takings clause in New York

1997Because the State defines the rights and obligations that constitute "property" in the absence of any superseding Federal law, the threshold step in a takings inquiry is to determine whether, in light of the "`existing rules or understandings'" of State law, plaintiffs ever possessed the property interest they now claim has been taken by the challenged governmental action ( Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council , 505 US 1003, 1030 [quoting Board of Regents v Roth , supra , 408 US, at 577 ]).

1997Because the State defines the rights and obligations that constitute "property” in the absence.of any superseding Federal law, the threshold step in a takings inquiry is to determine whether, in light of the " 'existing rules or understandings’ ” of State law, plaintiffs ever possessed the property interest they now claim has been taken by the challenged governmental action (Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1030 [quoting Board of Regents v Roth, supra, 408 US, at 577 ]).

2024Co. v State of New York, 30 NY3d at 140, citing Phillips v Washington Legal Foundation , 524 US 156, 164 [1998]).

2017The threshold step in any Takings Clause analysis is to determine whether a vested property interest has been identified (see Phillips, 524 US at 164 ; Landgraf, 511 US at 266 ; Alliance of Am.

2019"Where, as here, there is nothing more than an expectancy interest, there is an insufficient basis upon which to find a takings clause violation" ( Matter of Novara v Cantor Fitzgerald, LP , 20 AD3d 103, 108 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 710 [2005]; see generally Preble Aggregate v Town of Preble , 263 AD2d 849, 852 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 760 [2000]).

2013On August 11, 2010, the Tax Credit Deferral Provisions became effective “immediately.” (L 2010, ch 57, § 1, part Y, § 8.) Because plaintiffs’ Tax Law § 21 (a) (3) tangible property tax credit was deferred in August 2010, prior to its vesting, the credit was “nothing more than an expectancy interest, ... an insufficient basis upon which to find a takings clause violation.” (Matter of Novara v Cantor Fitzgerald, LP, 20 AD3d 103, 108 [3d Dept 2005].) Similarly, because plaintiffs lacked a vested property right when the Tax Credit Deferral Provisions were enacted, they failed to state a substantiv

2019"Where, as here, there is nothing more than an expectancy interest, there is an insufficient basis upon which to find a takings clause violation" ( Matter of Novara v Cantor Fitzgerald, LP , 20 AD3d 103, 108 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 710 [2005]; see generally Preble Aggregate v Town of Preble , 263 AD2d 849, 852 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 760 [2000]).

2005Where, as here, there is nothing more than an expectancy interest, there is an insufficient basis upon which to find a takings clause violation (see generally Preble Aggregate v Town of Preble, 263 AD2d 849, 852 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 760 [2000]).

2018A takings claim is therefore not justiciable until "the governmental entity charged with implementing the regulations has rendered a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property, and . . . the landowner has availed itself of the procedures provided by [s]tate law to obtain just compensation" ( Town of Orangetown v Magee , 88 NY2d 41, 50 [1996] [emphasis added]; see Suitum v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency , 520 US 725, 733-734 [1997]).

1998Applying his equivalent of Ockham’s Razor to the subject of TDRs, Justice Scalia concluded that consideration of TDRs must be “limited to the compensation side of the takings analysis [because] * * * taking them into account in determining whether a taking has occurred will render much of our regulatory takings jurisprudence a nullity” (supra, 520 US, at 750 [Scalia, concurring in part], citing Comment, Environmental Interest Groups and Land Regula tion: Avoiding the Clutches of Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 48 U Miami L Rev 1179, 1212 [1994]).

2005The only property right that plaintiffs assert is “dedication of Empire’s assets to its charitable mission.” Plaintiffs, either as subscribers to Empire’s health plans or as members of the public as a whole, however, do not have an enforceable “property interest” in the value of Empire’s assets or in the dedication of those assets to Empire’s mission (see Soon Duck Kim v City of New York, 90 NY2d 1, 6 [1997] [“Because the State defines the rights and obligations that constitute property in the absence of any superseding Federal law, the threshold step in a takings inquiry is to determine wheth

2005The only property right that plaintiffs assert is "dedication of Empire's assets to its charitable mission." Plaintiffs, either as subscribers to Empire's health plans or as members of the public as a whole, however, do not have an enforceable "property interest" in the value of Empire's assets or in the dedication of those assets to Empire's mission ( see Soon Duck Kim v City of New York, 90 NY2d 1, 6 [1997] ["Because the State defines the rights and obligations that constitute property in the absence of any superseding Federal law, the threshold step in a takings inquiry is to determine whet

2019Assn. v City of New York , 126 AD3d 837, 840 [2nd Dept 2015]).

2018A takings claim is therefore not justiciable until "the governmental entity charged with implementing the regulations has rendered a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property, and . . . the landowner has availed itself of the procedures provided by [s]tate law to obtain just compensation" ( Town of Orangetown v Magee , 88 NY2d 41, 50 [1996] [emphasis added]; see Suitum v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency , 520 US 725, 733-734 [1997]).

2018The Court noted that claimants cannot establish a takings claim "simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development" ( id. at 130).

2017Insurers v Chu, 77 NY2d 573, 585-587 [1991]).

2017West Virginia CWP Fund v Stacy, 671 F3d 378, 386-387 [4th Cir 2011], cert denied 568 US 816 [2012]; Swisher Intl., 550 F3d at 1054 - 1057). - 26 - - 27 - No. 96 were statutorily obligated to contribute.

2017West Virginia CWP Fund v Stacy, 671 F3d 378, 386-387 [4th Cir 2011], cert denied 568 US 816 [2012]; Swisher Intl., 550 F3d at 1054 - 1057). - 26 - - 27 - No. 96 were statutorily obligated to contribute.

2017However, to read these Court of Appeals cases as automatically barring a purchaser of regulated property from ever successfully raising a takings claim would be inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Palazzolo v Rhode Island ( 533 US 606 [2001]).

2017The United States Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner’s takings claim was not barred even though his acquisition of the property postdated the regulation (see Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 US at 617, 627, 630 ).

2015“Typically, takings claims involve the appropriation or occupation of property without the owner’s consent or, in the case of a regulatory taking, the enactment of legislation or an ordinance that is alleged to have destroyed the commercial value of a particular property.” (Matter of Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 13 NY3d 475, 489 [2009].) “Our precedents stake out two categories of regulatory action that generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes.

2013On August 11, 2010, the Tax Credit Deferral Provisions became effective “immediately.” (L 2010, ch 57, § 1, part Y, § 8.) Because plaintiffs’ Tax Law § 21 (a) (3) tangible property tax credit was deferred in August 2010, prior to its vesting, the credit was “nothing more than an expectancy interest, ... an insufficient basis upon which to find a takings clause violation.” (Matter of Novara v Cantor Fitzgerald, LP, 20 AD3d 103, 108 [3d Dept 2005].) Similarly, because plaintiffs lacked a vested property right when the Tax Credit Deferral Provisions were enacted, they failed to state a substantiv

2013The Supreme Court has recognized that it is more difficult to make out violations of the Takings Clause than a violation of the Due Process Clause (see Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 US 602, 641 [1993]).

2013On August 11, 2010, the Tax Credit Deferral Provisions became effective “immediately.” (L 2010, ch 57, § 1, part Y, § 8.) Because plaintiffs’ Tax Law § 21 (a) (3) tangible property tax credit was deferred in August 2010, prior to its vesting, the credit was “nothing more than an expectancy interest, ... an insufficient basis upon which to find a takings clause violation.” (Matter of Novara v Cantor Fitzgerald, LP, 20 AD3d 103, 108 [3d Dept 2005].) Similarly, because plaintiffs lacked a vested property right when the Tax Credit Deferral Provisions were enacted, they failed to state a substantiv