character rule in North Carolina

2002Ed. 2d 232 (1991); State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 279-80 , 283 S.E.2d 761, 780-81 (1981) (holding that although the defendant stipulated to the fact of his prior conviction, the state could introduce testimony concerning the murder at sentencing because “ ‘the purpose for considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances is to engage in a character analysis of the defendant to ascertain whether the ultimate penalty is called for in his or her particular case’ ”) (quoting Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1977)), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213 , 77 L.

1998In this case the prosecutor quoted State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 280 , 283 S.E.2d 761, 780 (1981), cert, denied, 463 U.S. 1213 , 77 L.

2002Ed. 2d 232 (1991); State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 279-80 , 283 S.E.2d 761, 780-81 (1981) (holding that although the defendant stipulated to the fact of his prior conviction, the state could introduce testimony concerning the murder at sentencing because “ ‘the purpose for considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances is to engage in a character analysis of the defendant to ascertain whether the ultimate penalty is called for in his or her particular case’ ”) (quoting Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1977)), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213 , 77 L.

1998In this case the prosecutor quoted State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 280 , 283 S.E.2d 761, 780 (1981), cert, denied, 463 U.S. 1213 , 77 L.

2007App. 369 , 305 S.E.2d 45 (1983), aff'd, 311 N.C. 277 , 316 S.E.2d 55 (1984), a medical negligence case in which this Court held that the admission of evidence to bolster the defendant doctor’s character was error, 63 N.C.

2007App. 369 , 305 S.E.2d 45 (1983), aff'd, 311 N.C. 277 , 316 S.E.2d 55 (1984), a medical negligence case in which this Court held that the admission of evidence to bolster the defendant doctor’s character was error, 63 N.C.

2007App. 369 , 305 S.E.2d 45 (1983), aff'd, 311 N.C. 277 , 316 S.E.2d 55 (1984), a medical negligence case in which this Court held that the admission of evidence to bolster the defendant doctor’s character was error, 63 N.C.

2007App. 369 , 305 S.E.2d 45 (1983), aff'd, 311 N.C. 277 , 316 S.E.2d 55 (1984), a medical negligence case in which this Court held that the admission of evidence to bolster the defendant doctor’s character was error, 63 N.C.

2001Id. at 739-41 , 96 L.

2001Id. at 739-41 , 96 L.

1980State v. Burell, 252 N.C. 115 , 113 S.E. 2d 16 (1960); State v. Bridgers, 233 N.C. 577 , 64 S.E. 2d 867 (1951); State v. Jones, 35 N.C.

1980State v. Burell, 252 N.C. 115 , 113 S.E. 2d 16 (1960); State v. Bridgers, 233 N.C. 577 , 64 S.E. 2d 867 (1951); State v. Jones, 35 N.C.

1980State v. Burell, 252 N.C. 115 , 113 S.E. 2d 16 (1960); State v. Bridgers, 233 N.C. 577 , 64 S.E. 2d 867 (1951); State v. Jones, 35 N.C.

1980State v. Burell, 252 N.C. 115 , 113 S.E. 2d 16 (1960); State v. Bridgers, 233 N.C. 577 , 64 S.E. 2d 867 (1951); State v. Jones, 35 N.C.

1980State v. Burell, 252 N.C. 115 , 113 S.E. 2d 16 (1960); State v. Bridgers, 233 N.C. 577 , 64 S.E. 2d 867 (1951); State v. Jones, 35 N.C.

1963S. v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470 , 53 S.E. 2d 853 ; S. v. Choate, 228 N.C. 491 , 46 S.E. 2d 476 ; S. v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697 , 28 S.E. 2d 232 ; S. v. Smith, supra. This assignment of error is sustained.

1963S. v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470 , 53 S.E. 2d 853 ; S. v. Choate, 228 N.C. 491 , 46 S.E. 2d 476 ; S. v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697 , 28 S.E. 2d 232 ; S. v. Smith, supra. This assignment of error is sustained.

1963But to reason thus from one crime to another is a clear violation of the character rule; hence if the first act has no other relevancy than that, it may not be proved.” In S. v. Graham, 121 N.C. 623 , 28 S.E. 409 , this Court said: “Evidence of a distinct, substantive offense cannot be admitted in support *524 of another offense, as a general rule. * * “It is when the transactions are so connected or contemporaneous as to form a continuing action that evidence of the collateral offense will be heard to prove the intent of the offense charged.” In the case of S. v. Smith, 204 N.C. 638 , 169 S.E

1963But to reason thus from one crime to another is a clear violation of the character rule; hence if the first act has no other relevancy than that, it may not be proved.” In S. v. Graham, 121 N.C. 623 , 28 S.E. 409 , this Court said: “Evidence of a distinct, substantive offense cannot be admitted in support *524 of another offense, as a general rule. * * “It is when the transactions are so connected or contemporaneous as to form a continuing action that evidence of the collateral offense will be heard to prove the intent of the offense charged.” In the case of S. v. Smith, 204 N.C. 638 , 169 S.E

1963But to reason thus from one crime to another is a clear violation of the character rule; hence if the first act has no other relevancy than that, it may not be proved.” In S. v. Graham, 121 N.C. 623 , 28 S.E. 409 , this Court said: “Evidence of a distinct, substantive offense cannot be admitted in support *524 of another offense, as a general rule. * * “It is when the transactions are so connected or contemporaneous as to form a continuing action that evidence of the collateral offense will be heard to prove the intent of the offense charged.” In the case of S. v. Smith, 204 N.C. 638 , 169 S.E

1963But to reason thus from one crime to another is a clear violation of the character rule; hence if the first act has no other relevancy than that, it may not be proved.” In S. v. Graham, 121 N.C. 623 , 28 S.E. 409 , this Court said: “Evidence of a distinct, substantive offense cannot be admitted in support *524 of another offense, as a general rule. * * “It is when the transactions are so connected or contemporaneous as to form a continuing action that evidence of the collateral offense will be heard to prove the intent of the offense charged.” In the case of S. v. Smith, 204 N.C. 638 , 169 S.E

1963S. v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470 , 53 S.E. 2d 853 ; S. v. Choate, 228 N.C. 491 , 46 S.E. 2d 476 ; S. v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697 , 28 S.E. 2d 232 ; S. v. Smith, supra. This assignment of error is sustained.

1963S. v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470 , 53 S.E. 2d 853 ; S. v. Choate, 228 N.C. 491 , 46 S.E. 2d 476 ; S. v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697 , 28 S.E. 2d 232 ; S. v. Smith, supra. This assignment of error is sustained.

1963S. v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470 , 53 S.E. 2d 853 ; S. v. Choate, 228 N.C. 491 , 46 S.E. 2d 476 ; S. v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697 , 28 S.E. 2d 232 ; S. v. Smith, supra. This assignment of error is sustained.

1963S. v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470 , 53 S.E. 2d 853 ; S. v. Choate, 228 N.C. 491 , 46 S.E. 2d 476 ; S. v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697 , 28 S.E. 2d 232 ; S. v. Smith, supra. This assignment of error is sustained.

1961The fact that defendants listed and paid the taxes is evidence of the character of their claim, Faulcon v. Johnston, 102 N.C. 264 , but it is no evidence of actual possession.

1948But to reason thus from one crime to another is .a clear violation of the character rule; hence if the first act has no other relevancy than that, it may not be proved.” See also S. v. Beam, 184 N. C., 730 , 115 S. E., 176 .

1948But to reason thus from one crime to another is .a clear violation of the character rule; hence if the first act has no other relevancy than that, it may not be proved.” See also S. v. Beam, 184 N. C., 730 , 115 S. E., 176 .

1939Stiles v. Newport, 76 Vt., 154 , 56 Atl., 662 .

1939Stiles v. Newport, 76 Vt., 154 , 56 Atl., 662 .

1909This interpretation of the words, “proof to the satisfaction of the jury,” is- fully supported in a later opinion of the Court, in Chaffin v. Manufacturing Co., 135 N. C., 95 , where, in an action to recover for damages caused by the erection and maintenance of a dam, the trial judge had charged the jury that “It is not sufficient for plaintiffs to show that their land has been damaged; -they must further prove to the satisfaction of the jury that this damage was caused by the erection of the dam.” It was objected that this required of plaintiffs a greater degree of proof than the law imposed

1909Tbe main purpose of this decision was to withdraw an issue of this character from the principle announced in Ely v. Early, 94 N. C., 1 , that in a certain class of cases, notably where it was soug’bt to correct or alter a written deed, or superimpose a trust thereon by parol, the proof must be clear, strong and convincing, and place it within the rule which ordinarily obtains in the determination of civil issues — that is, by the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence; the language of the opinion on the point in question being as follows: “But, on the other band, when the relief deman

1906And in Goodell’s case, 39 Wis., 232 , the headnote states the principle contended for by protestants with a quaere, and the body of the opinion requires that it should be so stated.

1906And in Goodell's case , 39 Wis. 232 , the headnote states the principle contended for by protestants with a quaere , and the body of the opinion requires that it should be so stated.

1906This was held in Stallings v. Ellis, 136 N. C., 69 , and the facts stated and the entire opinion show that the decision was made to depend on the relationship .between the parties as members of one and the same household and family.