takings claim in Rhode Island

2020“The first step in the analysis of a takings claim is to determine whether a recognizable property right is at stake.” Id. (citing Parella v. Retirement Board of Rhode Island Employees’ Retirement System, 173 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 1999)).

2020“The first step in the analysis of a takings claim is to determine whether a recognizable property right is at stake.” Id. (citing Parella v. Retirement Board of Rhode Island Employees’ Retirement System, 173 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 1999)).

2020The plaintiffs argue on appeal that she erred as a matter of law when she concluded that the 2012 Pension Ordinance did not constitute a taking pursuant to the Takings Clause of either the Rhode Island or United States Constitutions. 1 Standard of Review “[T]his Court will review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, employing the same standards and rules used by the hearing justice.” Cranston, 208 A.3d at 580 (quoting Cancel v. City of Providence, 187 A.3d 347, 349 (R.I. 2018)). “[T]he trial court’s decision will be affirmed ‘only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in t

2020The plaintiffs argue on appeal that she erred as a matter of law when she concluded that the 2012 Pension Ordinance did not constitute a taking pursuant to the Takings Clause of either the Rhode Island or United States Constitutions. 1 Standard of Review “[T]his Court will review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, employing the same standards and rules used by the hearing justice.” Cranston, 208 A.3d at 580 (quoting Cancel v. City of Providence, 187 A.3d 347, 349 (R.I. 2018)). “[T]he trial court’s decision will be affirmed ‘only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in t

1998In the case before us, the hearing justice found that “[a]n examination of the various factors deemed relevant to a takings analysis is premature.” The decision to grant summary judgment in favor of DEM rested on her conclusion that “[t]he initial assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over the wetlands at Woodland Manor amounted to nothing more than an exercise of authority by the DEM of the type referred to [in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 , 106 S.Ct. 455 , 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985), and Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed.Cir.1993)].

1996Tabb Lakes , 10 F.3d at 801 (an assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a government body cannot give rise to a takings claim.).

1998“Although courts have not devised an easy litmus test” to assess “a takings claim resulting from regulations that constrain the use of property, as opposed to outright physical appropriations,” Alegría, 687 A.2d at 1251-52 , general principles may be gleaned from existing case law.

1998The United States Supreme Court has “identified three factors as having particular significance in the analysis of whether a taking has occurred: (1) ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,’ (2) ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,’ and (3) ‘the character of the governmental action.’ ” Alegria, 687 A.2d at 1252 (quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 648 (1978)).

1998In the case before us, the hearing justice found that “[a]n examination of the various factors deemed relevant to a takings analysis is premature.” The decision to grant summary judgment in favor of DEM rested on her conclusion that “[t]he initial assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over the wetlands at Woodland Manor amounted to nothing more than an exercise of authority by the DEM of the type referred to [in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 , 106 S.Ct. 455 , 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985), and Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed.Cir.1993)].

1998In the case before us, the hearing justice found that “[a]n examination of the various factors deemed relevant to a takings analysis is premature.” The decision to grant summary judgment in favor of DEM rested on her conclusion that “[t]he initial assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over the wetlands at Woodland Manor amounted to nothing more than an exercise of authority by the DEM of the type referred to [in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 , 106 S.Ct. 455 , 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985), and Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed.Cir.1993)].

2018See Cranston Firefighters , 880 F.3d at 51 ("The lack of any allegation that the current benefits provided by the [s]tate fall below the present value of the contributions made by the Union pensioners, coupled with the absence of the alleged contract, also eliminates the basis for a claim under the Takings Clause.").

2018See Cranston Firefighters , 880 F.3d at 51 ("The lack of any allegation that the current benefits provided by the [s]tate fall below the present value of the contributions made by the Union pensioners, coupled with the absence of the alleged contract, also eliminates the basis for a claim under the Takings Clause.").

2006See Joslin Manufacturing Co. v. Clarke, 41 R.I. 350 , 103 A. 935 (1918) (statute permitting condemnation for municipal water supply that authorized city to determine the necessity of the taking without a hearing does not violate Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee because the determination of necessity is a legislative decision and not a judicial one); M.S.

2006See Joslin Manufacturing Co. v. Clarke, 41 R.I. 350 , 103 A. 935 (1918) (statute permitting condemnation for municipal water supply that authorized city to determine the necessity of the taking without a hearing does not violate Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee because the determination of necessity is a legislative decision and not a judicial one); M.S.

2005Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

2001See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 , 67 S.Ct. 1382, 1385 , 91 L.Ed. 1789, 1794 (1947) (applying six-year statute of limitations to an inverse condemnation suit arising out of government-flooded property and holding that the statute of limitations on the takings claim began to run when “the consequences of [the] inun dation have so manifested themselves that a final account may be struck”).

2001See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 , 67 S.Ct. 1382, 1385 , 91 L.Ed. 1789, 1794 (1947) (applying six-year statute of limitations to an inverse condemnation suit arising out of government-flooded property and holding that the statute of limitations on the takings claim began to run when “the consequences of [the] inun dation have so manifested themselves that a final account may be struck”).

2000See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2567-68 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285, 295-97 (1986) (court should not reach the merits of a takings claim if the claim is premature); Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 , 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126, 139 (1985) (judicial action on a takings claim is not supportable when the claim is not ripe).

2000See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2567-68 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285, 295-97 (1986) (court should not reach the merits of a takings claim if the claim is premature); Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 , 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126, 139 (1985) (judicial action on a takings claim is not supportable when the claim is not ripe).

2000Fixel v. U.S. 26 Cl.Ct. 353, 356 (1992) (citing Danforth v. U.S. 308 U.S. 271 . 284, 60 S.Ct. 231, 236 , 84 L.Ed. 240 (1939)); See also Flathead Joint Bd. of Control v. U.S., 30 Fed.Cl. 287, 293 (1993) ([F]or plaintiffs to state a claim for which relief may be granted under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, plaintiffs must allege a compensable property interest.).

2000Landers v. U.S., 39 Fed.Cl. 297, 302 (1997) (citing Murray v. U.S. 817 F.2d 1580 , 1583 (Fed.Cir. 1987) ([O]nly one possessing an ownership interest in the real property at the time of the taking is entitled to receive the required compensation.

2000Fixel v. U.S. 26 Cl.Ct. 353, 356 (1992) (citing Danforth v. U.S. 308 U.S. 271 . 284, 60 S.Ct. 231, 236 , 84 L.Ed. 240 (1939)); See also Flathead Joint Bd. of Control v. U.S., 30 Fed.Cl. 287, 293 (1993) ([F]or plaintiffs to state a claim for which relief may be granted under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, plaintiffs must allege a compensable property interest.).

2000See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2567-68 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285, 295-97 (1986) (court should not reach the merits of a takings claim if the claim is premature); Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 , 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126, 139 (1985) (judicial action on a takings claim is not supportable when the claim is not ripe).

2000See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2567-68 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285, 295-97 (1986) (court should not reach the merits of a takings claim if the claim is premature); Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 , 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126, 139 (1985) (judicial action on a takings claim is not supportable when the claim is not ripe).

1998The United States Supreme Court has “identified three factors as having particular significance in the analysis of whether a taking has occurred: (1) ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,’ (2) ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,’ and (3) ‘the character of the governmental action.’ ” Alegria, 687 A.2d at 1252 (quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 648 (1978)).

1998The United States Supreme Court has “identified three factors as having particular significance in the analysis of whether a taking has occurred: (1) ‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,’ (2) ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,’ and (3) ‘the character of the governmental action.’ ” Alegria, 687 A.2d at 1252 (quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 648 (1978)).

1997In his discussion of a takings claim resulting from regulations that constrain the *1252 use of property, as opposed to outright physical appropriation, Justice Holmes stated that “[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 , 43 S.Ct. 158, 160 , 67 L.Ed. 322, 326 (1922).

1997In his discussion of a takings claim resulting from regulations that constrain the *1252 use of property, as opposed to outright physical appropriation, Justice Holmes stated that “[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 , 43 S.Ct. 158, 160 , 67 L.Ed. 322, 326 (1922).

1997Although courts have not devised an easy litmus test to ascertain when a regulation goes “too far,” the underlying rationale for such a rule remains sound: “deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.” Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed.Cl. 37, 44 (1994).