41 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1988–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Palazzolo v. Rhode Islandgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 , 121 S. Ct. 2448 , 150 L. 2016See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 , 121 S. Ct. 2448 , 150 L. | 4 | 4 |
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwithgreen2 sentences2010See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 , 101 S. Ct. 446, 66 L. 2010See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 , 101 S. Ct. 446, 66 L. | 2 | 3 |
New England Estates, LLC v. Town of Branfordgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817, 848 , 988 A.2d 229 (2010) (claim for wrongful taking of property in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not barred by res judicata effect of prior action regarding valuation of property because, ‘‘[i]n the valuation appeal, the owners could not have raised their claim that the town violated the public use require- ment of the takings clause’’); Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, supra, 241 Conn. 49–52 (state law claims were not barred by res judicata effect of prior federal action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizatio 2023See, e.g., New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817, 848 , 988 A.2d 229 (2010) (claim for wrongful taking of property in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not barred by res judicata effect of prior action regarding valuation of property because, ‘‘[i]n the valuation appeal, the owners could not have raised their claim that the town violated the public use require- ment of the takings clause’’); Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, supra, 241 Conn. 49–52 (state law claims were not barred by res judicata effect of prior federal action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizatio | 2 | 2 |
State Department of Highways, Division of Highways v. Davisgreen2 sentences2002Our Supreme Court has stated that "when reviewing a takings claim based upon an alleged infringement of an owner's legal right of access to CT Page 15785 property, a court must ascertain the degree to which such access is impaired by the regulatory action; see e.g., Colorado Dept. of Highways v. Davis . 626 P.2d 661 , 664 (Cob. 1981): including the extent to which the regulation deprives the owner of a reasonably convenient and suitable means of access." Cohen v. City of Hartford , 244 Conn. 206 , 221-22 (1998). 1998Thus, when reviewing a takings claim based upon an alleged infringement of an owner’s legal right of access to property, a court must ascertain the degree to which such access is impaired by the regulatory action; see, e.g., Colorado Dept. of Highways v. Davis, 626 P.2d 661, 664 (Colo. 1981); including the extent to which the regulation deprives the owner of a reasonably convenient and suitable means of access. | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Town of Westportgreen2 sentences2017In other words, even though it was **70 unclear at the outset of the inverse condemnation action whether the plaintiff's damages claim was for a temporary or complete taking, the claim nevertheless was ripe and capable of resolution on the merits." (Citations omitted; footnote added.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager , supra, at 88 , 952 A.2d 1 ; see also Miller v. Westport , 268 Conn. 207 , 216, 842 A.2d 558 (2004) (explaining that, under Cumberland Farms, Inc. , "the denial of a variance by a zoning board of appeals is considered a final decision by an initial decision maker, which is all that 2017In other words, even though it was **70 unclear at the outset of the inverse condemnation action whether the plaintiff's damages claim was for a temporary or complete taking, the claim nevertheless was ripe and capable of resolution on the merits." (Citations omitted; footnote added.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager , supra, at 88 , 952 A.2d 1 ; see also Miller v. Westport , 268 Conn. 207 , 216, 842 A.2d 558 (2004) (explaining that, under Cumberland Farms, Inc. , "the denial of a variance by a zoning board of appeals is considered a final decision by an initial decision maker, which is all that | 1 | 2 |
Port Clinton Associates v. Board of Selectmengreen2 sentences2008Instead, the plaintiff argues that the right to build a dock is a riparian right; Orange v. Resnick, 94 Conn. 573 , 109 A. 864 (1920); that riparian rights are property; Port Clinton Associates v. Board of Selectmen, 217 Conn. 588 , 587 A.2d 126 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 814 , 112 S. Ct. 64 , 116 L. 2008Instead, the plaintiff argues that the right to build a dock is a riparian right; Orange v. Resnick, 94 Conn. 573 , 109 A. 864 (1920); that riparian rights are property; Port Clinton Associates v. Board of Selectmen, 217 Conn. 588 , 587 A.2d 126 , cert. denied, 502 U.S. 814 , 112 S. Ct. 64 , 116 L. | 1 | 2 |
John Corp. v. City of Houstongreen2 sentences2019Although developed in the context of fifth amendment takings jurisprudence, the Williamson County ripeness doctrine also "applies to due process claims arising from the same nucleus of facts as a takings claim." Kurtz v. Verizon New York, Inc. , 758 F.3d 506 , 515 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing cases); see also John Corp. v. Houston , 214 F.3d 573 , 584 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Since Williamson County was decided, courts have applied these principles to not only substantive due process claims, but also to procedural due process and equal protection claims. 2019Although developed in the context of fifth amendment takings jurisprudence, the Williamson County ripeness doctrine also "applies to due process claims arising from the same nucleus of facts as a takings claim." Kurtz v. Verizon New York, Inc. , 758 F.3d 506 , 515 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing cases); see also John Corp. v. Houston , 214 F.3d 573 , 584 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Since Williamson County was decided, courts have applied these principles to not only substantive due process claims, but also to procedural due process and equal protection claims. | 1 | 1 |
Caldwell, Iii v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2017See Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager , supra, at 88 , 952 A.2d 1 ("even though it was unclear at the outset of the inverse condemnation action whether the plaintiff's damages claim was for a temporary or complete taking, the claim nevertheless was ripe and capable of resolution on the merits"); see also Caldwell v. United States , supra, 391 F.3d at 1234 ("[i]t is not unusual that the precise nature of the takings claim, whether permanent or temporary, will not be clear at the time it accrues"). | 1 | 1 |
Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tagergreen2 sentences2017See Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager , supra, at 88 , 952 A.2d 1 ("even though it was unclear at the outset of the inverse condemnation action whether the plaintiff's damages claim was for a temporary or complete taking, the claim nevertheless was ripe and capable of resolution on the merits"); see also Caldwell v. United States , supra, 391 F.3d at 1234 ("[i]t is not unusual that the precise nature of the takings claim, whether permanent or temporary, will not be clear at the time it accrues"). 2017In other words, even though it was **70 unclear at the outset of the inverse condemnation action whether the plaintiff's damages claim was for a temporary or complete taking, the claim nevertheless was ripe and capable of resolution on the merits." (Citations omitted; footnote added.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager , supra, at 88 , 952 A.2d 1 ; see also Miller v. Westport , 268 Conn. 207 , 216, 842 A.2d 558 (2004) (explaining that, under Cumberland Farms, Inc. , "the denial of a variance by a zoning board of appeals is considered a final decision by an initial decision maker, which is all that | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. Town of Colchestergreen1 sentence2017See Brady v. Colchester , 863 F.2d 205 , 212 (2d Cir. 1988) (in the context of fourteenth amendment due process claim, employing the term vested property right interchangeably with property interest ... that was protectable under the fourteenth amendment ....). | 1 | 1 |
Kemp v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2017Cir. 2004) ("[i]t is not unusual **76 that the precise nature of the takings claim, whether permanent or temporary, will not be clear at the time it accrues"), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 826 , 126 S.Ct. 366 , 163 L.Ed.2d 72 (2005) ; see also Kemp v. United States , 65 Fed.Cl. 818 , 824 (2005) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that statute of limitations for taking was tolled because, "until the property was sold, she had no way of knowing when the period as to which she was entitled to compensation would end"); *425 Kemp v. United States , supra, at 823 ("Plaintiff [property owner] argues that the temp | 1 | 1 |
| Commissioner of Transportation v. Larobinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commissioner of Transportation v. Larobinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sgb Financial Services, Inc., Doing Business as Timber Ridge Apartments v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis-Marion County, Indianagreen | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen1 sentence2010General Statutes § 8-132 (b) (1); see also Commissioner of Transportation v. Larobina, 92 Conn. App. 15, 29 , 882 A. 2d 1265 (concluding that property owner may not, in context of valuation appeal taken pursuant to § 13a-76, challenge validity of condemnation), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 931 , 889 A.2d 816 (2005). *848 Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that, in the valuation appeal, the owners could not have raised their claim that the town wrongfully took the property in violation of the public use requirement of the takings clause. | 1 | 1 |
| Carroll County v. City of Bremengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| DuPuy v. City of Wacogreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 433880green | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Palm Beach County v. Tesslergreen | 1 | 1 |
| D'Addario v. Planning & Zoning Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cider Barrel Mobile Home Court v. Eadergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City
red
2 sentences2019The court reasoned that "[t]he [f]ifth [a]mendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation"; id. ; and, therefore, a takings claim is "premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process" for obtaining just compensation. 2017The court then proceeded in its memorandum of decision to separately discuss the federal law requirement of ripeness, as set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank , 473 U.S. 172 , 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), which provides that a takings claim "is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." The court further noted in its discussion of the federal ripeness requirement that (1) a plaintiff is excused from obtai | 4 | 1996–2019 |
Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency
green
2 sentences2002Gil v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency of the Town of Greenwich , 219 Conn. 404 , 593 A.2d 1368 (1991). 2002Gil v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency of the Town of Greenwich , 219 Conn. 404 , 593 A.2d 1368 (1991). | 4 | 1997–2002 |
Cohen v. City of Hartford
green
2 sentences2007The plaintiffs theory sounds less like a claim of improper retrospective application and more like a takings claim based on its “reasonable investment-backed expectations of use of the property.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Hartford, 244 Conn. 206 , 223-24 n.24, 710 A.2d 746 (1998). 2007The plaintiffs theory sounds less like a claim of improper retrospective application and more like a takings claim based on its “reasonable investment-backed expectations of use of the property.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Hartford, 244 Conn. 206 , 223-24 n.24, 710 A.2d 746 (1998). | 3 | 2001–2007 |
Daoust v. McWilliams
green
2 sentences2023See, e.g., New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817, 848 , 988 A.2d 229 (2010) (claim for wrongful taking of property in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not barred by res judicata effect of prior action regarding valuation of property because, ‘‘[i]n the valuation appeal, the owners could not have raised their claim that the town violated the public use require- ment of the takings clause’’); Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, supra, 241 Conn. 49–52 (state law claims were not barred by res judicata effect of prior federal action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizatio 2023See, e.g., New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817, 848 , 988 A.2d 229 (2010) (claim for wrongful taking of property in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not barred by res judicata effect of prior action regarding valuation of property because, ‘‘[i]n the valuation appeal, the owners could not have raised their claim that the town violated the public use require- ment of the takings clause’’); Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, supra, 241 Conn. 49–52 (state law claims were not barred by res judicata effect of prior federal action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizatio | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
green
2 sentences1996In upholding the trial court's decision, however, the Port Clinton court reasoned that, although the plaintiff received a decision of the final decision maker (the board of selectmen), the board's adverse decision could not be considered a "final" decision because "a property owner must do more than submit one plan to an agency in order to establish that the agency's decision is `final' for purposes of the takings clause." Id., 607 , citing MacDonald, Sommer Frates v. Yolo County , 477 U.S. 340 , 359 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986) (owner filed one application to subdivide property in 1996In upholding the trial court's decision, however, the Port Clinton court reasoned that, although the plaintiff received a decision of the final decision maker (the board of selectmen), the board's adverse decision could not be considered a "final" decision because "a property owner must do more than submit one plan to an agency in order to establish that the agency's decision is `final' for purposes of the takings clause." Id., 607 , citing MacDonald, Sommer Frates v. Yolo County , 477 U.S. 340 , 359 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986) (owner filed one application to subdivide property in | 2 | 1996–2010 |
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County
green
2 sentences2002Similarly, the United States Supreme Court requires a property owner to obtain "a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property, [prior to analyzing a takings claim, otherwise] it is impossible to tell whether the land retains any reasonable beneficial use or whether existing expectation interests have been destroyed." (Brackets omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDonald, Sommer Frates v. Yolo County , 477 U.S. 340 , 349 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986). 2002Similarly, the United States Supreme Court requires a property owner to obtain "a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property, [prior to analyzing a takings claim, otherwise] it is impossible to tell whether the land retains any reasonable beneficial use or whether existing expectation interests have been destroyed." (Brackets omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDonald, Sommer Frates v. Yolo County , 477 U.S. 340 , 349 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986). | 2 | 1996–2002 |
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego
green
2 sentences1996In upholding the trial court's decision, however, the Port Clinton court reasoned that, although the plaintiff received a decision of the final decision maker (the board of selectmen), the board's adverse decision could not be considered a "final" decision because "a property owner must do more than submit one plan to an agency in order to establish that the agency's decision is `final' for purposes of the takings clause." Id., 607 , citing MacDonald, Sommer Frates v. Yolo County , 477 U.S. 340 , 359 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986) (owner filed one application to subdivide property in 1996In upholding the trial court's decision, however, the Port Clinton court reasoned that, although the plaintiff received a decision of the final decision maker (the board of selectmen), the board's adverse decision could not be considered a "final" decision because "a property owner must do more than submit one plan to an agency in order to establish that the agency's decision is `final' for purposes of the takings clause." Id., 607 , citing MacDonald, Sommer Frates v. Yolo County , 477 U.S. 340 , 359 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 , 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986) (owner filed one application to subdivide property in | 2 | 1996–1999 |
Severance v. Patterson
green
1 sentence2019Thus, pursuant to Williamson County , a plaintiff's takings claim is not ripe for review until (1) the relevant administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive decision, and (2) the plaintiff has sought just compensation through the procedures provided by the state. 15 See Sherman v. Chester , 752 F.3d 554 , 561 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing that, for takings claim to be ripe under Williamson County doctrine, "the plaintiff must show that (1) the state regulatory entity has rendered a final decision on the matter, and (2) the plaintiff has sought just compensation by means of an availab | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Outagamie County Board of Adjustment
green
2 sentences2019The difference between the two standards explains why a variance from a zoning ordi- nance can be granted under conditions in which the application of that particular zoning ordinance would not result in an unconstitutional taking of property.’’ [Citation omitted; emphasis in original.]); State v. Board of Adjustment, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 642 , 628 N.W.2d 376 (2001) (‘‘[t]he unnecessary hardship standard ‘is neither the same nor as demanding as a takings analysis’ ’’ [emphasis in original]); 8 E. 2019The difference between the two standards explains why a variance from a zoning ordi- nance can be granted under conditions in which the application of that particular zoning ordinance would not result in an unconstitutional taking of property.’’ [Citation omitted; emphasis in original.]); State v. Board of Adjustment, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 642 , 628 N.W.2d 376 (2001) (‘‘[t]he unnecessary hardship standard ‘is neither the same nor as demanding as a takings analysis’ ’’ [emphasis in original]); 8 E. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Kurtz v. Verizon New York, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Although developed in the context of fifth amendment takings jurisprudence, the Williamson County ripeness doctrine also "applies to due process claims arising from the same nucleus of facts as a takings claim." Kurtz v. Verizon New York, Inc. , 758 F.3d 506 , 515 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing cases); see also John Corp. v. Houston , 214 F.3d 573 , 584 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Since Williamson County was decided, courts have applied these principles to not only substantive due process claims, but also to procedural due process and equal protection claims. 2019Although developed in the context of fifth amendment takings jurisprudence, the Williamson County ripeness doctrine also "applies to due process claims arising from the same nucleus of facts as a takings claim." Kurtz v. Verizon New York, Inc. , 758 F.3d 506 , 515 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing cases); see also John Corp. v. Houston , 214 F.3d 573 , 584 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Since Williamson County was decided, courts have applied these principles to not only substantive due process claims, but also to procedural due process and equal protection claims. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sherman v. Town of Chester
green
1 sentence2019Thus, pursuant to Williamson County , a plaintiff's takings claim is not ripe for review until (1) the relevant administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive decision, and (2) the plaintiff has sought just compensation through the procedures provided by the state. 15 See Sherman v. Chester , 752 F.3d 554 , 561 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing that, for takings claim to be ripe under Williamson County doctrine, "the plaintiff must show that (1) the state regulatory entity has rendered a final decision on the matter, and (2) the plaintiff has sought just compensation by means of an availab | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Caldwell v. United States
green
1 sentence2017Cir. 2004) ("[i]t is not unusual **76 that the precise nature of the takings claim, whether permanent or temporary, will not be clear at the time it accrues"), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 826 , 126 S.Ct. 366 , 163 L.Ed.2d 72 (2005) ; see also Kemp v. United States , 65 Fed.Cl. 818 , 824 (2005) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that statute of limitations for taking was tolled because, "until the property was sold, she had no way of knowing when the period as to which she was entitled to compensation would end"); *425 Kemp v. United States , supra, at 823 ("Plaintiff [property owner] argues that the temp | 1 | 2017–2017 |
C & H Management, LLC v. City of Shelton
green
2 sentences2017In C & H Management, LLC v. Shelton , 140 Conn.App. 608 , 615-16, 59 A.3d 851 (2013), the Appellate Court similarly concluded that a temporary takings claim was barred by res judicata when the plaintiff management company previously had brought a successful mandamus action to compel the defendant city to issue a building permit on a particular parcel of land. 2017In C & H Management, LLC v. Shelton , 140 Conn.App. 608 , 615-16, 59 A.3d 851 (2013), the Appellate Court similarly concluded that a temporary takings claim was barred by res judicata when the plaintiff management company previously had brought a successful mandamus action to compel the defendant city to issue a building permit on a particular parcel of land. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Baker v. Whitnum-Baker
neutral
1 sentence2017Consistent with the foregoing principles, the Appellate Court, in **72 Buck v. Berlin , 163 Conn.App. 282 , 293, 135 A.3d 1237 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 922 , 138 A.3d 283 (2016), concluded that a takings claim predicated on the defendant town's placement of a gate across a road that provided the sole access to the land of the plaintiff property owners was barred by res judicata because the property owners, in an earlier injunction action, had sought to enjoin the town from blocking the road. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Willman v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
green
2 sentences2017Cir. 2004) ("[i]t is not unusual **76 that the precise nature of the takings claim, whether permanent or temporary, will not be clear at the time it accrues"), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 826 , 126 S.Ct. 366 , 163 L.Ed.2d 72 (2005) ; see also Kemp v. United States , 65 Fed.Cl. 818 , 824 (2005) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that statute of limitations for taking was tolled because, "until the property was sold, she had no way of knowing when the period as to which she was entitled to compensation would end"); *425 Kemp v. United States , supra, at 823 ("Plaintiff [property owner] argues that the temp 2017Cir. 2004) ("[i]t is not unusual **76 that the precise nature of the takings claim, whether permanent or temporary, will not be clear at the time it accrues"), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 826 , 126 S.Ct. 366 , 163 L.Ed.2d 72 (2005) ; see also Kemp v. United States , 65 Fed.Cl. 818 , 824 (2005) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that statute of limitations for taking was tolled because, "until the property was sold, she had no way of knowing when the period as to which she was entitled to compensation would end"); *425 Kemp v. United States , supra, at 823 ("Plaintiff [property owner] argues that the temp | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Curran v. Zubkova
neutral
1 sentence2017Consistent with the foregoing principles, the Appellate Court, in **72 Buck v. Berlin , 163 Conn.App. 282 , 293, 135 A.3d 1237 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 922 , 138 A.3d 283 (2016), concluded that a takings claim predicated on the defendant town's placement of a gate across a road that provided the sole access to the land of the plaintiff property owners was barred by res judicata because the property owners, in an earlier injunction action, had sought to enjoin the town from blocking the road. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Barron Ex Rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore
green
2 sentences2016Thus, in Barron v. Mayor & City Council , 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 , 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833), the court rejected a claim that the fifth amendment's takings clause applied to state legislation. 2016Thus, in Barron v. Mayor & City Council , 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 , 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833), the court rejected a claim that the fifth amendment's takings clause applied to state legislation. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
City of Bristol v. Tilcon Minerals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015The trial court’s conclusions must stand unless they are legally or logi- cally inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Bristol v. Tilcon Minerals, Inc., 284 Conn. 55, 83 , 931 A.2d 237 (2007). ‘‘The [United States] Supreme Court has generally eschewed any set formula for identifying regulatory takings, instead preferring to engage in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries to determine in each case whether the challenged property restriction rises to the 2015The trial court’s conclusions must stand unless they are legally or logi- cally inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Bristol v. Tilcon Minerals, Inc., 284 Conn. 55, 83 , 931 A.2d 237 (2007). ‘‘The [United States] Supreme Court has generally eschewed any set formula for identifying regulatory takings, instead preferring to engage in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries to determine in each case whether the challenged property restriction rises to the | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| 184 Windsor Avenue, LLC. v. State green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Tamm v. Burns green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| G.T. Scott v. Greenville County green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Essex Fells v. Kessler Inst. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Town of Orange v. Resnick green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Bilzerian v. United States green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Quirk v. Town of Sandwich green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Gilliam v. Black green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Massachusetts v. United States green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Scalzo v. City of Danbury green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| City of Torrington v. Coles green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Dolan v. City of Tigard green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Fishman v. City of Stamford green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Huie v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Fishman v. City of Stamford green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Textron, Inc. v. Wood green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Corthouts v. Town of Newington green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.