takings analysis in Maryland

2024See, e.g., Neifert v. Dep’t of Env’t, 395 Md. 486, 517 (2006) (“Causation is a necessary element to establishing a valid takings claim.”) Thus, a board that considers whether to grant a variance on takings grounds must consider whether the denial of the variance, by itself, would effect a taking.

2020See Neifert, 395 Md. at 522 .

2014We said in Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., 370 Md. 604, 630 , 805 A.2d 1061, 1076 (2002), a “statute having the effect of abrogating a vested property right, and not providing for compensation, does ‘authorize private property, to be taken . . . , without just compensation’ (Article III, § 40).

2014We said in Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., 370 Md. 604, 630 , 805 A.2d 1061, 1076 (2002), a “statute having the effect of abrogating a vested property right, and not providing for compensation, does ‘authorize private property, to be taken . . . , without just compensation’ (Article III, § 40).

2017Although the Supreme Court found that an “ ‘essential nexus’ exists between the ‘legitimate state interest’ and the permit condition exacted by the city,” pursuant to Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 , 107 S.Ct. 3141 , 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), it nonetheless ruled that the City of Tigard failed to demonstrate that the required dedications were consistent with the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment because the extent of the exaction was not roughly proportional to “the impact of the proposed development.” Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-96 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 .

2017Although the Supreme Court found that an “ ‘essential nexus’ exists between the ‘legitimate state interest’ and the permit condition exacted by the city,” pursuant to Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 , 107 S.Ct. 3141 , 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), it nonetheless ruled that the City of Tigard failed to demonstrate that the required dedications were consistent with the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment because the extent of the exaction was not roughly proportional to “the impact of the proposed development.” Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-96 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 .

2020The Exhaustion Doctrine Applies to All Constitutional Claims Arising from the Application of Zoning Legislation to Property This case requires us to examine MRA’s asserted right to bring a takings claim arising out of the application of a zoning regulation, in the context of our settled and long- standing jurisprudence developed over many decades that requires a litigant to exhaust his or her administrative remedies where the General Assembly has vested original jurisdiction with an administrative agency—in this instance, the Board of Appeals. 54 Generally, the doctrine of exhaustion of admini

2020It is not enough for the property owners to show that the zoning action results in substantial loss or hardship. (emphasis added); see also Casey, 400 Md. at 307 (collecting cases); State v. Good Samaritan Hosp. of Md., Inc., 299 Md. 310 , 324–25 (1984) (“For government restriction upon the use of property to constitute a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense, so that compensation must be paid, the restriction must be such that it essentially deprives the owner of all beneficial uses of the property.”); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20 , 11 Of course, a takings claim only arises where t

2020It is not enough for the property owners to show that the zoning action results in substantial loss or hardship. (emphasis added); see also Casey, 400 Md. at 307 (collecting cases); State v. Good Samaritan Hosp. of Md., Inc., 299 Md. 310 , 324–25 (1984) (“For government restriction upon the use of property to constitute a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense, so that compensation must be paid, the restriction must be such that it essentially deprives the owner of all beneficial uses of the property.”); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20 , 11 Of course, a takings claim only arises where t

2020Comm’rs for Prince George’s Cty., 259 Md. 369 (1970) (board making initial determination of takings claims arising from zoning regulation, subject to court’s judicial review); City of Balt. v. Borinsky 239 Md. 611 (1965) (board making the initial determination on the property owner’s takings claim, subject to court’s judicial review).

2020See City of Balt. v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 622 (1965). 75 landowner of all beneficial use of a property; and (2) the administrative agency’s ability to grant relief in the form of a variance if an unconstitutional taking is established.

2020See Litz v. Dep’t. of Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 273 (2016). 48 Because every governmental action underlying an asserted takings claim is not the same, it is critical that we analyze the takings claim within our jurisprudence specific to the type of government action that is alleged to create a constitutional taking.

2020The Exhaustion Doctrine Applies to All Constitutional Claims Arising from the Application of Zoning Legislation to Property This case requires us to examine MRA’s asserted right to bring a takings claim arising out of the application of a zoning regulation, in the context of our settled and long- standing jurisprudence developed over many decades that requires a litigant to exhaust his or her administrative remedies where the General Assembly has vested original jurisdiction with an administrative agency—in this instance, the Board of Appeals. 54 Generally, the doctrine of exhaustion of admini

2019See, e.g. , Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill , 353 F.3d 651 , 657 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an as-applied regulatory takings claim ripened when the agency rendered a final decision because "there [were] no further [administrative] procedures available to [the plaintiff] to *778 challenge that decision short of resort to state courts for a writ of administrative mandamus"); Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron , 327 Conn. 53 , 171 A.3d 409 , 421 (Conn. 2017) ("[T]he denial of a variance by a zoning *159 board of appeals is considered a final decision by an initial

2019See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency , 520 U.S. 725 , 737, 117 S.Ct. 1659 , 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997) (observing that a takings claim is justiciable once "the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question") (citation omitted).

2019See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency , 520 U.S. 725 , 737, 117 S.Ct. 1659 , 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997) (observing that a takings claim is justiciable once "the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question") (citation omitted).

2019See, e.g. , Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill , 353 F.3d 651 , 657 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an as-applied regulatory takings claim ripened when the agency rendered a final decision because "there [were] no further [administrative] procedures available to [the plaintiff] to *778 challenge that decision short of resort to state courts for a writ of administrative mandamus"); Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron , 327 Conn. 53 , 171 A.3d 409 , 421 (Conn. 2017) ("[T]he denial of a variance by a zoning *159 board of appeals is considered a final decision by an initial

2019Goodrich , supra , 434 F.3d at 1336 ("Thus, we conclude that the issuance of a [record of decision] and final [environmental impact statement] is sufficient to constitute the taking and hence accrue a takings claim, regardless of when the consequences of the decisions contained therein are felt.").

2019Goodrich , supra , 434 F.3d at 1336 ("Thus, we conclude that the issuance of a [record of decision] and final [environmental impact statement] is sufficient to constitute the taking and hence accrue a takings claim, regardless of when the consequences of the decisions contained therein are felt.").

2019See, e.g. , Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill , 353 F.3d 651 , 657 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an as-applied regulatory takings claim ripened when the agency rendered a final decision because "there [were] no further [administrative] procedures available to [the plaintiff] to *778 challenge that decision short of resort to state courts for a writ of administrative mandamus"); Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron , 327 Conn. 53 , 171 A.3d 409 , 421 (Conn. 2017) ("[T]he denial of a variance by a zoning *159 board of appeals is considered a final decision by an initial