character claim in Virginia

1877Accident Ass’n v. Newman, 84 Va. 52 ; Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Chambers, 93 Va. 142 . (2) Insufficient Statement Not Denmrra-"ble. — The object of sec. 3249 of the Code, which authorizes the court to require a plaintiff or defendant to slate the particulars of his claim or defense is to give the opposing party more definite information of the character of such claim or defense than is generally disclosed by the declaration, notice, or plea, and to prevent surprise.

1877Accident Ass’n v. Newman, 84 Va. 52 ; Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Chambers, 93 Va. 142 . (2) Insufficient Statement Not Denmrra-"ble. — The object of sec. 3249 of the Code, which authorizes the court to require a plaintiff or defendant to slate the particulars of his claim or defense is to give the opposing party more definite information of the character of such claim or defense than is generally disclosed by the declaration, notice, or plea, and to prevent surprise.

1927City of Richmond v. Leaker, 99 Va. 6 , 37 S. E. 348 .

1910City of Richmond v. Leaker, 99 Va. 6 , 37 S. E. 348 .

1930The appellant relies upon Adams Express Co. v. Green, 112 Va. 527 , 72 S. E. 102 , to sustain its contention that the plaintiff has been guilty of fraud in this ease and is estopped to assert that the horse claimed to have been injured was other than an ordinary horse.

1930The appellant relies upon Adams Express Co. v. Green, 112 Va. 527 , 72 S. E. 102 , to sustain its contention that the plaintiff has been guilty of fraud in this ease and is estopped to assert that the horse claimed to have been injured was other than an ordinary horse.

1923And this is perfectly well understood by the profession and by the juries; this character of instruction having been given, indeed, so often and for so long in this State, in homicide cases, that, as said in Sims’ Case, 134 Va. 736 , 115 S. E. 382 , in the opinion by Judge Burks, it is “hoary with age.” Hence, there is no conflict between such an instruction and a further proper instruction informing the jury what burden of proof rests upon the Commonwealth when they come to weigh the evidence after it is all in; and, in such case, the two instructions, when read together, are entirely harmoni

1923And this is perfectly well understood by the profession and by the juries; this character of instruction having been given, indeed, so often and for so long in this State, in homicide cases, that, as said in Sims’ Case, 134 Va. 736 , 115 S. E. 382 , in the opinion by Judge Burks, it is “hoary with age.” Hence, there is no conflict between such an instruction and a further proper instruction informing the jury what burden of proof rests upon the Commonwealth when they come to weigh the evidence after it is all in; and, in such case, the two instructions, when read together, are entirely harmoni

1916Dec. 108 ; Drumright v. Hite, 2 Va. Dec. 465 , 26 S. E. 583—as to general subject of the character of claim of title which may support adverse possession in Virginia.) Otherwise the statute of limitations would not run in favor of possession under a bona fide claim of title when possession is taken beyond the bounds of the true title, and no honest man could acquire title under such statute.

1916Dec. 108 ; Drumright v. Hite, 2 Va. Dec. 465 , 26 S. E. 583—as to general subject of the character of claim of title which may support adverse possession in Virginia.) Otherwise the statute of limitations would not run in favor of possession under a bona fide claim of title when possession is taken beyond the bounds of the true title, and no honest man could acquire title under such statute.

1908The exception does refer to the evidence set out in bills of exceptions Eos. 1, 2 and 3, and the contract set out in Eo. 8, but as the admissibility of the evidence objected to depended largely, if not altogether, upon what evidence had preceded it, the exception left this court without a “clear apprehension of the propriety or impropriety of the ruling made by the court,” thus violating the rule announced in Kimball & Fink v. Carter, 95 Va. 77 , 27 S. E. 823 , 38 L.

1908The exception does refer to the evidence set out in bills of exceptions Eos. 1, 2 and 3, and the contract set out in Eo. 8, but as the admissibility of the evidence objected to depended largely, if not altogether, upon what evidence had preceded it, the exception left this court without a “clear apprehension of the propriety or impropriety of the ruling made by the court,” thus violating the rule announced in Kimball & Fink v. Carter, 95 Va. 77 , 27 S. E. 823 , 38 L.