character rule in Oregon

2025See Ingram, 313 Or at 146 (explaining that a court looks “to the character of the rule violated in the course of securing the evidence when deciding whether the rule implie[s] a right not to be prosecuted upon evidence so secured” when evaluating whether suppression under ORS 133.673 is appropriate (quoting Davis, 295 Or at 235 (brack- ets in Ingram))). 5 See State v. Reid, 319 Or 65, 71 , 872 P2d 416 (1994) (explaining that the warrant was defective under ORS 133.565(2)(b) because the text of the warrant authorized a search that was broader than the probable cause supplied by the supporting a

2025See Ingram, 313 Or at 146 (explaining that a court looks “to the character of the rule violated in the course of securing the evidence when deciding whether the rule implie[s] a right not to be prosecuted upon evidence so secured” when evaluating whether suppression under ORS 133.673 is appropriate (quoting Davis, 295 Or at 235 (brack- ets in Ingram))). 5 See State v. Reid, 319 Or 65, 71 , 872 P2d 416 (1994) (explaining that the warrant was defective under ORS 133.565(2)(b) because the text of the warrant authorized a search that was broader than the probable cause supplied by the supporting a

2025In Ingram we noted that not all statutory violations are subject to suppres- sion and explained that, in determining “which statutory violations will result in suppression,” we would look to Davis, 295 Or at 231 , and “ ‘the character of the rule violated in the course of securing the evidence when deciding whether the rule implie[s] a right not to be prosecuted upon evidence so secured,’ ” Ingram, 313 Or at 146 (quoting Davis, 295 Or at 235 (brackets in Ingram)). “[W]hen the object of the statute is to define the authority of officers to seize or to search a person or property, * * * the cour

2025In Ingram we noted that not all statutory violations are subject to suppres- sion and explained that, in determining “which statutory violations will result in suppression,” we would look to Davis, 295 Or at 231 , and “ ‘the character of the rule violated in the course of securing the evidence when deciding whether the rule implie[s] a right not to be prosecuted upon evidence so secured,’ ” Ingram, 313 Or at 146 (quoting Davis, 295 Or at 235 (brackets in Ingram)). “[W]hen the object of the statute is to define the authority of officers to seize or to search a person or property, * * * the cour

2025Our opinion holds—and we confirm on reconsider- ation—that ORS 133.545(6) requires that an affidavit in support of a warrant set forth that evidence presently be in the location to be searched, and that suppression is provided by statute because the character of the requirement con- tained in ORS 133.545(6) is a privacy protection that implies Cite as 373 Or 555 (2025) 561 a right not to be prosecuted upon evidence secured via a warrant obtained in violation of that protection.

2025Our opinion holds—and we confirm on reconsider- ation—that ORS 133.545(6) requires that an affidavit in support of a warrant set forth that evidence presently be in the location to be searched, and that suppression is provided by statute because the character of the requirement con- tained in ORS 133.545(6) is a privacy protection that implies Cite as 373 Or 555 (2025) 561 a right not to be prosecuted upon evidence secured via a warrant obtained in violation of that protection.

2014Lines v. Hill, 227 Or 474, 480 , 363 P2d 49 (1961) (concluding that the purpose of the PUC judicial review statute was “to grant to the courts a full scope of review to administer the relief appropriate to the cause”), with Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 293, 319-20 , 605 P2d 273 (1980) (explaining that, under the APA, “[i]f error is found, the statute provides for reversal, modification, or remand as appropriate to the character of the error and the agency’s further role in the matter”).

2014Lines v. Hill, 227 Or 474, 480 , 363 P2d 49 (1961) (concluding that the purpose of the PUC judicial review statute was “to grant to the courts a full scope of review to administer the relief appropriate to the cause”), with Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 293, 319-20 , 605 P2d 273 (1980) (explaining that, under the APA, “[i]f error is found, the statute provides for reversal, modification, or remand as appropriate to the character of the error and the agency’s further role in the matter”).

2014Lines v. Hill, 227 Or 474, 480 , 363 P2d 49 (1961) (concluding that the purpose of the PUC judicial review statute was “to grant to the courts a full scope of review to administer the relief appropriate to the cause”), with Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 293, 319-20 , 605 P2d 273 (1980) (explaining that, under the APA, “[i]f error is found, the statute provides for reversal, modification, or remand as appropriate to the character of the error and the agency’s further role in the matter”).

2014Lines v. Hill, 227 Or 474, 480 , 363 P2d 49 (1961) (concluding that the purpose of the PUC judicial review statute was “to grant to the courts a full scope of review to administer the relief appropriate to the cause”), with Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 293, 319-20 , 605 P2d 273 (1980) (explaining that, under the APA, “[i]f error is found, the statute provides for reversal, modification, or remand as appropriate to the character of the error and the agency’s further role in the matter”).

2025Our opinion holds—and we confirm on reconsider- ation—that ORS 133.545(6) requires that an affidavit in support of a warrant set forth that evidence presently be in the location to be searched, and that suppression is provided by statute because the character of the requirement con- tained in ORS 133.545(6) is a privacy protection that implies Cite as 373 Or 525 (2025) 531 a right not to be prosecuted upon evidence secured via a warrant obtained in violation of that protection.

2024Cite as 372 Or 618 (2024) 627 “And as I’ve said earlier, in the [c]ourt’s opinion, on a character analysis, there is sufficient evidence, the evi- dence that [defendant] is more inclined to think or act in a given way than is typical and, therefore, more likely to have acted or thought that way on a particular occasion.

1992Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, 68 Or.App. 700 , 702 n. 1, 683 P.2d 563 (1984).

1992Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, 68 Or.App. 700 , 702 n. 1, 683 P.2d 563 (1984).

1988In State v. Penney, 87 Or App 357 , 742 P2d 660 (1987), we also focused on the defendant’s attempt to avoid the police and rejected the state’s argument that the encounter was “mere conversation”: “Defendant had already demonstrated that he had no desire to engage the police in conversation when he changed directions on first sighting [the officer’s] patrol car and attempted to elude the police.

1988In State v. Penney, 87 Or App 357 , 742 P2d 660 (1987), we also focused on the defendant’s attempt to avoid the police and rejected the state’s argument that the encounter was “mere conversation”: “Defendant had already demonstrated that he had no desire to engage the police in conversation when he changed directions on first sighting [the officer’s] patrol car and attempted to elude the police.

1983From the beginning this consequence has been most obvious to courts when officers purporting to execute a judicial warrant seized evidence not covered by warrant, see State v. Slamon, supra, or when the warrant was wrongfully obtained, see State v. Sheridan, supra. A modern example in this court is State v. Jones, 279 Or 55 , 566 P2d 867 (1977), where a unanimous court suppressed evidence taken under a warrant which the issuing judge would have denied if he had been apprised of a prior court order, although the impropriety was not of constitutional magnitude.

1983From the beginning this consequence has been most obvious to courts when officers purporting to execute a judicial warrant seized evidence not covered by warrant, see State v. Slamon, supra, or when the warrant was wrongfully obtained, see State v. Sheridan, supra. A modern example in this court is State v. Jones, 279 Or 55 , 566 P2d 867 (1977), where a unanimous court suppressed evidence taken under a warrant which the issuing judge would have denied if he had been apprised of a prior court order, although the impropriety was not of constitutional magnitude.

1983In demanding a trial without such evidence, the defendant invokes rights personal to himself.” State v. McMurphy, 291 Or 782, 785 , 635 P2d 372 (1981). 11 Thus this court has looked, rather, to the character of the rule violated in the course of securing the evidence when deciding whether the rule implied a right not to be prosecuted upon evidence so secured.

1983In demanding a trial without such evidence, the defendant invokes rights personal to himself.” State v. McMurphy, 291 Or 782, 785 , 635 P2d 372 (1981). 11 Thus this court has looked, rather, to the character of the rule violated in the course of securing the evidence when deciding whether the rule implied a right not to be prosecuted upon evidence so secured.

1983From the beginning this consequence has been most obvious to courts when officers purporting to execute a judicial warrant seized evidence not covered by warrant, see State v. Slamon, supra, or when the warrant was wrongfully obtained, see State v. Sheridan, supra. A modern example in this court is State v. Jones, 279 Or 55 , 566 P2d 867 (1977), where a unanimous court suppressed evidence taken under a warrant which the issuing judge would have denied if he had been apprised of a prior court order, although the impropriety was not of constitutional magnitude.

1978He is charged with notice of the fact that a person other than his original cotenant is in possession of the land, and he is also charged with notice of the character of the claim of such person, and cannot assume that it is other than such as is indicated by the conveyance under which he holds.” Id. at 395 , quoting 4 Tiffany, Real Property 932, § 1185 (3d ed 1975).

1964In Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 173 Or 592 , 147 P2d 227 (1944) we held that although the presumption against suicide is not evidence in the strict sense, it has "evidentiary value" and an instruction revealing the evidentiary quality of the presumption must be given.

1964In Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 173 Or 592 , 147 P2d 227 (1944) we held that although the presumption against suicide is not evidence in the strict sense, it has "evidentiary value" and an instruction revealing the evidentiary quality of the presumption must be given.

1963However, in School District No. 68 v. Hoskins, 194 Or 301, 312-313 , 240 P2d 949 (1952), it was held that “inasmuch as the law requires the posting of notices, it may be implied therefrom that the legislature intended a hearing should be held.” The type of hearing intended was not specifically described.

1963However, in School District No. 68 v. Hoskins, 194 Or 301, 312-313 , 240 P2d 949 (1952), it was held that “inasmuch as the law requires the posting of notices, it may be implied therefrom that the legislature intended a hearing should be held.” The type of hearing intended was not specifically described.

1952(N.S.) 1040); Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27 ( 198 P. 377 , 18 A.L.R. 393 ); 1 Lewis on Eminent Domain, (3d Ed.) 86, § 78. *150 “It is not necessary that the owner of the property be actually dispossessed or that the property be completely destroyed in order to constitute a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provisions. [Citing cases.] “In an action of this character it is no defense-that there was no specific intention on the part of defendant to appropriate plaintiff’s property, but the defendant must be held to have intended to do those things which are the natural and o

1952(N.S.) 1040); Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27 ( 198 P. 377 , 18 A.L.R. 393 ); 1 Lewis on Eminent Domain, (3d Ed.) 86, § 78. *150 “It is not necessary that the owner of the property be actually dispossessed or that the property be completely destroyed in order to constitute a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provisions. [Citing cases.] “In an action of this character it is no defense-that there was no specific intention on the part of defendant to appropriate plaintiff’s property, but the defendant must be held to have intended to do those things which are the natural and o