takings claim in Wisconsin

2010While a jury may properly be asked to determine questions of fact pertinent to a takings claim, e.g., the amount of damages that will justly compensate a property owner for a taking, see Stelpflug v. Town Bd., Town of Waukesha, Cnty. of Waukesha, 2000 WI 81, ¶ 26 , 236 Wis. 2d 275 , 612 N.W.2d 700 , the ultimate determination of whether government conduct constitutes a taking is a question of law that is not properly placed before a jury.

2010While a jury may properly be asked to determine questions of fact pertinent to a takings claim, e.g., the amount of damages that will justly compensate a property owner for a taking, see Stelpflug v. Town Bd., Town of Waukesha, Cnty. of Waukesha, 2000 WI 81, ¶ 26 , 236 Wis. 2d 275 , 612 N.W.2d 700 , the ultimate determination of whether government conduct constitutes a taking is a question of law that is not properly placed before a jury.

2026“Liability depends on each defendant’s knowledge and actions, not on the knowledge or actions of persons they supervise.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009).

2026A § 1983 claim based on personal capacity is premised on “an officer act[ing] independently when enforcing an 8 Siebers’ pleadings referenced three cases: Goldberg v. Frerichs, 912 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that Illinois could not refuse to pay interest on property returned through its unclaimed property act solely because the property was not earning net interest before it was transferred to the state); Kolton v. Frerichs, 869 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that Illinois’ failure to pay interest on presumed abandoned property in its unclaimed property fund violated the

2026A § 1983 claim based on personal capacity is premised on “an officer act[ing] independently when enforcing an 8 Siebers’ pleadings referenced three cases: Goldberg v. Frerichs, 912 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that Illinois could not refuse to pay interest on property returned through its unclaimed property act solely because the property was not earning net interest before it was transferred to the state); Kolton v. Frerichs, 869 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that Illinois’ failure to pay interest on presumed abandoned property in its unclaimed property fund violated the

2026A § 1983 claim based on personal capacity is premised on “an officer act[ing] independently when enforcing an 8 Siebers’ pleadings referenced three cases: Goldberg v. Frerichs, 912 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that Illinois could not refuse to pay interest on property returned through its unclaimed property act solely because the property was not earning net interest before it was transferred to the state); Kolton v. Frerichs, 869 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that Illinois’ failure to pay interest on presumed abandoned property in its unclaimed property fund violated the

2026A § 1983 claim based on personal capacity is premised on “an officer act[ing] independently when enforcing an 8 Siebers’ pleadings referenced three cases: Goldberg v. Frerichs, 912 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that Illinois could not refuse to pay interest on property returned through its unclaimed property act solely because the property was not earning net interest before it was transferred to the state); Kolton v. Frerichs, 869 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that Illinois’ failure to pay interest on presumed abandoned property in its unclaimed property fund violated the

2018Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶¶31, 33 , 294 Wis. 2d 441 , 717 N.W.2d 803 ; Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 374 Wis. 2d 348, ¶¶6-10 . 5 No. 2016AP537.rgb constitutes individual real property and the correct denominator in the takings analysis.

2018Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶¶31, 33 , 294 Wis. 2d 441 , 717 N.W.2d 803 ; Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 374 Wis. 2d 348, ¶¶6-10 . 5 No. 2016AP537.rgb constitutes individual real property and the correct denominator in the takings analysis.

2018The California Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that "owners and occupiers of roadside property do not possess a 'right to be seen' that requires the payment of compensation for municipal landscaping efforts having no injurious effect on any property rights other than the claimed right to visibility." Id. ¶42 As here, the Regency court was assessing a takings claim in the context of a preexisting use of a billboard, where the sole harm alleged was that of loss of visibility from a public road.

2018The California Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that "owners and occupiers of roadside property do not possess a 'right to be seen' that requires the payment of compensation for municipal landscaping efforts having no injurious effect on any property rights other than the claimed right to visibility." Id. ¶ 42 As here, the Regency court was assessing a takings claim in the context of a preexisting use of a billboard, where the sole harm alleged was that of loss of visibility from a public road.

2018See Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 54 Wis. 2d at 444 , 195 N.W.2d 464 . ¶ 40 Numerous jurisdictions also have concluded that the right to visibility from a public road is not a recognized property right. 9 Indeed, Adams fails to *395 cite any *669 jurisdiction recognizing a right to visibility of private property from a public road in the absence of a physical taking. 10 ¶ 41 For example, the California Supreme Court rejected a takings claim by a billboard owner who asserted that palm trees that did not physically occupy any land owned by the billboard company reduced the visibility of its billboa

2018See Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 54 Wis. 2d at 444 , 195 N.W.2d 464 . ¶ 40 Numerous jurisdictions also have concluded that the right to visibility from a public road is not a recognized property right. 9 Indeed, Adams fails to *395 cite any *669 jurisdiction recognizing a right to visibility of private property from a public road in the absence of a physical taking. 10 ¶ 41 For example, the California Supreme Court rejected a takings claim by a billboard owner who asserted that palm trees that did not physically occupy any land owned by the billboard company reduced the visibility of its billboa

2014See Brenner, 343 Wis. 2d 320, ¶¶ 41-43 ; see also Hillcrest Golf & Country Club v. City of Altoona, 135 Wis. 2d 431 , 435 n.1, 400 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1986). ¶ 15.

2014Brenner, 343 Wis. 2d 320, ¶ 83 ("[G]overnment action of some sort is a prerequisite for a taking under the constitution."); Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012) ([R'Jelevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized government action.") (emphasis added).

2014See Brenner, 343 Wis. 2d 320, ¶¶ 41-43 ; see also Hillcrest Golf & Country Club v. City of Altoona, 135 Wis. 2d 431 , 435 n.1, 400 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1986). ¶ 15.

2014See Brenner, 343 Wis. 2d 320, ¶¶ 41-43 ; see also Hillcrest Golf & Country Club v. City of Altoona, 135 Wis. 2d 431 , 435 n.1, 400 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1986). ¶ 15.

2014Brenner, 343 Wis. 2d 320, ¶ 83 ("[G]overnment action of some sort is a prerequisite for a taking under the constitution."); Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012) ([R'Jelevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized government action.") (emphasis added).

2006Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (concluding that in order to have a takings claim under the United States Constitution, there must be no ability to maintain a suit for compensation against the government)).

2006Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 , 104 S.Ct. 2862 , 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) (concluding that in order to have a takings claim under the United States Constitution, there must be no ability to maintain a suit for compensation against the government)).

2001The Supreme Court held that: (1) the claims were ripe for adjudication, see id. at 2462; (2) acquisition of title after the effective date of the regulations does not bar a takings claim, see id. at 2464; and (3) since there was undisputed value of a portion of his land, he was precluded from making a claim that the denial deprived him of all economic use.

2001The Supreme Court held that: (1) the claims were ripe for adjudication, see id. at 2462; (2) acquisition of title after the effective date of the regulations does not bar a takings claim, see id. at 2464; and (3) since there was undisputed value of a portion of his land, he was precluded from making a claim that the denial deprived him of all economic use.