takings clause in District of Columbia

2024Id. at 1392 .

2023We ordinarily do not decide issues that were not properly presented to the trial court, except in “exceptional situations and when necessary to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice apparent from the record.” Linen v. Lanford, 945 A.2d 1173 , 1180 n.4 (D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023We ordinarily do not decide issues that were not properly presented to the trial court, except in “exceptional situations and when necessary to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice apparent from the record.” Linen v. Lanford, 945 A.2d 1173 , 1180 n.4 (D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2022The Mayor’s Agent thus did not resolve questions that would be necessary to reach such a conclusion, including: (1) whether the Takings Clause analysis should properly focus on the property as a whole rather than simply the Trestle, see generally Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945 ; (2) whether the property as a whole lacks any economically viable use in its current condition; and (3) whether, if so, the denial of a demolition permit would be the cause of the lack of any economically viable use.

2022The Mayor’s Agent thus did not resolve questions that would be necessary to reach such a conclusion, including: (1) whether the Takings Clause analysis should properly focus on the property as a whole rather than simply the Trestle, see generally Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945 ; (2) whether the property as a whole lacks any economically viable use in its current condition; and (3) whether, if so, the denial of a demolition permit would be the cause of the lack of any economically viable use.

2022Adkins II, 56 A.3d at 1165 n.5.

2022Adkins II, 56 A.3d at 1165 n.5.

2021Bernard Parish Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1357 . 32 Id. at 1361 . 18 While the theory that the government failed to maintain or modify a government-constructed project may state a tort claim, it does not state a takings claim.

2021Bernard Parish Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1357 . 32 Id. at 1361 . 18 While the theory that the government failed to maintain or modify a government-constructed project may state a tort claim, it does not state a takings claim.

2008Specifically in connection with landmark designations properly made pursuant to established laws and procedures, the takings inquiry focuses on “whether the interference with [petitioner’s] property is of such a magnitude that ‘there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [it].’ ” Id. at 136 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 , 43 S.Ct. 158 , 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922)).

2008Specifically in connection with landmark designations properly made pursuant to established laws and procedures, the takings inquiry focuses on “whether the interference with [petitioner’s] property is of such a magnitude that ‘there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [it].’ ” Id. at 136 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 , 43 S.Ct. 158 , 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922)).

2008D.C. 13, 16, 298 F.2d 674, 677 (1961)); see also Schottz P’ship v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Comm’n, 427 A.2d 905, 918 (D.C.1981) (“A vested right must be more than a mere expectation based on the anticipated application of existing law.”); Foggy Bottom Ass’n v. District of Columbia Office of Planning, 441 F.Supp.2d 84 (D.D.C.2006) (rejecting a takings claim based on alleged failure of Zoning Commission and the Office of Planning to enforce their regulations and a previous order).

2008Specifically in connection with landmark designations properly made pursuant to established laws and procedures, the takings inquiry focuses on “whether the interference with [petitioner’s] property is of such a magnitude that ‘there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [it].’ ” Id. at 136 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 , 43 S.Ct. 158 , 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922)).

2008Specifically in connection with landmark designations properly made pursuant to established laws and procedures, the takings inquiry focuses on “whether the interference with [petitioner’s] property is of such a magnitude that ‘there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [it].’ ” Id. at 136 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 , 43 S.Ct. 158 , 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922)).

2004The District’s arguments included the following: (1) No request for interest was made in the February 1981 Stipulation; (2) under Superior Court Administrative Order No. 94-26 relating to interest income from funds held in the court registry (not further identified except for the text), Mr. Arthur was not entitled to interest; (3) no statute nor court order required the District to place the sums deposited with the court in an interest-bearing account (this argument challenged ”[p]laintiffs’ reliance on Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 , 118 S.Ct. 1925 , 141 L.Ed.2d 174 (1998)

2004The District’s arguments included the following: (1) No request for interest was made in the February 1981 Stipulation; (2) under Superior Court Administrative Order No. 94-26 relating to interest income from funds held in the court registry (not further identified except for the text), Mr. Arthur was not entitled to interest; (3) no statute nor court order required the District to place the sums deposited with the court in an interest-bearing account (this argument challenged ”[p]laintiffs’ reliance on Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 , 118 S.Ct. 1925 , 141 L.Ed.2d 174 (1998)

1998D.C. at 31, 38 F.3d at 606 .