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30 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Beygreen2 sentences1999In State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45 , 548 A.2d 846 (1988) (Bey II), the Court examined the standard of review for constitutional violations in death penalty cases: [I]n assessing the impact of error in either the guilt or penalty phase of a capital case, we ... determine reversibility on the basis of a qualitative determination that considers, in the context of the entire case, whether the error was clearly capable of affecting either the verdict or the sentence. 1999In State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45 , 548 A.2d 846 (1988) (Bey II), the Court examined the standard of review for constitutional violations in death penalty cases: [I]n assessing the impact of error in either the guilt or penalty phase of a capital case, we ... determine reversibility on the basis of a qualitative determination that considers, in the context of the entire case, whether the error was clearly capable of affecting either the verdict or the sentence. | 1 | 4 |
Satterwhite v. Texasgreen2 sentences1999The only exception involves “constitutional violations ... [that] by their very nature east so much doubt on the fairness of the trial process that, as a matter of law, they can never be considered harmless.” [Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 94-95, 548 A.2d 846 (quoting Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 250 , 108 S.Ct 1792, 1794 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 293 (1988).)] The United States Supreme Court in Satterwhite, supra, held that Sixth Amendment constitutional violations that may be considered under a harmless error analysis and those that require automatic reversal are distinguished by whether or not 1999The only exception involves “constitutional violations ... [that] by their very nature east so much doubt on the fairness of the trial process that, as a matter of law, they can never be considered harmless.” [Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 94-95, 548 A.2d 846 (quoting Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 250 , 108 S.Ct 1792, 1794 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 293 (1988).)] The United States Supreme Court in Satterwhite, supra, held that Sixth Amendment constitutional violations that may be considered under a harmless error analysis and those that require automatic reversal are distinguished by whether or not | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hammgreen2 sentences1988See State v. Hamm, 207 N.J.Super. 40 (App.Div.1986). 1987But see State v. Hamm, 207 N.J. | 1 | 2 |
Falzone v. Buschgreen2 sentences1986The trend away from the impact rule in New Jersey began with the decision in Falzone v. Bush, 45 N.J. 559 (1965) where plaintiff suffered substantial injury from fright as a result of having been put in fear for her own safety when defendant's vehicle "negligently veered across the highway and headed in [her] direction." Id. at 561 . 1986The trend away from the impact rule in New Jersey began with the decision in Falzone v. Bush, 45 N.J. 559 (1965) where plaintiff suffered substantial injury from fright as a result of having been put in fear for her own safety when defendant's vehicle "negligently veered across the highway and headed in [her] direction." Id. at 561 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wildergreen2 sentences2017See State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 415 , 939 A.2d 781 (2008); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 , 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Allison, 208 N.J.Super. 9, 18-19 , 504 A.2d 1184 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 370 , 508 A.2d 235 (1985). 2017See State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 415 (2008); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 (1984); State v. Allison, 208 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Allisongreen2 sentences2017See State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 415 , 939 A.2d 781 (2008); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 , 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Allison, 208 N.J.Super. 9, 18-19 , 504 A.2d 1184 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 370 , 508 A.2d 235 (1985). 2017See State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 415 (2008); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 (1984); State v. Allison, 208 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kellygreen2 sentences2017See State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 415 , 939 A.2d 781 (2008); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 , 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Allison, 208 N.J.Super. 9, 18-19 , 504 A.2d 1184 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 370 , 508 A.2d 235 (1985). 2017See State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 415 (2008); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 (1984); State v. Allison, 208 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Bank of New York v. Laksgreen1 sentence2012Second, the Appellate Division panel deciding Laks held that “the remedy of dismissal without prejudice is consistent with the statutory mandate that a plaintiff in a residential foreclosure action plead compliance with the notice of intention precondition in *479 its complaint.” 422 N.J.Super, at 212, 27 A.3d 1222 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(f); Rule 4:64-l(b)(13)). | 1 | 1 |
Jablonowska v. Suthergreen1 sentence2011From a policy standpoint, courts also feared a “flood of litigation[ ] in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture and speculation.” Id. at 386 , 47 A. 561 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965) (discussing skepticism of claims for emotional disturbance absent physical injury). [ Id. at 102, 948 A.2d 610 .] ‘With the passage of time and the decisions in a series of cases in which practically nonexistent impact was the peg upon which recovery for serious emotional disturbance was | 1 | 1 |
Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp.green2 sentences2011From a policy standpoint, courts also feared a “flood of litigation[ ] in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture and speculation.” Id. at 386 , 47 A. 561 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965) (discussing skepticism of claims for emotional disturbance absent physical injury). [ Id. at 102, 948 A.2d 610 .] ‘With the passage of time and the decisions in a series of cases in which practically nonexistent impact was the peg upon which recovery for serious emotional disturbance was 2011From a policy standpoint, courts also feared a “flood of litigation[ ] in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture and speculation.” Id. at 386 , 47 A. 561 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965) (discussing skepticism of claims for emotional disturbance absent physical injury). [ Id. at 102, 948 A.2d 610 .] ‘With the passage of time and the decisions in a series of cases in which practically nonexistent impact was the peg upon which recovery for serious emotional disturbance was | 1 | 1 |
State v. Natalegreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-28 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-16 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649, 658-61 (1987); State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 481, 492-96 , 878 A. 2d 724 (2005); State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 647-48 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 58-64 , 735 A. 2d 513 (1999). 2006See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-28 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-16 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649, 658-61 (1987); State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 481, 492-96 , 878 A. 2d 724 (2005); State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 647-48 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 58-64 , 735 A. 2d 513 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Griffith v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-28 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-16 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649, 658-61 (1987); State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 481, 492-96 , 878 A. 2d 724 (2005); State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 647-48 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 58-64 , 735 A. 2d 513 (1999). 2006See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-28 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-16 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649, 658-61 (1987); State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 481, 492-96 , 878 A. 2d 724 (2005); State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 647-48 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 58-64 , 735 A. 2d 513 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Rios v. Szivosgreen2 sentences2005See also Rios v. Szivos, 354 N.J.Super. 578, 580 , 808 A. 2d 868 (App.Div.2002). 2005See also Rios v. Szivos, 354 N.J.Super. 578, 580 , 808 A. 2d 868 (App.Div.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Fowler v. Crystal Motors, Inc.green2 sentences2004See Fowler, supra, 340 N.J.Super. at 40 , 773 A. 2d 730 (finding Oswin limited the serious impact test to Types 6, 7, and 8 under the 1988 Act); Vellucci v. DiMella, 338 N.J.Super. 345, 348 , 769 A. 2d 410 (App.Div.2001) (finding serious impact test not necessary for type 9 injury); Puso v. Kenyon, 272 N.J.Super. 280, 290 , 639 A. 2d 1120 (App. Div.1994) (finding Oswin's serious impact test not applicable to injuries which define themselves). 2004See Fowler, supra, 340 N.J.Super. at 40 , 773 A. 2d 730 (finding Oswin limited the serious impact test to Types 6, 7, and 8 under the 1988 Act); Vellucci v. DiMella, 338 N.J.Super. 345, 348 , 769 A. 2d 410 (App.Div.2001) (finding serious impact test not necessary for type 9 injury); Puso v. Kenyon, 272 N.J.Super. 280, 290 , 639 A. 2d 1120 (App. Div.1994) (finding Oswin's serious impact test not applicable to injuries which define themselves). | 1 | 1 |
| Wayne Carl Coleman v. Ralph Kemp, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, Respondentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Redington Ranch Associates v. Redmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. MacOngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sandler v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Roselle v. La Fera Contracting Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Opinion of the Justicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Garssongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hammgreen2 sentences1988See State v. Hamm, 207 N.J.Super. 40 (App.Div.1986). 1987But see State v. Hamm, 207 N.J. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilbely
green
1 sentence2026We cannot, as defendant asks us to do here, review "that portion[] of [the] charge alleged to be erroneous . . . in isolation." Wilbely, 63 N.J. at 422 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Torres
green
1 sentence2026It is hopeful that you will be able to do that without violence to individual judgment." The court continued, "[e]ach of you must decide the case for yourself, but you are to do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors." And, the court instructed the jury, "do A-0564-24 22 not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors." When considering the impact of an error in a jury instruction, we must read the charge "as a whole." Torres, 183 N.J. at 564 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2018The argument does not nullify the limits found in Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), which "cannot be relaxed by invoking Rule 1:1-2 or Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) . . ." State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Allison
neutral
2 sentences2017See State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 415 , 939 A.2d 781 (2008); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 , 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Allison, 208 N.J.Super. 9, 18-19 , 504 A.2d 1184 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 370 , 508 A.2d 235 (1985). 2017See State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 415 , 939 A.2d 781 (2008); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218 , 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Allison, 208 N.J.Super. 9, 18-19 , 504 A.2d 1184 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 370 , 508 A.2d 235 (1985). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore Railroad
green
2 sentences2011From a policy standpoint, courts also feared a “flood of litigation[ ] in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture and speculation.” Id. at 386 , 47 A. 561 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965) (discussing skepticism of claims for emotional disturbance absent physical injury). [ Id. at 102, 948 A.2d 610 .] ‘With the passage of time and the decisions in a series of cases in which practically nonexistent impact was the peg upon which recovery for serious emotional disturbance was 2011From a policy standpoint, courts also feared a “flood of litigation[ ] in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture and speculation.” Id. at 386 , 47 A. 561 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment b (1965) (discussing skepticism of claims for emotional disturbance absent physical injury). [ Id. at 102, 948 A.2d 610 .] ‘With the passage of time and the decisions in a series of cases in which practically nonexistent impact was the peg upon which recovery for serious emotional disturbance was | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences2011L.J. 1237 *77 (1971)), aff'd, in part and rev’d in part, 109 N.J. 523 , 538 A.2d 346 (1988). 2011L.J. 1237 *77 (1971)), aff'd, in part and rev’d in part, 109 N.J. 523 , 538 A.2d 346 (1988). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Purnell
green
2 sentences2006See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-28 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-16 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649, 658-61 (1987); State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 481, 492-96 , 878 A. 2d 724 (2005); State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 647-48 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 58-64 , 735 A. 2d 513 (1999). 2006See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-28 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-16 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649, 658-61 (1987); State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 481, 492-96 , 878 A. 2d 724 (2005); State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 647-48 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 58-64 , 735 A. 2d 513 (1999). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Fortin
green
2 sentences2006See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-28 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-16 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649, 658-61 (1987); State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 481, 492-96 , 878 A. 2d 724 (2005); State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 647-48 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 58-64 , 735 A. 2d 513 (1999). 2006See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-28 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-16 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 649, 658-61 (1987); State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 481, 492-96 , 878 A. 2d 724 (2005); State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 647-48 , 843 A. 2d 974 (2004); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 58-64 , 735 A. 2d 513 (1999). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Beltran v. DeLima
green
2 sentences2005Since the James opinion had been widely followed by trial judges and appellate judges, the court in Beltran held that the Supreme Court did establish a new rule of law as to which retroactive analysis is appropriate. 379 N.J.Super. at 173 , 877 A. 2d 307 . 2005Since the James opinion had been widely followed by trial judges and appellate judges, the court in Beltran held that the Supreme Court did establish a new rule of law as to which retroactive analysis is appropriate. 379 N.J.Super. at 173 , 877 A. 2d 307 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Serrano v. Serrano
green
2 sentences2005After carefully reviewing the policy considerations relevant to a retroactivity analysis, the court concluded that the recent Supreme Court decisions in DiProspero and Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 , 874 A. 2d 1058 (2005) undeniably marked a departure from James , where the court found that the serious impact requirement was implicitly *214 incorporated in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. 2005After carefully reviewing the policy considerations relevant to a retroactivity analysis, the court concluded that the recent Supreme Court decisions in DiProspero and Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 , 874 A. 2d 1058 (2005) undeniably marked a departure from James , where the court found that the serious impact requirement was implicitly *214 incorporated in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
DiProspero v. Penn
green
2 sentences2005DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 506 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005). 2005DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 506 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
James v. Torres
green
2 sentences2005In James v. Torres, 354 N.J.Super. 586, 588 , 808 A. 2d 873 (App.Div.2002), after consideration of contrary arguments, we found that the serious impact requirement of Oswin survived the passage of AICRA and was implicitly incorporated within it. 2005In James v. Torres, 354 N.J.Super. 586, 588 , 808 A. 2d 873 (App.Div.2002), after consideration of contrary arguments, we found that the serious impact requirement of Oswin survived the passage of AICRA and was implicitly incorporated within it. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Vellucci v. DiMella
green
2 sentences2004See Fowler, supra, 340 N.J.Super. at 40 , 773 A. 2d 730 (finding Oswin limited the serious impact test to Types 6, 7, and 8 under the 1988 Act); Vellucci v. DiMella, 338 N.J.Super. 345, 348 , 769 A. 2d 410 (App.Div.2001) (finding serious impact test not necessary for type 9 injury); Puso v. Kenyon, 272 N.J.Super. 280, 290 , 639 A. 2d 1120 (App. Div.1994) (finding Oswin's serious impact test not applicable to injuries which define themselves). 2004See Fowler, supra, 340 N.J.Super. at 40 , 773 A. 2d 730 (finding Oswin limited the serious impact test to Types 6, 7, and 8 under the 1988 Act); Vellucci v. DiMella, 338 N.J.Super. 345, 348 , 769 A. 2d 410 (App.Div.2001) (finding serious impact test not necessary for type 9 injury); Puso v. Kenyon, 272 N.J.Super. 280, 290 , 639 A. 2d 1120 (App. Div.1994) (finding Oswin's serious impact test not applicable to injuries which define themselves). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Puso v. Kenyon
green
2 sentences2004See Fowler, supra, 340 N.J.Super. at 40 , 773 A. 2d 730 (finding Oswin limited the serious impact test to Types 6, 7, and 8 under the 1988 Act); Vellucci v. DiMella, 338 N.J.Super. 345, 348 , 769 A. 2d 410 (App.Div.2001) (finding serious impact test not necessary for type 9 injury); Puso v. Kenyon, 272 N.J.Super. 280, 290 , 639 A. 2d 1120 (App. Div.1994) (finding Oswin's serious impact test not applicable to injuries which define themselves). 2004See Fowler, supra, 340 N.J.Super. at 40 , 773 A. 2d 730 (finding Oswin limited the serious impact test to Types 6, 7, and 8 under the 1988 Act); Vellucci v. DiMella, 338 N.J.Super. 345, 348 , 769 A. 2d 410 (App.Div.2001) (finding serious impact test not necessary for type 9 injury); Puso v. Kenyon, 272 N.J.Super. 280, 290 , 639 A. 2d 1120 (App. Div.1994) (finding Oswin's serious impact test not applicable to injuries which define themselves). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Moreno v. Greenfield
green
2 sentences2001Moreno v. Greenfield, 272 N.J.Super. 456 , 640 A. 2d 335 (App.Div.1994), also did not hold that a serious impact requirement is applicable to a type 4 injury. 2001Moreno v. Greenfield, 272 N.J.Super. 456 , 640 A. 2d 335 (App.Div.1994), also did not hold that a serious impact requirement is applicable to a type 4 injury. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Oswin v. Shaw red | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Sherry v. Buonansonti
green
2 sentences2001In Sherry v. Buonansonti, 287 N.J.Super. 518 , 671 A. 2d 606 (App.Div. 1996), plaintiff's injury did not involve a *738 fracture, but was "very suggestive of degeneration." Id. at 521 , 671 A. 2d 606 . 2001In Sherry v. Buonansonti, 287 N.J.Super. 518 , 671 A. 2d 606 (App.Div. 1996), plaintiff's injury did not involve a *738 fracture, but was "very suggestive of degeneration." Id. at 521 , 671 A. 2d 606 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. PT & L. Construction Company, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Aronson v. Aronson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| South End Express, Inc. v. Sul America Terrestres Martimos E. Acidentes Companhia De Seguros neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Vitolo v. St. Peter's Church neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Vitolo v. St. Peter's Church neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. Alfred Joseph Samango green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| United States v. Nabil S. Al Mudarris, and Salah S. Al Mudarris green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| United States v. Carcaise green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Mudarris v. United States green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Munoz v. United States green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Carter v. Missouri green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Kreidler green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Whidby green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Clifford v. Opdyke green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Builders Block & Supply Co. v. Saint Brendan Const., Co. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Cloyes v. Township of Delaware green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Stringfield v. City of Hackensack green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| State v. Canatella green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.