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33 New York opinions name it 8 courts 1951–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carrington v. Northwell Healthgreen2 sentences2025Co. , 200 AD3d 890 , 891). ( Carrington v Northwell Health , — AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 00079, *1 [2d Dept 2025].) This Court was unable to locate authority regarding the impact of a bar association's President's duties on his legal practice in terms of meeting deadlines, but does note the authority that illness on the part of an attorney may be considered in determining whether to excuse a delay. 2025Co. , 200 AD3d 890 , 891). ( Carrington v Northwell Health , — AD3d &mdash, 2025 NY Slip Op 00079, *1 [2d Dept 2025].) This Court was unable to locate authority regarding the impact of a bar association's President's duties on his legal practice in terms of meeting deadlines, but does note the authority that illness on the part of an attorney may be considered in determining whether to excuse a delay. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2020Although it is well settled that "'a court may take judicial notice of facts which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of undisputable accuracy'" ( Hamilton v Miller , 23 NY3d 592, 603 [2014], quoting People v Jones , 73 NY2d 427, 431 [1989]), judicial notice of a fact is improper when it is "from a hearsay source or from unidentifiable or nonindisputable sources outside the record or at a time subsequent to the close of testimony" ( People v Jones , 73 NY2d at 432 ; see CRG at Arnot Mall, Inc. v Feehan , 177 AD3d 1135 , 1137 [2019] [stati 2020Although it is well settled that "'a court may take judicial notice of facts which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of undisputable accuracy'" ( Hamilton v Miller , 23 NY3d 592, 603 [2014], quoting People v Jones , 73 NY2d 427, 431 [1989]), judicial notice of a fact is improper when it is "from a hearsay source or from unidentifiable or nonindisputable sources outside the record or at a time subsequent to the close of testimony" ( People v Jones , 73 NY2d at 432 ; see CRG at Arnot Mall, Inc. v Feehan , 177 AD3d 1135 , 1137 [2019] [stati | 2 | 2 |
Hamilton v. Millergreen2 sentences2020Although it is well settled that "'a court may take judicial notice of facts which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of undisputable accuracy'" ( Hamilton v Miller , 23 NY3d 592, 603 [2014], quoting People v Jones , 73 NY2d 427, 431 [1989]), judicial notice of a fact is improper when it is "from a hearsay source or from unidentifiable or nonindisputable sources outside the record or at a time subsequent to the close of testimony" ( People v Jones , 73 NY2d at 432 ; see CRG at Arnot Mall, Inc. v Feehan , 177 AD3d 1135 , 1137 [2019] [stati 2020Although it is well settled that "'a court may take judicial notice of facts which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of undisputable accuracy'" ( Hamilton v Miller , 23 NY3d 592, 603 [2014], quoting People v Jones , 73 NY2d 427, 431 [1989]), judicial notice of a fact is improper when it is "from a hearsay source or from unidentifiable or nonindisputable sources outside the record or at a time subsequent to the close of testimony" ( People v Jones , 73 NY2d at 432 ; see CRG at Arnot Mall, Inc. v Feehan , 177 AD3d 1135 , 1137 [2019] [stati | 2 | 2 |
People v. Durhamgreen2 sentences2014Accordingly, defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of his plea is foreclosed by his valid waiver of appeal (see People v Osgood, 111 AD3d at 1030; People v Durham, 110 AD3d 1145, 1145 [2013]). 2014Accordingly, defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of his plea is foreclosed by his valid waiver of appeal (see People v Osgood, 111 AD3d at 1030; People v Durham, 110 AD3d 1145, 1145 [2013]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Osgoodgreen2 sentences2014Initially, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s challenge to the validity of his appeal waiver; County Court adequately informed him that his right to appeal was separate from the other rights automatically forfeited upon a guilty plea, the written appeal waiver he executed in open court similarly informed him of that fact, and he was provided with ample time to confer with counsel to ensure that he fully understood the impact of his waiver (see People v Campbell, 114 AD3d 996, 997 [2014]; People v Osgood, 111 AD3d 1029 , 1030 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1089 [2014]). 2014Initially, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s challenge to the validity of his appeal waiver; County Court adequately informed him that his right to appeal was separate from the other rights automatically forfeited upon a guilty plea, the written appeal waiver he executed in open court similarly informed him of that fact, and he was provided with ample time to confer with counsel to ensure that he fully understood the impact of his waiver (see People v Campbell, 114 AD3d 996, 997 [2014]; People v Osgood, 111 AD3d 1029 , 1030 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1089 [2014]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2014Initially, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s challenge to the validity of his appeal waiver; County Court adequately informed him that his right to appeal was separate from the other rights automatically forfeited upon a guilty plea, the written appeal waiver he executed in open court similarly informed him of that fact, and he was provided with ample time to confer with counsel to ensure that he fully understood the impact of his waiver (see People v Campbell, 114 AD3d 996, 997 [2014]; People v Osgood, 111 AD3d 1029 , 1030 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1089 [2014]). 2014Initially, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s challenge to the validity of his appeal waiver; County Court adequately informed him that his right to appeal was separate from the other rights automatically forfeited upon a guilty plea, the written appeal waiver he executed in open court similarly informed him of that fact, and he was provided with ample time to confer with counsel to ensure that he fully understood the impact of his waiver (see People v Campbell, 114 AD3d 996, 997 [2014]; People v Osgood, 111 AD3d 1029 , 1030 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1089 [2014]). | 2 | 2 |
Hoffman v. Parade Publicationsgreen2 sentences2026Indeed, the Court of Appeals in Hoffman v Parade Publs . ( 15 NY3d 285 [2010]), adopted an impact test for nonresidents who seek the protection of the City HRL and found that test "relatively simple for courts to apply and litigants to follow, leads to predictable results, and confines the protections of the City HRL to those who are meant to be protected—those who work in the city" ( id . at 291; see also Vangas v Montefiore Med. 2025Indeed, the Hoffman Court held that "the impact requirement does not exclude all nonresidents from [the] protection" of the Human Rights Law ( 15 NY3d 285, 290 [2010]). | 1 | 2 |
Vangas v. Montefiore Medical Centergreen1 sentence2026Ctr. , 823 F3d 174, 182 [2d Cir 2016]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Grudengreen1 sentence2026Thus, the three-year delay, during which R.G. died, prejudiced defendant to the benefit of the prosecution.</p> <p>While the dissent would remand this appeal for a fact-finding hearing rather than decide defendant's motion to dismiss today, this approach would unnecessarily prolong this proceeding and give the prosecution an unwarranted second opportunity to marshal facts where they already failed to meet their threshold burden of "rais[ing] a factual dispute on a material point" (<i>see </i>dissenting op at 4-5, citing <i>People v Gruden</i>, 42 NY2d 214, 215 [1977] [holding, in a statutory s | 1 | 1 |
People Ex Rel. Geer v. Common Council of Troygreen2 sentences2025Geer v Common Council of Troy , 82 NY 575, 576 [1880] ["We do not decide mere abstract questions from the determination of which no practical result can follow"]). 2025Geer v Common Council of Troy , 82 NY 575, 576 [1880] ["We do not decide mere abstract questions from the determination of which no practical result can follow"]). | 1 | 1 |
Comstock v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2025In adopting the slight impact rule, the Comstock Court again noted "the practical consideration that where there has been no physical contact there is danger that fictitious claims may be fabricated" (257 NY at 239). 2025In adopting the slight impact rule, the Comstock Court again noted "the practical consideration that where there has been no physical contact there is danger that fictitious claims may be fabricated" (257 NY at 239). | 1 | 1 |
Hearst Corp. v. Clynegreen2 sentences2025The impact an error from an expired permanency hearing order might have in subsequent permanency hearings is not only entirely speculative, but the potential resolution of that error—long after its occurrence—is not an "immediate consequence" of the underlying order that would "directly affect[ ]" the rights of the parties ( Matter of Hearst Corp. , 50 NY2d at 714; see People ex rel. 2025The impact an error from an expired permanency hearing order might have in subsequent permanency hearings is not only entirely speculative, but the potential resolution of that error—long after its occurrence—is not an "immediate consequence" of the underlying order that would "directly affect[ ]" the rights of the parties ( Matter of Hearst Corp. , 50 NY2d at 714 ; see People ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P.green1 sentence2024Chau v Donovan, 357 F Supp 3d 276, 283-284 [SD NY 2019]; Anderson v HotelsAB, LLC, 2015 WL 5008771 , *3-4, 2015 US Dist LEXIS 111820 , *10-12 [SD NY, Aug. 24, 2015, No. 15CV712 (LTS-JLC)]). -3- -4- No. 20 The Second Circuit reserved decision on plaintiff’s appeal and certified the following question to this Court: “Whether a nonresident plaintiff not yet employed in New York City or State satisfies the impact requirement of the New York City Human Rights Law or the New York State Human Rights Law if the plaintiff pleads and later proves that an employer deprived the plaintiff of a New York Cit | 1 | 1 |
Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp.green1 sentence2024Relevant factors include the impact of our rule on parties to a potential acquisition, whether imputing jurisdiction fairly reflects the reasonable assumptions and expectations of the parties to such transactions, whether doing so induces responsible parties to internalize responsibility for risks they create, and the impact of imputing jurisdiction on those injured by a predecessor’s acts (see Grant-Howard, 63 NY2d at 296-297 ; Semenetz, 7 NY3d at 200-201 ; see also Kreutter, 71 NY2d at 471-472 [declining to adopt fiduciary shield limit on personal jurisdiction where unnecessary as a matter o | 1 | 1 |
Fung v. Uddingreen1 sentence2013“The error . . . cannot be considered harmless, as it bore on the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury (see Cheul Soo Kang v Violante, 60 AD3d at 992; Noakes u Rosa, 54 AD3d 317 [2008]; Hatton v Gassier, 219 AD2d 697 [1995]; Gagliano v Vaccaro, 97 AD2d 430 [1983]; Murray v Donlan, 77 AD2d 337 [1980])” (Sanchez v Steenson, 101 AD3d 982, 983 [2012]; see also Conners v Duck’s Cesspool Serv., 144 AD2d 329 [1988]). | 1 | 1 |
Sanchez v. Steensongreen1 sentence2013“The error . . . cannot be considered harmless, as it bore on the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury (see Cheul Soo Kang v Violante, 60 AD3d at 992; Noakes u Rosa, 54 AD3d 317 [2008]; Hatton v Gassier, 219 AD2d 697 [1995]; Gagliano v Vaccaro, 97 AD2d 430 [1983]; Murray v Donlan, 77 AD2d 337 [1980])” (Sanchez v Steenson, 101 AD3d 982, 983 [2012]; see also Conners v Duck’s Cesspool Serv., 144 AD2d 329 [1988]). | 1 | 1 |
Conners v. Duck's Cesspool Service, Ltd.green1 sentence2013“The error . . . cannot be considered harmless, as it bore on the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury (see Cheul Soo Kang v Violante, 60 AD3d at 992; Noakes u Rosa, 54 AD3d 317 [2008]; Hatton v Gassier, 219 AD2d 697 [1995]; Gagliano v Vaccaro, 97 AD2d 430 [1983]; Murray v Donlan, 77 AD2d 337 [1980])” (Sanchez v Steenson, 101 AD3d 982, 983 [2012]; see also Conners v Duck’s Cesspool Serv., 144 AD2d 329 [1988]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hardygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kimesgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Crimminsgreen1 sentence2007(People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 240 [1975].) Reversal is required if there is any “reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction.” (People v Hamlin, 71 NY2d 750, 756 [1988].) For the reasons stated in Watson II , this court finds that the Crawford error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hamlingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jeanine B. Ex Rel. Blondis v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dodson v. Planning Board of Town of Highlandsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rochette & Parzini Corp. v. Campogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Battalla v. State
green
2 sentences1989While in both cases the vehicle that struck the husband had impact with the wife, the court (supra, at 231, n 9) specifically declined to require impact as a prerequisite, noting that in Battalla v State of New York ( 10 NY2d 237 [1961]) it "abolished the impact requirement in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.” In Bovsun (supra, at 231 ) the court made no reference to the No-Fault Law, but stated: "We are not suggesting that any trifling distress would be sufficient to support recovery of damages under the zone-of-danger rule. 1984As noted in footnote 9 on page 231: “We decline to adopt this impact rule (although there was such impact in each of the two appeals now before us) inasmuch as it is conceptually inconsistent with our holding in Battalla v State of New York ( 10 NY2d 237 ), where we abolished the impact requirement in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.” In modification of the Tobin case ( 24 NY2d 609 , supra) Justice Jones recites ( 61 NY2d, at p 232 ): “We recognize that our decision in these two appeals may be perceived as overruling, or at least as rejecting in a significant respect, the rati | 4 | 1978–1989 |
Natanel v. Plaza Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2025Co. , 200 AD3d 890 , 891). ( Carrington v Northwell Health , — AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 00079, *1 [2d Dept 2025].) This Court was unable to locate authority regarding the impact of a bar association's President's duties on his legal practice in terms of meeting deadlines, but does note the authority that illness on the part of an attorney may be considered in determining whether to excuse a delay. 2025Co. , 200 AD3d 890 , 891). ( Carrington v Northwell Health , — AD3d &mdash, 2025 NY Slip Op 00079, *1 [2d Dept 2025].) This Court was unable to locate authority regarding the impact of a bar association's President's duties on his legal practice in terms of meeting deadlines, but does note the authority that illness on the part of an attorney may be considered in determining whether to excuse a delay. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Bovsun v. Sanperi
green
2 sentences1989While in both cases the vehicle that struck the husband had impact with the wife, the court (supra, at 231, n 9) specifically declined to require impact as a prerequisite, noting that in Battalla v State of New York ( 10 NY2d 237 [1961]) it "abolished the impact requirement in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.” In Bovsun (supra, at 231 ) the court made no reference to the No-Fault Law, but stated: "We are not suggesting that any trifling distress would be sufficient to support recovery of damages under the zone-of-danger rule. 1984As noted in footnote 9 on page 231: “We decline to adopt this impact rule (although there was such impact in each of the two appeals now before us) inasmuch as it is conceptually inconsistent with our holding in Battalla v State of New York ( 10 NY2d 237 ), where we abolished the impact requirement in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.” In modification of the Tobin case ( 24 NY2d 609 , supra) Justice Jones recites ( 61 NY2d, at p 232 ): “We recognize that our decision in these two appeals may be perceived as overruling, or at least as rejecting in a significant respect, the rati | 2 | 1984–1989 |
Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024Relevant factors include the impact of our rule on parties to a potential acquisition, whether imputing jurisdiction fairly reflects the reasonable assumptions and expectations of the parties to such transactions, whether doing so induces responsible parties to internalize responsibility for risks they create, and the impact of imputing jurisdiction on those injured by a predecessor’s acts (see Grant-Howard, 63 NY2d at 296-297 ; Semenetz, 7 NY3d at 200-201 ; see also Kreutter, 71 NY2d at 471-472 [declining to adopt fiduciary shield limit on personal jurisdiction where unnecessary as a matter o | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Grant-Howard Associates v. General Housewares Corp.
green
1 sentence2024Relevant factors include the impact of our rule on parties to a potential acquisition, whether imputing jurisdiction fairly reflects the reasonable assumptions and expectations of the parties to such transactions, whether doing so induces responsible parties to internalize responsibility for risks they create, and the impact of imputing jurisdiction on those injured by a predecessor’s acts (see Grant-Howard, 63 NY2d at 296-297 ; Semenetz, 7 NY3d at 200-201 ; see also Kreutter, 71 NY2d at 471-472 [declining to adopt fiduciary shield limit on personal jurisdiction where unnecessary as a matter o | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Noakes v. Rosa
green
1 sentence2013“The error . . . cannot be considered harmless, as it bore on the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury (see Cheul Soo Kang v Violante, 60 AD3d at 992; Noakes u Rosa, 54 AD3d 317 [2008]; Hatton v Gassier, 219 AD2d 697 [1995]; Gagliano v Vaccaro, 97 AD2d 430 [1983]; Murray v Donlan, 77 AD2d 337 [1980])” (Sanchez v Steenson, 101 AD3d 982, 983 [2012]; see also Conners v Duck’s Cesspool Serv., 144 AD2d 329 [1988]). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Murray v. Donlan
green
1 sentence2013“The error . . . cannot be considered harmless, as it bore on the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury (see Cheul Soo Kang v Violante, 60 AD3d at 992; Noakes u Rosa, 54 AD3d 317 [2008]; Hatton v Gassier, 219 AD2d 697 [1995]; Gagliano v Vaccaro, 97 AD2d 430 [1983]; Murray v Donlan, 77 AD2d 337 [1980])” (Sanchez v Steenson, 101 AD3d 982, 983 [2012]; see also Conners v Duck’s Cesspool Serv., 144 AD2d 329 [1988]). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Gagliano v. Vaccaro
green
1 sentence2013“The error . . . cannot be considered harmless, as it bore on the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury (see Cheul Soo Kang v Violante, 60 AD3d at 992; Noakes u Rosa, 54 AD3d 317 [2008]; Hatton v Gassier, 219 AD2d 697 [1995]; Gagliano v Vaccaro, 97 AD2d 430 [1983]; Murray v Donlan, 77 AD2d 337 [1980])” (Sanchez v Steenson, 101 AD3d 982, 983 [2012]; see also Conners v Duck’s Cesspool Serv., 144 AD2d 329 [1988]). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Hatton v. Gassler
green
1 sentence2013“The error . . . cannot be considered harmless, as it bore on the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury (see Cheul Soo Kang v Violante, 60 AD3d at 992; Noakes u Rosa, 54 AD3d 317 [2008]; Hatton v Gassier, 219 AD2d 697 [1995]; Gagliano v Vaccaro, 97 AD2d 430 [1983]; Murray v Donlan, 77 AD2d 337 [1980])” (Sanchez v Steenson, 101 AD3d 982, 983 [2012]; see also Conners v Duck’s Cesspool Serv., 144 AD2d 329 [1988]). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Wahlstrom v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad
green
1 sentence2010Courts adopting the impact requirement have done so out of concern that merely focusing the inquiry on where the termination decision is made—as opposed to where the impact of that decision is felt—results in the expansion of the NYCHRL to cover any plaintiff who is terminated pursuant to a decision made by an employer from its New York City headquarters regardless of where the plaintiff works (see Wahlstrom, 89 F Supp 2d at 527-528 , citing Duffy, 1998 WL 252063 , *12, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 7215 , *36). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Rylott-Rooney v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa Per Azioni
green
1 sentence2010Subsequently, in Rylott-Rooney v Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa Per Azioni ( 549 F Supp 2d 549 [SD NY 2008]), the plaintiff, a resident of Minnesota working out of the defendant’s Minneapolis office, commenced NYCHRL and NYSHRL claims against her employer, alleging age discrimination. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Tebbenhoff v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp.
green
1 sentence2009Corp., 2005 WL 3182952 , 2005 US Dist LEXIS 29874 [SD NY 2005], affd 244 Fed Appx 382 [2d Cir 2007]; Torrico v International Bus. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Eastman green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Mattone v. State of New York Department of Taxation & Finance neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Matter of Robert Lee Realty Co. v. Vill. of Spring Valley green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. Valente green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Tandem Holding Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Hempstead green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Veysey v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Glens Falls green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Claim of Young v. Western Electric Co. neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Gyory v. Radgowski green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Preece v. Baur green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Tobin v. Grossman green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Red Apple Rest, Inc. v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Red Apple Rest, Inc. v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Kessler v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Shelton v. Tucker green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| New York Times Co. v. United States green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Wooley v. Maynard green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Castaneda v. Partida green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Johnson v. State of New York green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Boden v. Boden green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Hoffa v. United States green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Wong Sun v. United States green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| People ex rel. Spitznagel v. Sisson neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Shampine v. Fleming neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Andrew J. Aikens v. State of Wisconsin green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co. green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Glasser v. United States green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| People v. Doran green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.