54 Pennsylvania opinions name it 11 courts 1962–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Niederman v. Brodskygreen2 sentences2023We did not diverge from the impact rule until Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401 , 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970), when we adopted the “zone of danger” theory of NIED liability, which provided compensation to those who did not actually suffer a physical impact resulting in emotional distress so long as they were in personal danger of the physical impact. 2023We did not diverge from the impact rule until Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401 , 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970), when we adopted the “zone of danger” theory of NIED liability, which provided compensation to those who did not actually suffer a physical impact resulting in emotional distress so long as they were in personal danger of the physical impact. | 3 | 22 |
Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc.green2 sentences2023The impact rule “barred recovery for fright, nervous shock or mental or emotional distress unless it was accompanied by a physical injury or impact upon the complaining party.” Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 515 Pa. 183 , 527 A.2d 988, 992 (Pa. 1987); see also, Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581 , 112 A.2d 100, 104 (Pa. 1955). 2023The impact rule “barred recovery for fright, nervous shock or mental or emotional distress unless it was accompanied by a physical injury or impact upon the complaining party.” Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 515 Pa. 183 , 527 A.2d 988, 992 (Pa. 1987); see also, Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581 , 112 A.2d 100, 104 (Pa. 1955). | 3 | 4 |
Potere v. Philadelphiagreen2 sentences2023The impact rule “barred recovery for fright, nervous shock or mental or emotional distress unless it was accompanied by a physical injury or impact upon the complaining party.” Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 515 Pa. 183 , 527 A.2d 988, 992 (Pa. 1987); see also, Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581 , 112 A.2d 100, 104 (Pa. 1955). 2023The impact rule “barred recovery for fright, nervous shock or mental or emotional distress unless it was accompanied by a physical injury or impact upon the complaining party.” Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 515 Pa. 183 , 527 A.2d 988, 992 (Pa. 1987); see also, Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581 , 112 A.2d 100, 104 (Pa. 1955). | 3 | 4 |
Brown v. Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicinegreen2 sentences2022Recovery is available under the impact rule only "where a plaintiff sustains bodily injuries... accompanied by fright or mental suffering directly traceable to the peril in which the defendant's negligence placed the plaintiff..." Brown • Philadelphia Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 449 Pa.Super. 667, 679 , 674 A.2d 1130 , 1135--36 (1996). 2022Recovery is available under the impact rule only "where a plaintiff sustains bodily injuries... accompanied by fright or mental suffering directly traceable to the peril in which the defendant's negligence placed the plaintiff..." Brown • Philadelphia Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 449 Pa.Super. 667, 679 , 674 A.2d 1130 , 1135--36 (1996). | 2 | 4 |
Doe v. Philadelphia Community Health Alternatives Aids Task Forcegreen2 sentences2022See Doe v. Philadelphia Cmty. Health Alternatives AIDS Task Force, 2000 PA Super 6 , 745 A.2d 25, 27 , aff'd, 564 Pa. 264 , 767 A.2d 548 (2001). 2022See Doe v. Philadelphia Cmty. Health Alternatives AIDS Task Force, 2000 PA Super 6 , 745 A.2d 25, 27 , aff'd, 564 Pa. 264 , 767 A.2d 548 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
Doe v. Philadelphia Community Health Alternatives Aids Task Forcegreen2 sentences2022See Doe v. Philadelphia Cmty. Health Alternatives AIDS Task Force, 2000 PA Super 6 , 745 A.2d 25, 27 , aff'd, 564 Pa. 264 , 767 A.2d 548 (2001). 2022See Doe v. Philadelphia Cmty. Health Alternatives AIDS Task Force, 2000 PA Super 6 , 745 A.2d 25 , 27, aff'd, 564 Pa. 264 , 767 A.2d 548 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
Doe v. Philadelphia Community Health Alternatives AIDS Task Forcegreen2 sentences2022See Doe v. Philadelphia Cmty. Health Alternatives AIDS Task Force, 2000 PA Super 6 , 745 A.2d 25, 27 , aff'd, 564 Pa. 264 , 767 A.2d 548 (2001). 2022See Doe v. Philadelphia Cmty. Health Alternatives AIDS Task Force, 2000 PA Super 6 , 745 A.2d 25 , 27, aff'd, 564 Pa. 264 , 767 A.2d 548 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
Bosley v. Andrewsgreen2 sentences1993Justice Musmanno in his famous dissent in the case of the perambulating bovines said he would dissent from the strict application of the impact rule “until the cows come home.” Bosely v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161 , 142 A.2d 263 (1958). 1993Justice Musmanno in his famous dissent in the case of the perambulating bovines said he would dissent from the strict application of the impact rule “until the cows come home.” Bosely v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161 , 142 A.2d 263 (1958). | 1 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Storygreen2 sentences2023See Story, 383 A.2d at 165 n.18 (“One factor to be considered by an appellate court assessing the impact of an error is whether the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the information which was improperly brought to its attention. 2023Here, the only thing the trial court judge told the jury after allowing the disputed testimony was “[o]kay[,] and just to [defense counsel’s] point, that is his right as a defendant, okay, [c]onstitutional [r]ight.” (N.T., 8/7/2019, at 102.) It is hard to classify [J-78-2022] - 33 this brief remark as “[a]dequate,” Story, 383 A.2d at 165 n.18, especially when compared to the more thorough instruction this Court found inadequate in Turner, see Turner, 454 A.2d at 538 n.2. 19 The second factor supporting our conclusion is the split verdict. | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2013Mitchell, 839 A.2d at 215 . 2003See Majority Opinion at ___, 839 A.2d at 215 ("Taking [the uncontradicted] evidence and comparing it in weight to the impact of the error ..., the court concludes that the error created by this improper query was harmless."). [1] *218 This appears, at least to me, to be a dilution of the harmless error standard which the Court took pains to apply correctly in Young . | 1 | 2 |
Knaub v. Gotwaltgreen2 sentences2011Justice Musmanno referenced a prior case in which the majority of the Court denied a woman recovery for NIED when she was charged by a bull and suffered a heart condition as a result of the fright, despite any physical impact from the bull; Justice Musmanno opined: Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267 , 220 A.2d 646, 649 (1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting). 2011Justice Musmanno referenced a prior case in which the majority of the Court denied a woman recovery for NIED when she was charged by a bull and suffered a heart condition as a result of the fright, despite any physical impact from the bull; Justice Musmanno opined: Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267 , 220 A.2d 646, 649 (1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Greengreen1 sentence2021This Court has applied a harmless error analysis where a trial court errs in admitting evidence in contravention of the best evidence rule but the impact of the error is de minimis; see Commonwealth v. Green, 162 A.3d 509, 522 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc) (“Given this verdict, we hold that any prejudicial effect associated with [the problematic] testimony was de minimis by comparison to the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of Appellant’s guilt.”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Waltergreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Walter, 849 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa.Super.2004) (internal citation omitted) (“In a jury trial where the jury is instructed to disregard the information which was improperly brought to its attention, the impact of an error may be minimized so as to render it harmless.”). | 1 | 1 |
Stoddard v. Davidsongreen2 sentences2011Citing to scholarly criticism of the impact rule as creating absurd results, see Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 54, at 362-64, she claims that Pennsylvania witnessed the absurdity of the impact rule in Stoddard v. Davidson, 355 Pa.Super. 262 , 513 A.2d 419, 422 (1986), where the Superior Court found a “physical impact” in the jolt that occurred when a plaintiffs automobile ran over a corpse that was negligently left in the road, and the plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result. 2011Citing to scholarly criticism of the impact rule as creating absurd results, see Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 54, at 362-64, she claims that Pennsylvania witnessed the absurdity of the impact rule in Stoddard v. Davidson, 355 Pa.Super. 262 , 513 A.2d 419, 422 (1986), where the Superior Court found a “physical impact” in the jolt that occurred when a plaintiffs automobile ran over a corpse that was negligently left in the road, and the plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. O'Briengreen1 sentence2004Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 836 A.2d 966, 972 (Pa.Super.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2003See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494-95 , 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2365 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (determining that the effect of a New Jersey sentencing enhancement was “unquestionably to turn a second-degree offense into a first-degree offense[;][t]he degree of criminal culpability the legislature chooses to associate with particular, factually distinct conduct has significant implications both for a defendant’s very liberty, and for the heightened stigma associated with an offense the legislature has selected as worthy of greater punishment”). 2003See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494-95 , 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2365 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (determining that the effect of a New Jersey sentencing enhancement was “unquestionably to turn a second-degree offense into a first-degree offense[;][t]he degree of criminal culpability the legislature chooses to associate with particular, factually distinct conduct has significant implications both for a defendant’s very liberty, and for the heightened stigma associated with an offense the legislature has selected as worthy of greater punishment”). | 1 | 1 |
| Carson v. City of Philadelphiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shumosky v. Lutheran Welfare Services of Northeastern PA, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Tomikel v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matos v. Riveragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Piercegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Weismangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanders Appealgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dziokonski v. Babineaugreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morgan v. Bulletin Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Okrina v. Midwestern Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chapman v. Californiared | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sinn v. Burd
green
2 sentences2011Foreseeability enters into the determination of liability in determining whether the emotional injuries sustained by the plaintiff were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.” Id. at 169-70, 404 A.2d at 684 . 25 Thus far, most of the decisions issued by this Court in the strict products liability arena reflect physical impact. 26 While some state courts have abandoned that requirement, their decisions were largely based on negligence concepts. 2002In 1979, our Supreme Court in Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146 , 404 A.2d 672 (1979), addressed the question of whether to permit recovery for emotional distress by a complainant who, while outside of the zone of danger, actually witnessed an accident causing serious injury to a close relative. | 3 | 1993–2011 |
PAPIEVES Et Ux. v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2004Invocation of the impact rule is no more meaningful in this instance than it would have been in the areas of libel or invasion of privacy where recovery is permitted for mental or emotional distress without regard to the presence of ‘impact.’” Papieves, 437 Pa. at 380 , 263 A.2d at 121-22 . (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied) The “impact rule” is somewhat antiquated and may even be characterized as a misnomer at this point. 2004Invocation of the impact rule is no more meaningful in this instance than it would have been in the areas of libel or invasion of privacy where recovery is permitted for mental or emotional distress without regard to the presence of ‘impact.’” Papieves, 437 Pa. at 380 , 263 A.2d at 121-22 . (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied) The “impact rule” is somewhat antiquated and may even be characterized as a misnomer at this point. | 2 | 1978–2004 |
American Chain & Cable Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences2000Id. (quoting American & Chain Cable, 454 A.2d at 214 n. 4). 6 . 1992American Chain & Cable Co., supra, 70 Pa.Cmwlth. at 584 n. 4, 454 A.2d at 214 n. 4. | 2 | 1992–2000 |
In the Interest of DelSignore
green
2 sentences1990In Interest óf DelSignore, 249 Pa.Super. 149 , 375 A.2d 803 (1977) has never been overruled, nor have we been granted sufficient latitude in our review to raise suá sponte any issues which have been omitted by counsel. 1990In Interest óf DelSignore, 249 Pa.Super. 149 , 375 A.2d 803 (1977) has never been overruled, nor have we been granted sufficient latitude in our review to raise suá sponte any issues which have been omitted by counsel. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Commonwealth v. Davenport
green
2 sentences1982E.g., Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391 , 383 A.2d 155 (1978); Commonwealth v. Davenport, 462 Pa. 543 , 342 A.2d 67 (1975). [7] Prior to the trial, the lower court granted the appellant's Motion to Suppress the out-of-court identifications since the slide projections, viewed in the police station, were conducted in the presence of all of the participants and identifications were made openly in each other's presence. [8] Testimony by the police officer that the appellant answered to both the names "Jerry" and "Mark" were merely cumulative of other evidence which established the appellant's nam 1982E.g., Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391 , 383 A.2d 155 (1978); Commonwealth v. Davenport, 462 Pa. 543 , 342 A.2d 67 (1975). [7] Prior to the trial, the lower court granted the appellant's Motion to Suppress the out-of-court identifications since the slide projections, viewed in the police station, were conducted in the presence of all of the participants and identifications were made openly in each other's presence. [8] Testimony by the police officer that the appellant answered to both the names "Jerry" and "Mark" were merely cumulative of other evidence which established the appellant's nam | 2 | 1978–1982 |
Commonwealth v. Servich
green
1 sentence2026Graham acknowledges that in Commonwealth v. Servich, 602 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. 1992), this Court held that the lack of alibi notice prejudices the Commonwealth and the trial court has broad discretion to select a remedy, but asserts here the court allowed the jury to consider the lack of notice against him, and “[t]he Servich language is wrong because it ignored the exception now found in Rule 567(B)” ____________________________________________ 7 Though Graham asserts no separate claim of prosecutorial misconduct, he asserts the prosecutor’s closing argument highlighted the impact of the inst | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Jordan, E. v. PSU
green
1 sentence2026Id. at 774 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Turner
green
1 sentence2023Here, the only thing the trial court judge told the jury after allowing the disputed testimony was “[o]kay[,] and just to [defense counsel’s] point, that is his right as a defendant, okay, [c]onstitutional [r]ight.” (N.T., 8/7/2019, at 102.) It is hard to classify [J-78-2022] - 33 this brief remark as “[a]dequate,” Story, 383 A.2d at 165 n.18, especially when compared to the more thorough instruction this Court found inadequate in Turner, see Turner, 454 A.2d at 538 n.2. 19 The second factor supporting our conclusion is the split verdict. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Davis v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2020In Davis v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 341 F.3d 1310 (11th. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
DEPT. OF GEN. SERV. v. US Mineral Prod.
green
1 sentence2011DGS, 587 Pa. at 259 , 898 A.2d at 604 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Shepard v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2011The court acknowledged the integral role foreseeability plays in the bystander rule, even in the products liability context, reasoning that “[t]he injuries complained of are as much a foreseeable consequence of a defect in design and manufacture as of the negligence of the driver[.]” Id. 27 Deviating from the impact rule for strict products liability actions in Pennsylvania, however, plainly would violate this Court’s admonition that foreseeability has no place in Pennsylvania’s strict liability law. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Pennsylvania Department of General Services v. United States Mineral Products Co.
green
1 sentence2011DGS, 587 Pa. at 259 , 898 A.2d at 604 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Goodman v. Board of Commissioners
green
2 sentences2005Appellants also contend that common pleas erred in relying on Goodman v. Board of Commissioners, 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 35 , 411 A.2d 838 (1980), to conclude that the Section 4.3 requirement of harmonious development 13 was unenforceable. 2005Appellants also contend that common pleas erred in relying on Goodman v. Board of Commissioners, 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 35 , 411 A.2d 838 (1980), to conclude that the Section 4.3 requirement of harmonious development 13 was unenforceable. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2003Taking this evidence and comparing it in weight to the impact of the error caused when the prosecutor asked Appellant if the day of trial was the first time since the shooting that he told anyone that Montrell was the shooter, this court concludes that the error created by this improper query was harmless. 12 In the final claim of error, Appellant asserts that a new trial is warranted as the Commonwealth failed to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence as required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 13 The exculpatory evidence Appellant points t 2003Taking this evidence and comparing it in weight to the impact of the error caused when the prosecutor asked Appellant if the day of trial was the first time since the shooting that he told anyone that Montrell was the shooter, this court concludes that the error created by this improper query was harmless. 12 In the final claim of error, Appellant asserts that a new trial is warranted as the Commonwealth failed to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence as required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 13 The exculpatory evidence Appellant points t | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Botek v. Mine Safety Appliance Corp. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Armstrong v. Paoli Memorial Hospital green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Hastings Industries v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hoffner v. Hodge green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Novak v. Jeannette District Memorial Hospital green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| KRYSMALSKI BY KRYSMALSKI v. Tarasovich green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Caldwell Et Ux. v. Com. of Pa. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Hunger v. Grand Central Sanitation green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. Rasheed green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Harrington v. California red | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Commonwealth v. Brown green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Parker v. Randolph red | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Kutsch v. Miller green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Hughes v. Moore green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Commonwealth v. Thomas green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Commonwealth v. Martinolich green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Phelps v. United States green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| District of Columbia v. Walters green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Reynolds v. Public Service Coordinated Transport green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Falzone v. Busch green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Commonwealth v. Cooney green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Aquino v. Bulletin Co. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Hostrander v. Lucas green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Miller v. HUBBARD green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Robb v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.