impact error in Virginia

2022“In Kennedy, the Supreme Court made it clear that the exclusive focus should not be on the fact of prosecutorial error or on the impact of such error upon a defendant, but only on the intent of the prosecutor in committing the error.” Robinson v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 551, 553 , aff’d en banc, 18 Va. App. 814 (1994).

1997“In Kennedy , the Supreme Court made it clear that the exclusive focus should not be on the fact of prosecutorial error or on the impact of such error upon the defendant, but only on the intent of the prosecutor in committing the error.” Robinson, 17 Va.App. at 553 , 439 S.E.2d at 624 .

1997Thus, as the trial court determined, the dispositive issue here is not whether Mr. Smith’s “possible violation of a disciplinary rule bars the defendant’s retrial, but whether or not the actions of Mr. Smith, which may have ethical implications, were done by him with the intent to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” In proving “that the second prosecution is barred by double jeopardy, [the defendant] must produce sufficient evidence to allow the court to infer ‘the existence or nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances.’ ” Robinson, 17 Va.App. at 553 , 439 S.

1997Thus, as the trial court determined, the dispositive issue here is not whether Mr. Smith’s “possible violation of a disciplinary rule bars the defendant’s retrial, but whether or not the actions of Mr. Smith, which may have ethical implications, were done by him with the intent to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” In proving “that the second prosecution is barred by double jeopardy, [the defendant] must produce sufficient evidence to allow the court to infer ‘the existence or nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances.’ ” Robinson, 17 Va.App. at 553 , 439 S.

1997“In Kennedy , the Supreme Court made it clear that the exclusive focus should not be on the fact of prosecutorial error or on the impact of such error upon the defendant, but only on the intent of the prosecutor in committing the error.” Robinson, 17 Va.App. at 553 , 439 S.E.2d at 624 .

1997Thus, as the trial court determined, the dispositive issue here is not whether Mr. Smith’s “possible violation of a disciplinary rule bars the defendant’s retrial, but whether or not the actions of Mr. Smith, which may have ethical implications, were done by him with the intent to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” In proving “that the second prosecution is barred by double jeopardy, [the defendant] must produce sufficient evidence to allow the court to infer ‘the existence or nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances.’ ” Robinson, 17 Va.App. at 553 , 439 S.

2022“In Kennedy, the Supreme Court made it clear that the exclusive focus should not be on the fact of prosecutorial error or on the impact of such error upon a defendant, but only on the intent of the prosecutor in committing the error.” Robinson v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 551, 553 , aff’d en banc, 18 Va. App. 814 (1994).

2012E.g., Moran, 29 Va. App. at 416-17 , 512 S.E.2d at 838 (involving expert testimony identifying passive factors that contributed to the appreciation in value of separate property and drawing conclusions as to the impact of those factors); Rowe, 24 Va. App. at 134 , 480 S.E.2d at 765 .

2012E.g., Moran, 29 Va. App. at 416-17 , 512 S.E.2d at 838 (involving expert testimony identifying passive factors that contributed to the appreciation in value of separate property and drawing conclusions as to the impact of those factors); Rowe, 24 Va. App. at 134 , 480 S.E.2d at 765 .

2007We made clear the impact of these factors in Craddock, 16 Va.App. 402 , 429 S.E.2d 889 .

2007We made clear the impact of these factors in Craddock, 16 Va.App. 402 , 429 S.E.2d 889 .

2005One of those safeguards most pertinent to this case is the requirement that "[a]bsent specific knowledge by a defendant of a plaintiff's unusual sensitivity, there should be no recovery for mental or emotional disturbance and consequent physical injury to a hypersensitive person where a normal individual would not be affected under the circumstances." Id. at 34 , 197 S.E.2d at 219 .

2005One of those safeguards most pertinent to this case is the requirement that "[a]bsent specific knowledge by a defendant of a plaintiff's unusual sensitivity, there should be no recovery for mental or emotional disturbance and consequent physical injury to a hypersensitive person where a normal individual would not be affected under the circumstances." Id. at 34 , 197 S.E.2d at 219 .

1977The court in this case gave a full review of Virginia law and substantially moved forward from its previous holding in Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419 (1932), when it stated the following: Based on a close scrutiny of Bowles , and believing the reasons for the existence of the impact rule are not logical, we today clarify our rule.

1968Vol.; 2 Elliott v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 595 , 1 S. E. 2d 273 (1939); Commonwealth v. Padget, supra; Gaertner v. State, supra. We are here confronted with an error of constitutional proportions, and the question presented is whether the evidentiary use of defendant’s statement can be tested by the harmless error standard of the recent case of Chapman v. State of California, 386 U. S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L. ed. 2d 705 (1967), or whether defendant’s conviction must be reversed without any inquiry as to the impact of the error under the doctrine of automatic reversal.

1968Vol.; [2] Elliott Commonwealth, 172 Va. 595 , 1 S.E.2d *416 273 (1939); Commonwealth Padget, supra; Gaertner State, supra. We are here confronted with an error of constitutional proportions, and the question presented is whether the evidentiary use of defendant's statement can be tested by the harmless error standard of the recent case of Chapman State of California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.ed.2d 705 (1967), or whether defendant's conviction must be reversed without any inquiry as to the impact of the error under the doctrine of automatic reversal.