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12 Louisiana opinions name it 3 courts 1994–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maritrans Inc. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2009Similarly, while the DEQ's refusal to continue consideration of Belle's permit application prevented Belle from gaining the necessary permission to operate a solid waste landfill on its property, Belle nonetheless retained complete control over its property and could use the property for any lawful purpose. [11] In so holding we recognize there is no blanket rule that one may never prevail on a takings claim if participating in a heavily regulated industry, Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 790, 795-797 (1998), but that the asserted claim may be considered in the context of reasonab 2009In so holding we recognize there is no blanket rule that one may never prevail on a takings claim if participating in a heavily regulated industry, Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 790, 795-797 (1998), but that the asserted claim may be considered in the context of reasonableness of the property owner's expectation and the safety issue underlying the regulation. | 2 | 2 |
NRG Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2009See for example NRG Company v. United States, 24 Cl.Ct. 51, 52-53 (1991), in which the owners of mineral prospecting permits that authorized them to explore for coal on an Indian reservation brought actions claiming that the government's cancellation of the permits pursuant to the Cancellation Act constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 2009See for example NRG Company v. United States, 24 Cl.Ct. 51, 52-53 (1991), in which the owners of mineral prospecting permits that authorized them to explore for coal on an Indian reservation brought actions claiming that the government’s cancellation of the permits pursuant to the Cancellation Act constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. | 2 | 2 |
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Louisiana Department of Insurancegreen2 sentences1998Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Louisiana Department of Insurance, 62 F.3d 115, 117-118 (5th Cir.1995). 1998Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Louisiana Department of Insurance, 62 F.3d 115, 117-118 (5th Cir.1995). | 2 | 2 |
Golden v. Mercer County Tax Claim Bureau (In Re Golden)green2 sentences2007Tax Claim Bureau (In re Golden) , 190 B.R. 52 , 57 (Bankr.W.D.Penn. 1995) ("In a tax sale context, the takings clause is not dispositive nor the appropriate basis for starting an inquiry."); Fitzgerald v. Neves., Inc. , 15 Wash.App. 421 , 428 , 550 P.2d 52 (1976) ("We are hard pressed to find that the `taking' was for public use as opposed to the general purpose of enforcing payment of justly imposed taxes." (emphasis in original)); Richardson v. Brunner , 356 S.W.2d 252 , 254 (Ky.Ct.App.), cert. denied , 371 U.S. 815 , 83 S.Ct. 27 , 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962) (holding under Kentucky's constitution t 2007"The purpose of tax sales is not to strip the taxpayer of his property, but to insure the collection of taxes" and to "collect the fair share from those who have failed to meet their burden." Golden , 190 B.R. at 57 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States
green
2 sentences2015Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. U.S., ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 517 . 2015Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. U.S., — U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 517 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Century Exploration New Orleans, Inc. v. United States
green
1 sentence2026Mesquite Asset Recovery Group, LLC, 154 F. 4th at 317; Century Exploration New Orleans, Inc., 103 Fed. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Sears v. Cottrell
green
1 sentence2007Tax Claim Bureau (In re Golden) , 190 B.R. 52 , 57 (Bankr.W.D.Penn. 1995) ("In a tax sale context, the takings clause is not dispositive nor the appropriate basis for starting an inquiry."); Fitzgerald v. Neves., Inc. , 15 Wash.App. 421 , 428 , 550 P.2d 52 (1976) ("We are hard pressed to find that the `taking' was for public use as opposed to the general purpose of enforcing payment of justly imposed taxes." (emphasis in original)); Richardson v. Brunner , 356 S.W.2d 252 , 254 (Ky.Ct.App.), cert. denied , 371 U.S. 815 , 83 S.Ct. 27 , 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962) (holding under Kentucky's constitution t | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Richardson v. Brunner
green
1 sentence2007Tax Claim Bureau (In re Golden) , 190 B.R. 52 , 57 (Bankr.W.D.Penn. 1995) ("In a tax sale context, the takings clause is not dispositive nor the appropriate basis for starting an inquiry."); Fitzgerald v. Neves., Inc. , 15 Wash.App. 421 , 428 , 550 P.2d 52 (1976) ("We are hard pressed to find that the `taking' was for public use as opposed to the general purpose of enforcing payment of justly imposed taxes." (emphasis in original)); Richardson v. Brunner , 356 S.W.2d 252 , 254 (Ky.Ct.App.), cert. denied , 371 U.S. 815 , 83 S.Ct. 27 , 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962) (holding under Kentucky's constitution t | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Fitzgerald v. Neves, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Tax Claim Bureau (In re Golden) , 190 B.R. 52 , 57 (Bankr.W.D.Penn. 1995) ("In a tax sale context, the takings clause is not dispositive nor the appropriate basis for starting an inquiry."); Fitzgerald v. Neves., Inc. , 15 Wash.App. 421 , 428 , 550 P.2d 52 (1976) ("We are hard pressed to find that the `taking' was for public use as opposed to the general purpose of enforcing payment of justly imposed taxes." (emphasis in original)); Richardson v. Brunner , 356 S.W.2d 252 , 254 (Ky.Ct.App.), cert. denied , 371 U.S. 815 , 83 S.Ct. 27 , 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962) (holding under Kentucky's constitution t 2007Tax Claim Bureau (In re Golden) , 190 B.R. 52 , 57 (Bankr.W.D.Penn. 1995) ("In a tax sale context, the takings clause is not dispositive nor the appropriate basis for starting an inquiry."); Fitzgerald v. Neves., Inc. , 15 Wash.App. 421 , 428 , 550 P.2d 52 (1976) ("We are hard pressed to find that the `taking' was for public use as opposed to the general purpose of enforcing payment of justly imposed taxes." (emphasis in original)); Richardson v. Brunner , 356 S.W.2d 252 , 254 (Ky.Ct.App.), cert. denied , 371 U.S. 815 , 83 S.Ct. 27 , 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962) (holding under Kentucky's constitution t | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Bankers Trust Co. v. United States
green
1 sentence2007Tax Claim Bureau (In re Golden) , 190 B.R. 52 , 57 (Bankr.W.D.Penn. 1995) ("In a tax sale context, the takings clause is not dispositive nor the appropriate basis for starting an inquiry."); Fitzgerald v. Neves., Inc. , 15 Wash.App. 421 , 428 , 550 P.2d 52 (1976) ("We are hard pressed to find that the `taking' was for public use as opposed to the general purpose of enforcing payment of justly imposed taxes." (emphasis in original)); Richardson v. Brunner , 356 S.W.2d 252 , 254 (Ky.Ct.App.), cert. denied , 371 U.S. 815 , 83 S.Ct. 27 , 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962) (holding under Kentucky's constitution t | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Budget Dress Corp. v. Joint Board of Dress & Waistmakers' Union
green
1 sentence2007Tax Claim Bureau (In re Golden) , 190 B.R. 52 , 57 (Bankr.W.D.Penn. 1995) ("In a tax sale context, the takings clause is not dispositive nor the appropriate basis for starting an inquiry."); Fitzgerald v. Neves., Inc. , 15 Wash.App. 421 , 428 , 550 P.2d 52 (1976) ("We are hard pressed to find that the `taking' was for public use as opposed to the general purpose of enforcing payment of justly imposed taxes." (emphasis in original)); Richardson v. Brunner , 356 S.W.2d 252 , 254 (Ky.Ct.App.), cert. denied , 371 U.S. 815 , 83 S.Ct. 27 , 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962) (holding under Kentucky's constitution t | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Richardson v. Brunner
neutral
1 sentence2007Tax Claim Bureau (In re Golden) , 190 B.R. 52 , 57 (Bankr.W.D.Penn. 1995) ("In a tax sale context, the takings clause is not dispositive nor the appropriate basis for starting an inquiry."); Fitzgerald v. Neves., Inc. , 15 Wash.App. 421 , 428 , 550 P.2d 52 (1976) ("We are hard pressed to find that the `taking' was for public use as opposed to the general purpose of enforcing payment of justly imposed taxes." (emphasis in original)); Richardson v. Brunner , 356 S.W.2d 252 , 254 (Ky.Ct.App.), cert. denied , 371 U.S. 815 , 83 S.Ct. 27 , 9 L.Ed.2d 56 (1962) (holding under Kentucky's constitution t | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
green
2 sentences2004The Lucas Court reasoned that unlike a partial taking, where the elements of Penn Central were "keenly relevant" to the takings analysis, 505 U.S. at 1019 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 2886 , a regulation that prohibited all economically beneficial use of land should be treated in the same manner as state action which results in a "permanent physical occupation" of the land, in which the government has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner. 2004The Lucas Court reasoned that unlike a partial taking, where the elements of Penn Central were "keenly relevant" to the takings analysis, 505 U.S. at 1019 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 2886 , a regulation that prohibited all economically beneficial use of land should be treated in the same manner as state action which results in a "permanent physical occupation" of the land, in which the government has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Lane v. Chiles
green
2 sentences1998In Lane v. Chiles, 698 So.2d 260 (Fla.1997), the court recently rejected a similar takings clause challenge to Florida's amendment banning gill nets, reasoning: "[T]he amendment does not prohibit all possible uses for the property and equipment in question. 1998State statutes that limit fishing seasons, restrict permitted gear, and define certain zones for particular activities have been upheld.... [R]estrictions on the harvest of marine fish does not constitute a taking of property from particular individuals." 698 So.2d at 264 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
La. Seafood Management Council v. La. Wildlife and Fisheries Com'n
green
1 sentence1998Louisiana Seafood Management Council , 97-1367 at p.8; 715 So.2d at 392 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Richard Reahard Ann P. Reahard v. Lee County
green
1 sentence1994Reahard, 968 F.2d at 1136 .) In the second prong of the takings test, the question becomes whether the ordinance denies the property owner of economically viable use of his property. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.