.

21982–1991
Dillon v. Legg green
cal · 1968
2 sentences

2015Instead, beginning with the seminal California case of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728 , 441 P.2d 912 , 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), nearly three fourths of the states have adopted some form of what has come to be known as the rule of reasonable foreseeability.

2015Instead, beginning with the seminal California case of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728 , 441 P.2d 912 , 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), nearly three fourths of the states have adopted some form of what has come to be known as the rule of reasonable foreseeability.

12015–2015
D'Ascanio v. D'Ascanio green
conn · 1996
1 sentence

2013We look to our Supreme Court’s opinion in D’Ascanio v. D’Ascanio, supra, 237 Conn. 481 , for guidance on the issue of whether the agreement’s self-executing provision terminating alimony in the event of cohabitation should have been enforced by the court after it found that the plaintiff had cohabited as defined in § 46b-86 (b).

12013–2013
Burns v. Hanson green
conn · 1999
2 sentences

2007In Burns v. Hanson, 249 Conn. 809 , 734 A.2d 964 (1999), the plaintiff, the mother of one child, had multiple sclerosis (MS) and was advised that any future pregnancy could be detrimental to her.

2007In Burns v. Hanson, 249 Conn. 809 , 734 A.2d 964 (1999), the plaintiff, the mother of one child, had multiple sclerosis (MS) and was advised that any future pregnancy could be detrimental to her.

12007–2007
Ochs v. Borrelli green
conn · 1982
1 sentence

2007But public policy cannot support an exception to tort liability when the impact of such an exception would impair the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 258 .

12007–2007
State v. Mitchell green
conn · 1986
1 sentence

2006See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 , 128 n.12, 659 A.2d 683 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s challenges to probable cause hearing and therefore declining to reconsider holdings that flawed probable cause hearing deprives court of personal jurisdiction over defendant); State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 , 74 n.13, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) (declining to reconsider and overrule State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 323 , because trial court properly found probable cause).

12006–2006
State v. Greenfield green
conn · 1993
2 sentences

2006See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 , 128 n.12, 659 A.2d 683 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s challenges to probable cause hearing and therefore declining to reconsider holdings that flawed probable cause hearing deprives court of personal jurisdiction over defendant); State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 , 74 n.13, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) (declining to reconsider and overrule State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 323 , because trial court properly found probable cause).

2006See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 , 128 n.12, 659 A.2d 683 (1995) (rejecting defendant’s challenges to probable cause hearing and therefore declining to reconsider holdings that flawed probable cause hearing deprives court of personal jurisdiction over defendant); State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 , 74 n.13, 634 A.2d 879 (1993) (declining to reconsider and overrule State v. Mitchell, supra, 200 Conn. 323 , because trial court properly found probable cause).

12006–2006
Apprendi v. New Jersey green
scotus · 2000
2 sentences

2004It is well settled that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled “to a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 147 L.

2004It is well settled that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled “to a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 147 L.

12004–2004
State v. Alexander green
conn · 2000
2 sentences

2001“An appeal to emotions, passions, or prejudices improperly diverts the jury’s attention away from the facts and makes it more difficult for it to decide the case on the evidence in the record.” State v. Alexander, 254 Conn. 290, 307 , 755 A.2d 868 (2000).

2001“An appeal to emotions, passions, or prejudices improperly diverts the jury’s attention away from the facts and makes it more difficult for it to decide the case on the evidence in the record.” State v. Alexander, 254 Conn. 290, 307 , 755 A.2d 868 (2000).

12001–2001
State v. McCarthy green
conn · 1985
2 sentences

2000We turn, therefore, to the second prong of the test, namely, whether there was an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons in the jury array. 1 Courts traditionally have employed one of four statistical models in order to analyze the question of whether a particular group is underrepresented in a jury pool: (1) absolute disparity; 12 (2) comparative disparity; 13 (3) statistical decision theory; 14 or (4) sub stantial impact. 15 In State v. Castonguay, supra, 194 Conn. 426 , this court stated that “the choice of a statistical method depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” This cou

2000We turn, therefore, to the second prong of the test, namely, whether there was an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons in the jury array. 1 Courts traditionally have employed one of four statistical models in order to analyze the question of whether a particular group is underrepresented in a jury pool: (1) absolute disparity; 12 (2) comparative disparity; 13 (3) statistical decision theory; 14 or (4) sub stantial impact. 15 In State v. Castonguay, supra, 194 Conn. 426 , this court stated that “the choice of a statistical method depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” This cou

12000–2000
Southland Corp. v. Vernon green
connappct · 1983
1 sentence

2000That discretion includes . . . the degree of complexity of the factual and legal issues, the likely time requirements for trial, the need for discovery and the degree of discovery which is reasonably required, whether complex defenses will be raised in good faith, the impact of hearing the case on the rest of the summary process docket, and whether other actions for similar relief are pending elsewhere." Id.

12000–2000
People v. Higinbotham green
colo · 1986
1 sentence

1992Thus, “[w]hen faced with a situation such as is presented here, a court should analyze the implications of the violation for the defendant’s prison rehabilitation program as well as the subsidiary concern of the impact of the violation on the defendant’s speedy trial rights.” People v. Higinbotham, supra, 998 .

11992–1992
Roe v. Wade red
scotus · 1973
1 sentence

1991It is now clearly established that parents have a constitutionally protected interest located "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees;" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 485 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 153 , 93 S.Ct. 1409 , 35 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973); to employ contraceptive techniques to limit the size of their family.

11991–1991
Bobek v. Ohio green
scotus · 1973
1 sentence

1991It is now clearly established that parents have a constitutionally protected interest located "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees;" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , 485 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 153 , 93 S.Ct. 1409 , 35 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973); to employ contraceptive techniques to limit the size of their family.

11991–1991
State v. Bruno green
conn · 1985
2 sentences

1986State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 336 , 497 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 , 106 S. Ct. 1635 , 90 L.

1986State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 336 , 497 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 , 106 S. Ct. 1635 , 90 L.

11986–1986
Martin v. Ohio green
scotus · 1986
1 sentence

1986State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 336 , 497 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 , 106 S. Ct. 1635 , 90 L.

11986–1986
Hollins v. Powell green
scotus · 1986
1 sentence

1986State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 336 , 497 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 , 106 S. Ct. 1635 , 90 L.

11986–1986
Paschall v. United States green
scotus · 1986
1 sentence

1986State v. Bruno, 197 Conn. 326, 336 , 497 A.2d 758 , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 , 106 S. Ct. 1635 , 90 L.

11986–1986

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-199 (5) CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

FL 106 (1966–2026) CA 83 (1956–2025) TX 74 (1969–2021) IL 63 (1970–2025) MN 58 (1943–2018) DC 56 (1964–2026) PA 54 (1962–2026) IN 50 (1973–2025) GA 37 (1967–2025) NY 33 (1951–2026) NJ 30 (1957–2026) OR 25 (1986–2025) KS 22 (1972–2025) MD 19 (1963–2014) LA 18 (1975–2023) MA 17 (1978–2025) CO 16 (1977–2017) VA 14 (1968–2022) WA 14 (1968–2026) TN 14 (1973–2019) CT 13 (1982–2015) MI 12 (1972–2017) NM 12 (1987–2025) MO 11 (1950–2018) WI 10 (1979–2026) OH 9 (1961–2025) NC 9 (1980–2025) UT 9 (1989–2018) KY 8 (1971–2023) ME 8 (1982–2026) WV 7 (1982–2026) MS 7 (1975–2024) IA 7 (1981–2024) NV 6 (1985–2024) HI 6 (1974–2025) OK 5 (1969–2025) RI 5 (1997–2010) SC 4 (2002–2026) WY 4 (1986–2023) MT 4 (1980–2002) AZ 4 (1954–2023) AK 4 (1978–2023) DE 4 (1965–1987) AR 3 (1979–1999) NE 3 (1955–2003) ND 2 (1972–1990) VT 2 (2004–2014) AL 2 (1969–2001) NH 2 (1979–1989)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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