takings clause in Utah

2017The demand for property is either permissible or forbidden under the takings clause at the time the demand is made based upon an evaluation of the "projected impact of [the] proposed development." Dolan , 512 U.S. at 388 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 ; see Koontz , 570 U.S. 595 , 133 S.Ct. 2586 , 186 L.Ed.2d 697 . ¶ 29 The developers' allegations here that West Jordan either failed to spend impact fees within six years or spent the fees on impermissible expenditures are inadequate to support a takings claim.

2017The demand for property is either permissible or forbidden under the takings clause at the time the demand is made based upon an evaluation of the "projected impact of [the] proposed development." Dolan , 512 U.S. at 388 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 ; see Koontz , 570 U.S. 595 , 133 S.Ct. 2586 , 186 L.Ed.2d 697 . ¶ 29 The developers' allegations here that West Jordan either failed to spend impact fees within six years or spent the fees on impermissible expenditures are inadequate to support a takings claim.

2011This principle is clear in our case law, where we have held that in order to succeed on a takings claim, a plaintiff "must possess some protectable interest in property before that interest is entitled to recover." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990). ¶ 28 Before a property interest will be considered protectable under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate something more "than a unilateral expectation of continued privileges." Strawberry Elec.

2005Regulations promulgated under that power “are not considered as appropriating private property for a public use, but simply as regulating its use and enjoyment.” Id. ¶33 In light of these principles, we conclude that the court of appeals erred when it reversed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Alta on The View’s takings claim.

2020Co., 249 P. 1036, 1041 (Utah 1926) (applying a four-year statute of limitations to a takings claim). 1.

2020See Lujan, 2020 UT 5 , ¶ 49 n.7 (explaining that we may “depart from the federal formulation if and when we are presented with state constitutional analysis rooted in the original meaning of the Utah [Constitution]” (emphasis added)); Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶ 17 , 424 P.3d 95 (declining to “conduct an independent analysis of the Utah takings clause” where the parties “do not undertake an independent analysis of the language of the Utah provision, cite authority interpreting it, or otherwise present an independent rationale for a takings violation as a matter of

2017The demand for property is either permissible or forbidden under the takings clause at the time the demand is made based upon an evaluation of the "projected impact of [the] proposed development." Dolan , 512 U.S. at 388 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 ; see Koontz , 570 U.S. 595 , 133 S.Ct. 2586 , 186 L.Ed.2d 697 . ¶ 29 The developers' allegations here that West Jordan either failed to spend impact fees within six years or spent the fees on impermissible expenditures are inadequate to support a takings claim.

2017The demand for property is either permissible or forbidden under the takings clause at the time the demand is made based upon an evaluation of the "projected impact of [the] proposed development." Dolan , 512 U.S. at 388 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 ; see Koontz , 570 U.S. 595 , 133 S.Ct. 2586 , 186 L.Ed.2d 697 . ¶ 29 The developers' allegations here that West Jordan either failed to spend impact fees within six years or spent the fees on impermissible expenditures are inadequate to support a takings claim.

2007White therefore has no such right to enforce against Randall. 5 Cf. Tuttle v. Olds , 2007 UT App 10 , ¶ 16 (affirming dismissal of a takings claim because the defendants' actions "did not deprive Plaintiffs of anything but the illegal use of water"). ¶ 21 The district court applied Adamson v. Brockbank , 112 Utah 52 , 185 P.2d 264 (1947), to provide White with a water access easement across Randall's property, despite the absence of such an easement in either White's or Randall's deeds.

2007White therefore has no such right to enforce against Randall. 5 Cf. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, ¶ 16 (affirming dismissal of a takings claim because the defendants' actions "did not deprive Plaintiffs of anything but the illegal use of water").

2007Although water rights constitute a protectable property interest, see Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah 278 , 142 P.2d 154, 157 (1943), Plaintiffs failed to allege facts from which the trial court could have determined that Defendants deprived or even sought to deprive Plaintiffs of their water rights.

2007Although water rights constitute a protectable property interest, see Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah 278 , 142 P.2d 154, 157 (1943), Plaintiffs failed to allege facts from which the trial court could have determined that Defendants deprived or even sought to deprive Plaintiffs of their water rights.

2005See Jones v. Hardesty, 261 Ark. 716 , 551 S.W.2d 543, 546 (1977); Cleek v. Va. Gold Mining & Milling Co., 63 Idaho 445 , 122 P.2d 232, 237 (1942). ¶ 27 The State advances two arguments in an attempt to avoid this conclusion.

2005See Jones v. Hardesty, 261 Ark. 716 , 551 S.W.2d 543, 546 (1977); Cleek v. Va. Gold Mining & Milling Co., 63 Idaho 445 , 122 P.2d 232, 237 (1942). ¶ 27 The State advances two arguments in an attempt to avoid this conclusion.

2005Palazzolo held, in part, that a takings claim “is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired- after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction.” Id. at 630 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 .

2005Palazzolo held, in part, that a takings claim “is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired- after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction.” Id. at 630 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 .

2005See Jones v. Hardesty, 261 Ark. 716 , 551 S.W.2d 543, 546 (1977); Cleek v. Va. Gold Mining & Milling Co., 63 Idaho 445 , 122 P.2d 232, 237 (1942). ¶ 27 The State advances two arguments in an attempt to avoid this conclusion.

2005See Jones v. Hardesty, 261 Ark. 716 , 551 S.W.2d 543, 546 (1977); Cleek v. Va. Gold Mining & Milling Co., 63 Idaho 445 , 122 P.2d 232, 237 (1942). ¶ 27 The State advances two arguments in an attempt to avoid this conclusion.

2005See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 , 121 S.Ct. -2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001) (remanding for consideration of the claimant's takings claim under the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) analysis, even though the claimant' proceeded only under a total takings theory below); see also id. at 650, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the claimant "never raised or argudd the Penn Central issue in the state system”). 16 .

2005See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 , 121 S.Ct. -2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001) (remanding for consideration of the claimant's takings claim under the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) analysis, even though the claimant' proceeded only under a total takings theory below); see also id. at 650, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the claimant "never raised or argudd the Penn Central issue in the state system”). 16 .

2004See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 277 Ill.App.3d 926 , 214 Ill.Dec. 526 , 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("[A] municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property."), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 976 , 117 S.Ct. 413 , 136 L.Ed.2d 325 (1996); McClure v. City of Springfield, 175 Or.App. 425 , 28 P.3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (noting parties' stipulation that "the city's enactment of dedication requirements as an ordinance did not relieve it of the obligation to make particularized

2004See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 277 Ill.App.3d 926 , 214 Ill.Dec. 526 , 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("[A] municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property."), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 976 , 117 S.Ct. 413 , 136 L.Ed.2d 325 (1996); McClure v. City of Springfield, 175 Or.App. 425 , 28 P.3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (noting parties' stipulation that "the city's enactment of dedication requirements as an ordinance did not relieve it of the obligation to make particularized

2004See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 277 Ill.App.3d 926 , 214 Ill.Dec. 526 , 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("[A] municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property."), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 976 , 117 S.Ct. 413 , 136 L.Ed.2d 325 (1996); McClure v. City of Springfield, 175 Or.App. 425 , 28 P.3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (noting parties' stipulation that "the city's enactment of dedication requirements as an ordinance did not relieve it of the obligation to make particularized

2004See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 277 Ill.App.3d 926 , 214 Ill.Dec. 526 , 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("[A] municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property."), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 976 , 117 S.Ct. 413 , 136 L.Ed.2d 325 (1996); McClure v. City of Springfield, 175 Or.App. 425 , 28 P.3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (noting parties' stipulation that "the city's enactment of dedication requirements as an ordinance did not relieve it of the obligation to make particularized

2004See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 277 Ill.App.3d 926 , 214 Ill.Dec. 526 , 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("[A] municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property."), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 976 , 117 S.Ct. 413 , 136 L.Ed.2d 325 (1996); McClure v. City of Springfield, 175 Or.App. 425 , 28 P.3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (noting parties' stipulation that "the city's enactment of dedication requirements as an ordinance did not relieve it of the obligation to make particularized

2004Dec. 526, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("LA] municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property."), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 976 , 117 S.Ct. 418 , 186 LEd.2d 825 (1996); McClure v. City of Springfield, 175 Or.App. 425 , 28 P.3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (noting parties' stipulation that "the city's enactment of dedication requirements as an ordinance did not relieve it of the obligation to make particularized findings showing that any resulting exactions were roughly proportional to the

2004See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 277 Ill.App.3d 926 , 214 Ill.Dec. 526 , 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) ("[A] municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property."), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 976 , 117 S.Ct. 413 , 136 L.Ed.2d 325 (1996); McClure v. City of Springfield, 175 Or.App. 425 , 28 P.3d 1222, 1224 (2001) (noting parties' stipulation that "the city's enactment of dedication requirements as an ordinance did not relieve it of the obligation to make particularized

2004See Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at 113 , 16 P.3d 588 ; Malan v. Lewis, 698 P.2d 661 , 669 (Utah 1984) (holding that the uniform operation of laws and equal protection clauses "embody the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different cireumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same"). 16 The Utah Constitution does not provide monetary damages for violations of constitutional provisions except for the takings clause.

2004See Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at 120 , 16 P.3d 583 .

2004See Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at 120 , 16 P.3d 583 .